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## • News digest for October

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LONGMAN





# AFRICA

## SOUTH AFRICA

### Formation of Freedom Alliance

Negotiations on the interim constitution continued at the multiparty negotiating forum during October, preparing the way for the convening of the transitional executive council (TEC) before the end of the year [see p. 39622]. However, right-wing groups continued to boycott the forum while at the same time demanding recognition within the negotiating process as a third force with the same standing as the government and the African National Congress (ANC) [see pp. 39497; 39542; 39584-85]. The Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG—see p. 39542), re-launching itself on Oct. 7 as the "Freedom Alliance", announced the suspension of all bilateral negotiations with the government and with the ANC.

Leaders of the Alliance were Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the *Inkatha* Freedom Party, Ferdi Hartzenberg of the Conservative Party (CP), Gen. (ret'd) Constand Viljoen of the *Afrikaner Volksunie* (Afrikaner National Front), and the rulers of the nominally independent Bophuthatswana and Ciskei bantustans ("homelands"), Lucas Mangope and Brig. Joshua Oupa Gqozo. Its main declared objective was to negotiate a constitution entrenching the right to self-determination. It called for the abandonment of the multiparty negotiating forum in favour of a new national convention of all major leaders, and rejected the establishment of the TEC.

While expressing the desire that all parties should participate in the negotiating forum and the TEC, both the government and the ANC were reluctant to accede to the Freedom Alliance's demands. On Oct. 11, following an apparently unsuccessful meeting to encourage Alliance leaders to return to the talks, State President F. W. de Klerk warned that if agreement on an interim constitution could not be reached within four weeks a referendum to test national commitment to democratic reform could be the only means of moving forward. In response the ANC said that a referendum "could only be considered" as a means of endorsing a negotiated settlement, but urged parties within the negotiating forum to agree on an interim constitution without delay, despite the absence of the Freedom Alliance.

### Hani murder trial - Death sentences

On Oct. 14, at the end of a 10-day non-jury trial in the Rand Supreme Court, Janusz Walus and Clive Derby-Lewis were convicted of the murder of Chris Hani, the leading figure in the ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) who was shot dead in April [see pp. 39398; 39446]. A third defendant, Gaye Derby-Lewis (who had been released on bail in August—see p. 39585), was acquitted.

Presiding judge C. F. Eloff found Walus guilty of murder and illegal possession of a firearm, stating that the case against the Polish-born emigré was overwhelming. Clive Derby-Lewis, a prominent member of the CP, was pronounced guilty on the grounds that it was he who had supplied the murder weapon. Gaye Derby-Lewis, whose testimony the judge described as "unacceptable and far-fetched", was nevertheless acquitted because he had been unable to discern sufficient hard evidence against her. The defendants were acquitted on an additional charge of conspiring to murder ANC president Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo of the SACP and six other people whose names had been found on a list at the home of Walus [see pp. 39398; 39446].

The ANC reacted angrily to the acquittal of Gaye Derby-Lewis and later announced that it reserved the right to retry her.

On Oct. 15 Eloff sentenced the two men to death—the "ultimate penalty" for the "cowardly, cold-blooded" murder. He said that neither defendant had shown any remorse and that they knew that the killing was likely to cause "chaos, anarchy and widespread bloodshed". The severity of the sentences was welcomed by the ANC, and by hundreds of ANC and SACP supporters outside the court, although a senior ANC official restated the organization's opposition to the death penalty [see also p. 39498].

### Lifting of UN economic sanctions - International recognition

The UN General Assembly on Oct. 8 adopted by consensus a resolution lifting economic sanctions against South Africa. Responding to Mandela's September appeal [see p. 39622], the Assembly ended all prohibitions and restrictions on economic relations with South Africa and its nationals. It also decided that the oil embargo would be lifted as soon as the TEC became operational. The 1977 mandatory arms embargo was not affected by the resolution.

During the month several countries took steps to normalize their relations with South Africa. China, Russia and South Korea were among those countries to resume economic and trade links while Algeria, Ireland and Swaziland announced the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Growing international recognition of progress in South Africa was symbolized by the award of the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize to Mandela and de Klerk on Oct. 15 [see p. 39714].

### SADF raid on Umtata

In an operation authorized by de Klerk, a commando unit of the South African Defence Force (SADF) raided a house in Umtata, capital of the Transkei bantustan, on Oct. 8, killing five people. According to the SADF the house was being used by the Azanian People's Lib-

eration Army (APLA), the armed wing of the Pan-African Congress (PAC), responsible for a series of attacks on white civilians during 1993 [see p. 39446].

In a statement the SADF said that it had acted on intelligence from "sources in the custody of the South African police" which had indicated that the house was being used as a "springboard for criminal acts of terror". It said that the people in the house were killed when they offered resistance. It also claimed that arms and ammunition had been recovered from the scene. The PAC confirmed that the house was owned by a PAC member, but denied that it was being used as an APLA base. It said that all the victims were juveniles who had been shot in the head by soldiers using sub-machine guns fitted with silencers.

Although the raid won the support of right-wing groups, it was condemned by the ANC and its allies, Mandela describing the attack as "an act of thuggery". The action was also censured by the UN Observer Mission in South Africa [see p. 39037], the Organization of African Unity, and the Commonwealth.

The Transkei authorities reacted angrily to the raid, maintaining that the territory was not being used as a base for terrorist activities. On Oct. 17, following reports that the South African embassy in Umtata had been used to co-ordinate the raid, Maj.-Gen. Bantu Holomisa, military ruler of the nominally independent Transkei, ordered the expulsion of the South African ambassador and the SADF personnel guarding the embassy.

### Conviction of Terreblanche

On Oct. 27 Eugene Terreblanche, leader of the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), was convicted of charges of public violence arising from his part in an attack on a rally addressed by President de Klerk in Ventersdorp in August 1991 [see pp. 38376-77].

A Potchefstroom magistrate imposed a fine of 12,500 rand (about US\$3,000) and an 18-month suspended prison term after Terreblanche promised not to commit the offence again. The 10 other defendants were also found guilty, although only one was imprisoned—Albertus Buitendag, who received a five-year term after the court found that he had been responsible for much of the shooting.

■ Last article pp. 39622-23; reference article pp. R21-22.

## SWAZILAND

### General election

Elections to the House of Assembly, the lower house of an expanded *Libandla* (parliament), took place on a non-party basis over two rounds on Sept. 18 and Oct. 11.

Only three Cabinet ministers were re-elected, while Prime Minister Obed Dlamini was eliminated in the second round of voting; the 12 other members of the Cabinet either failed to be re-elected or were disqualified from participating because of new regulations preventing members of the royal family from standing.



The three ministers who did win seats were Themba M. Masuku (Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives in the outgoing Cabinet), Solomon Dlamini (Economic Planning and Development) and Albert Nhlanhla Shabangu (Transport and Communication).

As a result of Prime Minister Dlamini's defeat, the King was on Oct. 25 compelled to appoint an acting Prime Minister with responsibility for all 16 ministries, namely Andreas Fakudze. A new Prime Minister and Cabinet were expected to be named in early November.

The 55 elective members of the House of Assembly (compared with 40 at dissolution) were for the first time directly elected, with voters electing one representative from each of the *Tinkhundla* (traditional assemblies). A further 10 members of the Assembly were to be appointed by King Mswati III. The King was also expected to appoint 20 members of the Senate (10 at dissolution); a further 10 members were to be elected from among its own membership by the House of Assembly. This process was expected to be completed by early November.

■ Last article pp. 39134; 39500; 39588; 39629; reference article pp. R23-24.

## ANGOLA

### Lusaka peace talks

The rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) made a series of apparent concessions during October in talks with the UN and the three international observers to the Angolan peace process—Portugal, Russia and the USA. This resulted in some optimism that direct peace talks between UNITA and the Angolan government, adjourned in May [see p. 39447], could resume early in November.

On Oct. 6 UNITA announced that it was prepared to recognize the results of the September 1992 general election [see pp. 39082; 39128-29], although it maintained that they had been "fraudulent". UNITA further accepted the validity of the May 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord [see p. 38180], although adding that the agreement needed updating, and stated that it considered the Abidjan Protocol [see pp. 39399-400; 39447] as a "serious basis" for negotiations with the government. It said that it "took note" of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Angolan conflict [see pp. 39350; 39497; 39623], asserted its readiness to co-operate with Alioune Blondin Beye, the UN representative in Angola, and committed itself to maintaining its unilateral ceasefire which had been declared on Sept. 20 [see p. 39623].

The government reacted to the UNITA statement with scepticism. On Oct. 8 President José Eduardo dos Santos described it as "ambiguous and contradictory" and a "manoeuvre to gain time and recover positions lost on the battlefield". However, he did not discount the possibility of negotiations with the rebels. Speaking the following day he called for a preliminary meeting between representatives of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM-2), the troika of observers, and UNITA, to clarify UNITA's position. He was particularly concerned

to obtain explanations of (i) UNITA's reservations regarding the 1992 election results; (ii) its intention to "update" the Bicesse Accord; and (iii) the meaning of its statement that it had only "taken note" of the UN resolutions. He also restated the government's view that negotiations could only take place once UNITA had withdrawn from territory occupied since the outbreak of renewed fighting in October 1992.

On Oct. 25-27, in response to the government request, a series of meetings between UNITA, UNAVEM and the international observers took place in Lusaka, Zambia. UN representative Beye expressed optimism on Oct. 27 that direct talks between the two sides were imminent. Although he was not prepared to give details, he said that the dos Santos government had been satisfied with the explanations provided by UNITA, and that UNITA had undertaken to discuss with the government the ways and means of vacating occupied territory, as well as the demobilization of its troops and its transformation into a political party.

### Arrival of aid in Kuito

Food aid from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) arrived on Oct. 21 in Kuito, which had been besieged by UNITA for nine months. The aid flight, the first since the start of the siege, had been delayed for three days as a result of a dispute between the UN and UNITA, the latter having sought unsuccessfully to insist that its troops should inspect all aircraft carrying emergency supplies.

UN officials who had entered the city prior to the arrival of the aid described Kuito as a vast cemetery in desperate need. Manuel Aranda de Silva, the head of the UN emergency co-ordination operation, said that the situation in Kuito was worse than anywhere else in the country, with 25,000 dead and every building damaged by shelling [see also p. 39623].

■ Last article p. 39623; reference article p. R3.

## MOZAMBIQUE

### Visit by Boutros-Ghali - Agreement between Chissano and Dhlakama

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced a major breakthrough in the peace process on Oct. 20 after talks in Maputo with President Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or Renamo). In September the UN Security Council had urged both sides to maintain the momentum towards implementing the October 1992 General Peace Accord [see p. 39129].

Giving details of the agreement reached by Chissano and Dhlakama at the end of a four-day visit, Boutros-Ghali said that they had concurred on the creation of an Electoral Commission which would consist of 10 members from the government, seven from Renamo and three from other opposition parties; members of the Commission would choose an independent chairman. Meanwhile, a draft electoral law would be ready for sub-

mission to the Assembly of the Republic by the end of November.

Boutros-Ghali also disclosed that disputes delaying the demobilization of paramilitary forces [see pp. 39400; 39498; 39623] had been resolved, and that a new timetable for demobilization would be ready shortly. Regarding the composition of the three peace accord commissions, he said that the two sides had settled differences by agreeing that the commission overseeing liaison between the government and Renamo-controlled areas, known as the Commission for Administration, would be chaired in rotation by the government and Renamo.

On Oct. 22 the Supervision and Control Commission, appointed under the terms of the 1992 peace accord, approved a new election timetable stipulating the approval of the electoral law by the end of November; the holding of a general election in October 1994; the demobilization of troops between January and May 1994; and the establishment of a fully operational army by September 1994.

■ Last article p. 39623; reference article pp. R16-17.

## MALAWI

### Formation of Presidential Council

Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, believed to be in his 90s, underwent emergency surgery on Oct. 2 in a hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa, to drain excess fluid from his brain.

Banda's incapacity gave rise to measures under Sections 13 and 16 of the Constitution which allowed for the formation of a Presidential Council to exercise executive power in his absence.

On Oct. 13, having rejected opposition demands for the election of an interim "neutral" president, the Office of the President announced that a three-member Presidential Council had been formed. It would be chaired (as required by the Constitution) by the secretary-general of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), Gwanda Chakuamba, and would also include MCP veterans John Tembo, Minister of State in the President's Office and party treasurer-general, and Robson Chirwa, Minister of Transport and Communications and northern regional party chairman.

A former opponent of Banda, Chakuamba had been sentenced in March 1981 to 22 years' imprisonment for anti-government activities and plotting to assassinate Banda [see pp. 30729; 31540]. Released suddenly in July 1993, he had then defected from the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) and was appointed by an MCP convention on Oct. 6 as MCP secretary-general, filling the post left vacant since the death in 1983 of its previous incumbent, Dick Tennyson Matenje [see p. 32417]. It was not clear whether his appointment had the blessing of Banda or whether it was the initiative of senior party leaders to avert a constitutional crisis. It was widely believed that by co-opting a former critic, the MCP leadership was also hoping to gain support in the south, a UDF stronghold and home of Chakuamba.



**Return of Banda - Release of prisoners**

Banda returned from Johannesburg on Oct. 24 and on Oct. 26 the Presidential Council, ostensibly to mark his return, ordered the immediate release of 429 prisoners.

■ Last article p. 39628; reference article pp. R14-15.

**BURUNDI****Abortive military coup**


A wave of tribal violence swept the country following an abortive coup by army paratroopers who killed President Melchior Ndadaye and six senior ministers, including one of the two Deputy Prime Ministers, on Oct. 21. The failure of the coup was confirmed on Oct. 28 after Prime Minister Sylvie Kinigi, who had sought refuge with some other ministers in the French embassy in Bujumbura, emerged from hiding to announce that she had regained control of the government.

The coup, the bloodiest since independence in 1962, appeared to have been planned by dissident officers belonging to the historically dominant minority Tutsi tribe after Ndadaye became the first member of the majority Hutu tribe to be elected President [see p. 39496 for his landslide election victory in June]. Ndadaye, leader of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), had ousted Pierre Buyoya, head of the *Union pour le progrès national* (UPRONA) which had been in power for 31 years and was backed almost entirely by Tutsis.

It was unclear how much support the coup commanded among the Tutsi-dominated armed forces. Some reports suggested that the Army Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Jean Bikomagu, had colluded with the plotters but panicked when confronted with the scale of the violence unleashed. On Oct. 24 Bikomagu disowned the plotters and appealed to the government to regain control of the administration while urging it to "examine the question of amnesty for those who participated in the coup". The army's loyalty to the government and its disavowal of any political ambition were reiterated by a military spokesman on Oct. 25. Earlier, troops had disbanded the National Committee of Public Salvation established by the coup leaders, who named François Ngeze, Interior Minister in the government of former President Buyoya, as its head. Ngeze, a Hutu, had reportedly been chosen to show that the coup was not ethnically motivated.

**Reports of tribal violence**

The depth of the political crisis was compounded by reports of widespread tribally motivated atrocities. On Oct. 23 French radio reported that the Tutsi-dominated army had started "eliminating" Hutu intellectuals and prominent figures in Kayanza, 20 km from the border with Rwanda. A fierce Hutu backlash was reported on Oct. 25 when hundreds of Tutsi peasants were massacred in Kakuzi and Gitega, east of Bujumbura. Subsequent reports on Oct. 28 said that at least 400 people



had died in tribal violence around the northern town of Karuzi, and that 100 Tutsi women and children had been burned alive by marauding Hutus in the village of Banga.

**Refugee crisis**

On Oct. 29 the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that more than 500,000 refugees had fled the country since the attempted coup to escape the killings. An estimated 342,000 had crossed into Rwanda, 214,000 into Tanzania and 21,000 into Zaïre. The UNHCR appealed for some US\$3,000,000-US\$4,000,000 in relief assistance for the refugees.

**International reaction**

The coup and the violence it generated met with strong condemnation from the UN Security Council, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the European Communities (EC), some of whose members threatened to impose economic sanctions against Burundi. On Oct. 28 the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, James Jonah, who arrived in Burundi as the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, said that the UN would consider plans to ensure the safety of government ministers. The statement came amid reports that some ministers, still fearing for their lives, had refused to leave the French embassy.

On Oct. 29 a regional summit held in Kigali, Rwanda, attended by the leaders of Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaïre, endorsed a plan for an African "stabilization force" to restore democracy in Burundi.

■ Last article pp. 39547; 39629; reference article p. R6.

**RWANDA****Launch of UN mission**

The UN Security Council on Oct. 4 unanimously adopted Resolution 872, establishing the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement signed in August by the government and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) [see p. 39586].

The mission was expected to start operations at the beginning of November, by which time the Military Observer Group (GOM) deployed by the Organiza-

tion of Africa Unity (OAU) in July 1992 [see p. 38996], and the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) established in August 1993 [see p. 39586], were to have been integrated into the new force. UNAMIR was expected to consist of 2,500 military personnel when fully fielded. Its mandate included monitoring observance of the ceasefire; assisting in ensuring the security of Kigali and that of the transitional government; and investigating and reporting on incidents regarding the activities of the police and gendarmerie. It was also called upon to monitor the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of displaced people, and to assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities.

■ Last article p. 39586; reference article pp. R18-19.

**ZAÏRE****Deadlock in talks on transitional government**

Although agreement had been reached by all parties on Sept. 30, to adopt new constitutional arrangements to end the period of competing claims to government authority [see pp. 39623-24], the talks aimed at finalizing details of an interim constitution apparently reached an impasse in October.

Members of the former Sacred Union were reportedly insisting that a transitional government should be headed by Etienne Tshisekedi, elected Prime Minister by the National Conference in August 1992 [see p. 39039]. This demand rejected by representatives of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who pointed out that Tshisekedi's claim was based the authority of the National Conference, which had itself been superseded under the September 1993 agreement.

On Oct. 15 the UN Secretary-General's special envoy overseeing the negotiations, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, left Kinshasa after a two-week stay with no protocol based on the September agreement having been signed.

An official announcement on behalf of the Mobutu-backed government of Prime Minister Faustin Birindwa, issued on Oct. 5, said that Mpinga Kasenda, Minister of External Relations in the Birindwa government, had been recognized by the 48th session of the UN General Assembly as head of Zaïre's official delegation. In September the Birindwa government had contested the claim of the Tshisekedi government to represent Zaïre [see p. 39624].

**Monetary reform**

The Birindwa government on Oct. 21 announced the introduction of a new currency, the new zaïre (NZ), valued at NZ 1.00=Z 3,000,000.00. The new currency, aimed at supporting monetary reform initiated by the Bank of Zaïre, coincided with the steep fall in the market value of the old zaïre which stood at around US\$1.00=Z 7,000,000 in early October, compared with US\$1.00=Z 1,955,614 as at Dec. 31, 1992.

■ Last article pp. 39623-24; reference article pp. R25-26.



## CONGO

### Election re-run

Second-round voting in the legislative elections was repeated in all 11 contested constituencies on Oct. 3, in line with the agreement in August to end the election crisis [see p. 39584]. The opposition, led by the Union for Democratic Renewal—Congolese Labour Party (URD-PCT) coalition, having called off its boycott of the election process, won seven of the seats whose results had been disputed [see pp. 39495-96]. Despite these gains however, final results of the elections, released on Oct. 10, indicated an absolute majority in the National Assembly for supporters of President Pascal Lissouba, with the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) and its allies taking 65 of the 125 seats.

Commentators noted that the second-round re-run would not necessarily mark the end of the controversial election process, as, despite the objections of the Senate (the upper house of the bicameral legislature), a team of international magistrates was continuing to study 56 petitions arising from the first round in May [see pp. 39448; 39584; 39624].

■ Last article p. 39624; reference article p. R8.

### Complete results of Congo legislative elections

| Party   | Seats      |
|---|------------|
| Pan-African Union for Social Democracy                    | 47         |
| Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development | 28         |
| Congolese Labour Party                                    | 15         |
| Rally for Democratic and Social Progress                  | 10         |
| Rally for Democracy and Development                       | 6          |
| Union of Democratic Forces                                | 3          |
| Union for Democracy and the Republic                      | 2          |
| Congolese Party for Renewal                               | 2          |
| Union for Democratic Renewal                              | 2          |
| Union of Congolese Democracy                              | 1          |
| Patriotic Union for National Renewal                      | 1          |
| Union for Development and Social Progress                 | 1          |
| Patriotic Union for National Renewal                      | 1          |
| Other parties   | 4          |
| Independents  | 2          |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>125</b> |

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

### Legislative election results

Final results published on Oct. 9 for the parliamentary elections held over two rounds in August and September [see pp. 39583-84; 39624] confirmed that the Central African People's Liberation Party, the party of newly elected President Ange-Felix Patasse, had secured by far the largest number of seats in the National Assembly but did not command an

### CAR legislative elections

| Party   | Seats     |
|---|-----------|
| Central African People's Liberation Party                               | 34        |
| Central African Democratic Rally  | 13        |
| Patriotic Front for Progress  | 7         |
| Liberal Democratic Party  | 7         |
| Alliance for Democracy and Progress                                     | 6         |
| *David Dacko movement   | 6         |
| National Convention   | 3         |
| Social Democratic Party   | 3         |
| Movement for Social Evolution in Black Africa                           | 1         |
| Civic Forum   | 1         |
| Central African Republican Party  | 1         |
| Movement for Democracy, the Renaissance and Evolution of Central Africa | 1         |
| Independents  | 2         |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>85</b> |

\*Nominally independent candidates supporting David Dacko.

absolute majority. The second largest number of seats was won by the Central African Democratic Rally, the former sole legal party led by former President André Kolingba, ahead of the Patriotic Front for Progress, part of the Consultative Group of Democratic Forces and led by Patasse's main rival in the presidential elections, Abel Goumba.

### New Prime Minister

On Oct. 25 Patasse announced the appointment of Jean-Luc Mandaba as Prime Minister. A member of the presidential party, Mandaba had served in the Kolingba government as Minister of Health in 1981-1982 before being imprisoned. He promised to appoint an alliance government and said that he had already met with representatives of various of the parliamentary parties to discuss his coalition plans.

■ Last article p. 39624; reference article p. R7.

## EQUATORIAL GUINEEA

### Deteriorating relations with Spain

Relations with Spain, which had recently come under strain [see p. 39583], deteriorated further with the expulsion of seven Spanish nationals whom the government accused on Oct. 21 of spying and of entering the country without visas. The Spanish ambassador in the capital, Malabo, and the Spanish consul in Bata were also accused of "interference in Guinean internal affairs".

Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana Madariaga said in Madrid on Oct. 21 that the Equatorial Guinean regime was "obsessed with the idea that Spain wanted to interfere in its affairs". He warned, however, that Spain would reconsider financial aid to Equatorial Guinea if legislative elections scheduled for November did not take place.

### Expulsion of UN ambassador

Equatorial Guinea's permanent representative at the UN and accredited representative at other international organizations in Geneva, Marcelo Engoga Motulu, was officially requested on Oct. 13 to leave Switzerland after being declared persona non grata by the Swiss government for failure to honour huge debts which he had accumulated. A Guinean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Motulu had left Switzerland on Oct. 6.

■ Last article p. 39624; reference article pp. R9-10.

## NIGERIA

### Hijack of jet to Niger

A Nigerian Airways aircraft with 150 people aboard was hijacked en route from Lagos to Abuja on Oct. 25 and forced to fly to Niamey, the capital of neighbouring Niger. On Oct. 28, with 20 hostages still being held, Niger army commandos stormed the aircraft; the four hijackers were captured but one of the hostages, a co-pilot, was killed in the operation. The commandos were supported by French troops, and Israeli security forces were also reportedly on the scene on behalf of the Nigerian government.

The hijackers had claimed to be supporters of Moshood Kashimawo Olawale "MKO" Abiola, the presumed winner of Nigeria's aborted June presidential elections [see p. 39494]. Claiming membership of the hitherto unknown Movement for the Advancement of Democracy, they called for the Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Adegunle Shonekan to step down immediately in favour of Abiola. Abiola had immediately distanced himself from their action, condemning the hijacking and calling on them to surrender.

### Announcement of SDP election boycott

A communiqué issued on Oct. 13 at the end of a two-day meeting signalled a reconciliation within the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had previously been divided in its support for Abiola [see p. 39625]. The national leadership declared that Abiola had won the June 12 election "freely and fairly", and said that until he was sworn in as President the party would boycott the election process completely.

In contrast the National Republican Convention (NRC) on Oct. 19 reaffirmed its rejection of the June 12 election, declaring that the country could not be "held to ransom" by "personal political ambition". It confirmed that it would be accepting a government grant of N 100 million to contest the forthcoming presidential and local government elections. Details of the grants, available to both parties, were published on Oct. 5.

### Return of Akinloye

Chief Augustus Adisa Akinloye, who had been chairman of the now defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the ruling party during the period of the Second Republic (1979-1983), returned from exile on Oct. 9.



Akinloye had left the country in the wake of the coup on Dec. 31, 1983, which toppled the four-year civilian regime of President Shehu Shagari [see p. 32841; 33259].

Earlier in the month Richard Akinjide, a Minister of Justice in Shagari's government and a powerful member of the NPN, also responded to calls for the return of exiles.

■ Last article pp. 39624-25; reference article p. R18.

## BENIN

### Realignment of parliamentary forces

President Nicéphore Soglo's support in the National Assembly was seriously compromised when 15 of his erstwhile supporters announced on Oct. 11 their intention to form an independent movement. The defectors included Théophile Behanzin-Paoletti, hitherto leader of *Renouveau*, a parliamentary grouping established in March 1992 to support the President and based around his *Union pour la triomphe du renouveau démocratique* (UTRD).

The breakaway group accused Soglo of ignoring the National Assembly and indulging in the "solitary exercise" of power, complaining that he had left on a private visit to France without presenting to the Assembly the Cabinet changes made in September [see pp. 39625-26].

The 64-member Assembly now comprised 19 deputies supporting Soglo, 15 in the new breakaway group, 12 unaffiliated opposition deputies, and 18 deputies associated with the Democracy and Solidarity grouping who described themselves as "moderates".

■ Last article pp. 39625-26; reference article pp. R3-4.

## SIERRA LEONE

### Arrest of coup suspects

On Oct. 19 the acting inspector-general of police, S. L. Lamin Bangura, reported the arrest of four suspected mercenaries, carrying UK passports, following the discovery of an alleged coup plot.

Lamin Bangura said that the four men, of Vietnamese and Chinese descent, had been arrested on Oct. 14 in a combined police and military intelligence operation, and that he had reason to believe that they were mercenaries hired by what he described as "disgruntled Sierra Leoneans and businessmen abroad" to facilitate a coup attempt scheduled to take place on Oct. 16.

■ Last article p. 39544; reference article p. R20.

## GUINEA

### Death toll in September demonstration

According to a communiqué issued on Oct. 6 by the leadership of *Changement démocratique* (CD), a grouping of 30 opposition parties, demonstrations on Sept. 28-29 [see p. 39626] left 63 people dead and 405 wounded.

These figures conflicted with the official death toll announced on Sept. 30 which indicated that 18 people had died and 198 were wounded during the clashes between opposition protesters and the police. The CD statement called for the institution of a transitional national government, and demanded an international commission of inquiry into the deaths, which it described as "unjustified repression".

### Multiparty talks

In the run-up to presidential elections due on Dec. 5, round table discussions were held on Oct. 13 between President Lansana Conte and representatives of all registered parties. At this first multiparty meeting since the approval in December 1991 of legislation on the legalization of political parties [see p. 38708], the opposition repeated demands for the establishment of a transitional government. These were rejected by Conte, although he promised that the December elections would be free and fair.

■ Last article p. 39626; reference article p. R12.

## SENEGAL

### Continuing industrial action

Despite the apparent agreement between the government and trade union organizations on the implementation of austerity measures [see p. 39626], industrial action in protest against the government's economic recovery programme continued during October.

The campaign against wage cuts was headed by an alliance of five trade union bodies including the National Union of Independent Labour Unions of Senegal and the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers. However, support for the action appeared to be waning. A three-day strike beginning on Oct. 19 was only partially observed in Dakar, while a call for similar action on Oct. 26 appeared to have had little effect.

■ Last article p. 39626; reference article pp. R19-20.

## CHAD

### Killing of CNRT leader

Col. Abbas Koty, leader of the rebel *Conseil national de redressement du Tchad* (CNRT), was shot dead on Oct. 22 during an exchange of fire with security forces who had been ordered to arrest him after the discovery of an alleged coup plot.

The transitional government had signed an agreement with Koty on Oct. 16 (expanding on an agreement signed in August—see p. 39587) to end his armed rebellion, integrate his forces into the national army and transform the CNRT into a political party. According to Interior and Security Minister Ali Djalbor, however, the government by this time

already suspected that Koty was planning a coup attempt. These rumours, Djalbor said, were then confirmed by the discovery of documents signed by Koty scheduling attacks on the presidency, airport and radio and television stations for Oct. 24.

Koty's supporters, however, insisted that Koty had signed the peace accord in good faith and denied the allegations of a coup plot. They claimed that Koty's death had been an act of premeditated murder on the part of the government. On Oct. 24 Idriss Agar Bichara, a CNRT leader, speaking from Tripoli, Libya, accused the government of violating the Oct. 16 agreement and said that he would resume the armed struggle.

### Resignation of Prime Minister

On Oct. 28 Prime Minister Fidèle Moungar tendered his resignation and that of his government. The move followed a vote of no confidence in his administration which had apparently been initiated by supporters of President Idriss Déby in the Higher Transitional Council (CST—transitional legislature).

Moungar linked the vote to his recent disagreements with Déby, including the conflict in September over the appointment of the Finance Minister [see p. 39626]. He asserted that the vote had violated procedures and warned that a dangerous precedent had been set by which the President could effectively sideline the CST and appoint a prime minister of his choice.

On Oct. 30 it was announced that the CST would examine Moungar's complaints, although it would also begin accepting nominations for the post of Prime Minister.

■ Last article p. 39626; reference article pp. R7-8.

## SUDAN

### Dissolution of RCC - Formation of civilian government

President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir announced a package of political reforms on Oct. 19 designed to ensure the holding of fresh presidential and general elections in 1994 and 1995 respectively. The move followed the dissolution on Oct. 16 of the ruling military council, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which named Bashir as President and head of a new civilian government.

The 15-member RCC led by Bashir had seized power in June 1989 in a bloodless military coup, ousting the democratically elected civilian government of Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi [see p. 36728]. The RCC, backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF), turned Sudan into an Islamic state. More recently the regime had come under increasing international and domestic pressure because of its alleged support for terrorist movements abroad [see pp. 39587; 39590; 39627], and for its economic mismanagement [see below].

### Formation of civilian government

All current ministers, who submitted their resignations on Oct. 17 to allow Bashir to form a new government, were asked to stay on in an



acting capacity until fresh elections. Minor changes introduced by Bashir included the surrender of his Defence portfolio to Lt.-Gen. Hasan Abdel-Rahman Ali and the appointment of Maj.-Gen. Zubir Mohammed Saleh as Vice-President.

Among Bashir's first acts as head of the new civilian government was the lifting on Oct. 25 of the nationwide curfew first imposed in June 1989. Announcing his decision to the National Assembly Bashir said that Sudan had become safe.

#### Fuel shortage protests

Severe fuel shortages, leading to rampant black-marketeering, prompted street protests in early October giving rise to some of the worst violence since Bashir seized power in 1989.

The violence began in Khartoum and Omdurman and then spread to the Adbara, Wad Medani and Gedaref. Reports said that demonstrations were broken up by police firing tear gas and by pro-government militants belonging to the NIF. Dozens of communists and trade union members were also reported to have been arrested.

The government blamed foreign oil companies for the crisis, saying that they had failed to honour their contracts to supply oil, in anticipation of a rise in oil prices expected after a recent agreement to set new quotas by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) [see pp. 39666-67]. The allegations were denied by the oil companies. Observers meanwhile noted that the government was virtually bankrupt after a boycott by international donors, formalized by Sudan's suspension from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [see pp. 39587; 39666], and stiff penalties imposed by some Arab countries, including Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia, for Sudan's non-payment of dues for previous oil supplies.

■ Last article pp. 39626-27; reference article p. R23.

## SOMALIA

### Shift in UN policy - Reorientation of US policy

Speculation mounted in October over an imminent change in UN policy in Somalia, shifting the focus away from the hunt for faction leader Gen. Mohammed Farah Aydid and towards the search for a negotiated peace settlement.

On Oct. 13 Kofi Annan, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, told a press conference in Mogadishu that UN member states could no longer sustain the casualties they had suffered in Somalia, and that many were prepared to accept "some sort of judicial process" which would investigate Aydid's responsibility for the deaths of UN soldiers.

On Oct. 22 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, speaking in Nairobi after talks with UN officials during an unannounced stopover at Mogadishu airport earlier that day, said that the UN would reconsider UN Resolution 837, ordering the arrest of Aydid on charges of killing 24 Pakistani soldiers in June [see p. 39499], if Aydid "accepted the jurisdiction of a commission of inquiry".

On Oct. 29 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 878 extending the mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) until Nov. 18.

#### Reorientation of US policy

In late September US President Bill Clinton signalled a change in US policy during an address to the UN General Assembly in which he called for urgent steps towards the creation of a new government in Somalia.

The increasingly forthright US reappraisal of its role in Somalia gained momentum after Aydid's announcement on Oct. 9 of a unilateral ceasefire. The offer came on the eve of talks held on Oct. 10-13, between US political representative Robert Oakley and close advisers of Gen. Aydid, aimed at securing the release of two men, US helicopter pilot Michael Durant and Nigerian soldier Umar Shantali, who had been captured during a ferocious gun battle in Mogadishu on Oct. 3 in which some 300 Somalis and 18 US soldiers were killed.

On Oct. 14 Aydid's forces released Durant and Shantali, saying that relations with the USA had entered "a new political state".

Clinton, who welcomed the release, denied that the two hostages had been freed as a result of a secret US deal with Aydid. Aydid, who after four months in hiding emerged at a press conference in Mogadishu coinciding with the release of the hostages, offered, however, to negotiate directly with the USA. At a subsequent press conference on Oct. 28 he welcomed the USA's "positive" policy towards Somalia and claimed that it was in marked contrast to the UN's policy of "threats and destruction".

An outbreak of factional fighting in Mogadishu in late October between pro-Aydid forces and clansmen loyal to interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed threatened to undermine current international efforts to end the civil war. On Oct. 14, leaders representing the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), who met Boutros-Ghali in Cairo, had called for a Somali peace settlement mediated by the UN in co-operation with regional organizations.

#### Further troop withdrawals

On Oct. 7 Clinton announced the withdrawal of all US troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, regardless of whether or not a political settlement had been reached. At the same time he ordered the immediate deployment to Somalia of 1,700 infantry troops and 104 armoured vehicles, and the stationing of 3,600 US Marines offshore.

In a further and more controversial move on Oct. 19, Clinton ordered the immediate withdrawal of some 600 elite US Ranger special forces, while denying that this had any connection with the release of Durant [see above]. The Rangers had been deployed in late August to assist in the hunt for Aydid [see pp. 39586; 39627].

Germany indicated on Oct. 17 that its peacekeeping contingent would be withdrawn by April 1994. Belgium, France and Sweden were also said to be planning troop withdrawals by mid-January 1994.

On Oct. 17 Pakistan announced that it would send a further 5,000 soldiers to Somalia.

#### UNHCR appeal on behalf of rape victims

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on Oct. 19 renewed its appeal for US\$1,100,000 to help Somali rape victims in refugee camps in Kenya.

An earlier appeal made in June had met with no response. The latest appeal followed a report by the Washington-based human rights organization, Africa Watch, which on Oct. 4 had alleged that Somali boys aged between five and 13 had been raped in refugee camps in north-eastern Kenya. The Kenyan government denied the allegations.

■ Last article p. 39627; reference article pp. R20-21.

## KENYA

### Continued ethnic clashes

The government imposed fresh emergency measures on Oct. 20 after a renewed outbreak of ethnic violence in the Rift Valley districts of Narok and Nakuru [see p. 39627].

This latest round of clashes, in which dozens were reported killed, were said to involve attacks by members of minority tribes, notably the Masai, on peasant farmers belonging to the large and once dominant Kikuyu tribe. On Oct. 28 critics of the government, including several Presbyterian pastors, accused President Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin) of instigating the violence and of showing indifference to the plight of the Kikuyu.

On Oct. 27 a parliamentary debate on the disturbances ended in a violence between deputies defending rival positions.

#### Resignation of IPK leader

The leader of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), Shaikh Khalid Balala, announced his resignation on Oct. 9, claiming that he had suffered "abuse and belittlement" from the party's interim chairman, Omar Mwinyi.

#### Unification of exchange rates

Finance Minister Musalia Mudavadi announced on Oct. 18 that the government had decided to end the existing dual rate of exchange by allowing the official rate of the shilling to float up to the level of the free-market rate. This measure, effective from Oct. 19, had apparently been recommended by the IMF as the first step towards the abolition of currency controls.

Mudavadi said that the measure would encourage exporters who would henceforth be permitted to exchange half their foreign exchange earnings (which were required to be surrendered to the central bank) at the market rate rather than the official exchange rate. The gap between the two was currently less than 2 per cent.



**German and Japanese aid**

Germany and Japan became the first countries to take the lead in resuming financial assistance to Kenya since the freeze imposed by donor countries in November 1991 to force the pace of economic and political change [see p. 38563].

On Oct. 13 Germany signed an agreement for a development aid package worth DM 127,200,000 (about US\$80,000,000) over the next two years in recognition of the government's on-going economic and political reform programme. This was followed by a Japanese agreement signed on Oct. 26 for a balance-of-payments support loan to Kenya worth some US\$75,000,000, on the grounds that Japan had been "encouraged" by the government's substantial reform measures.

■ Last article p. 39627; reference article p. R13.

**MADAGASCAR****Ministerial appointments**

Completing the appointment of his new Cabinet [see p. 39587], Prime Minister François Ravony on Oct. 5 named Falgence Fanony as Minister of National Education and Damasy Andriambao as Minister of Public Health. Both men had served in the government of Ravony's predecessor, Guy Razanamasy—Fanony as Minister of Public Instruction and Andriambao as Health Minister. Ralahy Nelson Rabenirainy was appointed as Minister-Delegate attached to the Prime Minister in charge of Judicial Affairs and as Keeper of the Seals.

■ Last article p. 39587; reference article p. R14.

**IN BRIEF**

**CÔTE D'IVOIRE:** President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 88, who had been absent from the country for five months, was admitted to the urology unit of a Paris hospital on Oct. 9, having undergone prostate surgery earlier in the year; he was reported to be in a serious condition.

**ETHIOPIA:** Details of a DM 200 million (about US\$124 million) debt rescheduling agreement with Germany were announced on Oct. 13. The deal involved partial debt remission, including forgiveness of amounts due to the former German Democratic Republic, while the repayment of remaining debts was extended until 2017.

**SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE:** The government was reported to be concerned about an epidemic of dysentery which by Oct. 5 had affected more than 3,000 of the population of 120,000 and resulted in the death of more than 500 people; the outbreak, the main causes of which had not been identified, was said to be spreading.

**UGANDA:** Some 130 people were killed in clashes over cattle in early October in the eastern district of Moroto; the conflict was described as the worst incident of its kind in 20 years.

# AMERICAS

**UNITED STATES****Approval of emergency funding - Proposal of further spending cuts**

The 1994 fiscal year began on Oct. 1 with only two of the 13 government appropriations bills having been approved by Congress. Temporary funding was provided in the form of a "continuing resolution" approved by both houses of Congress on Sept. 29 and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on the following day.

In accordance with a commitment made in August [see p. 39588], on Oct. 26 Clinton proposed to Congress further spending cuts of \$10,000 million. Although this involved cuts in some existing programmes, most of the proposed savings were in the form of the reduction of inefficiencies in government expenditure. He also unveiled a simplified government procurement programme which, according to official estimates, could save \$22,500 million over the next five years.

**Foreign policy statements - Defeat of congressional attempt to limit deployment of troops**

Senior officials in the Clinton administration, including the President himself, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, made a series of co-ordinated statements in mid-October in an attempt to redefine US foreign policy. The essence of the policy which emerged lay in the notion of the "enlargement" of free-market democracy in place of the defunct Cold War policy of the "containment" of Soviet communism.

In an interview with the *Washington Post* of Oct. 17, Clinton stated that his handling of foreign issues had not been free of error, particularly in relation to Somalia, but he rejected suggestions that his government should place greater emphasis on foreign affairs at the expense of domestic issues. He criticized the countries of western Europe for their inability to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia, singling out the UK and France in particular for having opposed US calls to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and launch air strikes against the Serbs. Clinton, and particularly Christopher, also suggested that US policy had been too Eurocentric in the past, and that western Europe could no longer be viewed by the USA as an automatic or reliable partner in international affairs.

Growing criticism over the government's handling of foreign affairs had intensified in October with the death of 18 US servicemen in Somalia [see p. 39675] and the prevention on Oct. 8 of US deployment of troops in Haiti [see p. 39680]. This disquiet found concrete expression in a congressional bid to limit Clinton's power to deploy US troops under

foreign commanders. This process reached its climax on Oct. 20 with the defeat by 65 votes to 33 of a Senate motion, which would have prohibited funding for any UN operations in which US soldiers would be placed under the command of foreign officers unless with the express consent of Congress. A non-binding resolution calling on the President to consult Congress before placing troops under foreign command was approved. On the following day the Senate defeated Republican motions which sought to limit the President's power to deploy troops in Bosnia and Haiti, a similar attempt to limit deployment in Somalia having been defeated earlier in the month.

**Unveiling of new drug plan**

The Clinton administration unveiled an interim drug control policy on Oct. 20 which sought to concentrate law enforcement efforts on hardcore drug addiction rather than casual use.

The plan, made public at a Senate judiciary committee hearing by Lee Brown, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, suggested that addicts were responsible not merely for the consumption of the bulk of drugs such as cocaine and heroin, but also for most of the social disruption and violence associated with illegal drug use. Brown suggested that the new policy would aim more at the treatment of drug use as a medical problem rather than simply as an issue of law enforcement. He stressed, however, that "the administration is, without reservation, opposed to the legalization, decriminalization, or medicalization of illegal drugs". A number of senators criticized the policy for being too vague, and denounced the President for having reduced the budget of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and slashed its staffing level from 146 to 25.

**Corruption cases**

Corruption investigations continued to proceed against two Republican Senators—Bob Packwood (Oregon) and David F. Durenberger (Minnesota)—during October.

An inquiry by the Senate ethics committee into the charge that Packwood had sexually harassed 26 women [see p. 39454], reached a crucial stage on Oct. 20 when the committee issued a subpoena for the senator's 8,200-page diaries. On the following day Packwood refused to make the diaries available, a move which led the committee to vote unanimously in favour of asking the full Senate for the authority to begin court proceedings in order to enforce the subpoena. In an effort to discourage the Senate from taking such a step, Packwood informed his colleagues on Oct. 25 that the diaries contained information relating to the infidelities and sexual relations of numerous fellow Senators.

A court of first instance on Oct. 22 rejected a suit by Durenberger that charges against him should be dismissed. Durenberger had claimed that the corruption indictments [see p. 39406], under which he



could face up to 10 years in prison, had been improperly obtained.

Also under pressure from corruption allegations were Dan Rostenkowski, one of Clinton's key allies in the House of Representatives, and Commerce Secretary Ron Brown.

It was reported on Oct. 19 that federal prosecutors had delayed a decision on whether or not to seek indictments against Rostenkowski, the Democratic chairman of the House ways and means committee who had been under investigation by a grand jury concerning financial irregularities connected to the House Post Office scandal [see pp. 39549-50]. It was believed that the decision was taken in order to investigate fresh allegations against him. It was also reported that the House ethics committee had launched an investigation into the disappearance of hundreds of payroll records relating to Rostenkowski's staff.

It was reported on Oct. 23 that Brown had been interviewed by FBI agents concerning the allegation that he solicited \$700,000 from a Vietnamese businessman in return for a promise to lift the US trade embargo against Vietnam. The charge, which was the subject of a grand jury investigation, alleged that Brown requested that the money be paid to a close female friend of his who lived in a house in Washington which had allegedly been paid for by Brown. The Commerce Secretary's interview with the FBI increased Republican calls for Attorney General Janet Reno to appoint an independent counsel (special prosecutor) to investigate the matter.

## Opening of Supreme Court session

The 1993-94 session of the Supreme Court opened on Oct. 4, with its most recent recruit, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, having been seated on Oct. 1. Among the cases which the Court agreed to hear in its forthcoming session was *Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc.*, which involved a definition of the concept of sexual harassment.

The case, in which oral arguments were heard by the Court on Oct. 13, involved an appeal by a woman who claimed that she had been forced to leave her job at a truck-leasing company in Nashville, Tennessee, because of persistent sexual harassment by the company's owner. Lower courts had ruled that the man's conduct had ranged from the "inane and adolescent" to the "truly gross and offensive" but that it did not qualify as sexual harassment because there was no clear evidence that it had caused psychological damage to the plaintiff.

## Ruling on issue of homosexuals in armed forces

Assistant Defence Secretary Edwin Dorn issued a memorandum on Oct. 1 which ordered the armed forces to suspend the implementation of the Clinton administration's policy—which had been unveiled on July 19—on the eligibility of homosexuals to serve in the military [see p. 39549]. The memorandum ordered an immediate end to all discharges or other

adverse actions against service personnel on the basis "solely of his or her homosexual orientation or statements of homosexuality".

The memorandum was issued on the day after Judge Terry J. Hatter, of the US District Court in Los Angeles, issued a sweeping order which banned military discrimination against homosexuals. The order was issued in the case of Petty Officer Keith Meinhold who had been dismissed from the Navy after admitting his homosexuality. In an earlier ruling Hatter had declared this dismissal unconstitutional and had ordered Meinhold's reinstatement. In reiterating this ruling Hatter issued the unequivocal ban on discrimination and warned that if the government violated the order and was found in contempt then it would face fines of at least \$10,000 a day. The Defence Department criticized the order as constituting a serious threat to the management of the armed forces and gave notice of its intention to appeal at the earliest possible opportunity. The Supreme Court ruled on Oct. 29 that the administration could implement its policy on homosexuals in the military while the Defence Department's appeal against the lower court's ruling was in progress.

## Developments in Tailhook scandal

Defence Secretary Les Aspin decided on Oct. 4 not to accept the recommendation of Navy Secretary John Dalton that Adml. Frank B. Kelso, the chief of naval operations, should be dismissed. The recommendation had been motivated by Kelso's alleged failure to deal effectively with the Tailhook scandal.

The scandal arose from a convention of naval pilots—which Kelso had attended—in Las Vegas in 1991 at which 83 women and seven men were subjected to sexual harassment and assault. A report on the affair in April had accused 117 men of improper conduct [see p. 39406], but only 42 had been disciplined and none subjected to a court martial. Charges against Cmdr. Robert E. Stumpf and Capt. Gregory J. Bonam—two of the most publicized Tailhook cases—were dropped on Oct. 7 and Oct. 21 respectively, due to insufficient evidence and problems of identification.

## Conclusion of Denny trial

The trial concluded in October of two black men accused of the near fatal beating of white truck driver Reginald Denny and of assaulting seven other people during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Police were placed on tactical alert in case of renewed disturbances as the verdicts were announced. A racially mixed jury on Oct. 18 found Damian Williams and Henry Watson not guilty of the most serious charges upon which they had been indicted.

The trial, which had begun in August [see p. 39590], had been seen as a counterpoint to that of Rodney King—the case which had sparked the rioting [see pp. 38856; 38894]—because the assault on Denny had been televised and had come to symbolize the random racial violence associated with the riots. During the course of the trial five jurors were replaced: two because of illness, one for personal reasons, one for misconduct and another, at the judge's instruction, for being incapable of deliberating.

The jury eventually found Watson not guilty on five counts, including the attempted murder of Denny, but convicted him of a misdemeanor charge of having assaulted the truck driver. Williams was found not guilty on nine charges of assault and robbery, but guilty on one count of simple mayhem and four counts of assault. The jury was unable to reach a decision on a count against Williams of attempted murder and one against Watson of assault with a deadly weapon. After being told to continue its deliberations the jury acquitted Williams of the remaining charge on Oct. 20, and Judge John Ouderkirk then declared a mistrial in regard to the final count against Watson.

Williams, who faced a maximum prison term of 10 years, was due to be sentenced on Dec. 7. Watson, who faced a maximum sentence of six months, was released having been in custody for the 17 months since his arrest. Although the verdicts were greeted with delight by the defendants and by many other black Americans, there was also widespread anxiety that they represented as much a miscarriage of justice as had the verdicts in the Rodney King trial.

## Report on Waco siege

A report on the 51-day siege of the Branch Davidian sect in Waco, Texas, which had ended on April 19 in an assault and fire in which more than 70 cult members died [see p. 39407], was released by the Justice Department on Oct. 8. Prepared under the supervision of Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, the report concluded that the fatal fire had been started by those within the compound, and dismissed as "utterly false" the claims by some cult members that it had been caused by the FBI assault on the buildings.

The report also exonerated Attorney General Reno of any blame for the deaths, although it contained evidence which contradicted some of Reno's early justifications for ordering the assault. Among these were her claim that she had been informed by the FBI that children were being physically abused within the compound, and that she had been informed by experts that there was little chance of a mass suicide by cult members in the event of an assault.

The mild tone of the report was criticized in some quarters. Don Edwards, the Democratic chairman of the House judiciary committee, described it as "essentially an in-house review".

In sharp contrast, an earlier report produced under the supervision of Assistant Treasury Secretary Ronald K. Noble and released on Sept. 30 had lambasted the handling of the initial Feb. 28 raid on the Waco compound by members of the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).

Senior ATF personnel were criticized for going ahead with this raid (in which four ATF agents and six cult members were killed) even when it was known that the element of surprise, essential to its success, had been lost. The report questioned the ATF decision to attempt the raid when it lacked the experience to mount such an operation, and criticized the agency for not attempting to arrest cult leader David Koresh outside the compound. It also found that, in the aftermath of the operation, "numerous" ATF officials had been "less than truthful



about the facts" and that evidence had been altered to mislead the inquiry.

Following the issuing of this first report, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen had announced on Sept. 30 that he was removing Stephen Higgins from his position as ATF director with immediate effect. Higgins had announced his resignation on Sept. 27, to become effective on Oct. 30. Bentsen also placed on administrative leave five other ATF officials whom the report had accused of lying about the raid.

## Advancement of primary election dates by California and Ohio

California Governor Pete Wilson on Oct. 5 signed legislation to advance the date of the state's presidential primary elections from June to late March. Although California had the largest number of convention delegates of any state, its primaries had not played a decisive role in nominating a presidential candidate since 1972, because the contest was invariably in effect decided by the time they were held.

The move followed an earlier decision by Ohio to move its primaries from May to March, and to hold them on the same date as those of its Midwestern neighbours in Illinois and Michigan. The result of the two changes meant that the 1996 nomination campaign could be effectively decided in March by primaries in California, the three Midwestern states, and the group of Southern states which, since 1984, had grouped their primaries in early March in an event which had become known as "Super Tuesday". The overall effect of the changes was thought likely to add to the advantages of those candidates who had a high public profile and could raise money prior to the beginning of the primary process in February.

## In brief

On Oct. 11 Jack Kevorkian was ordered to stand trial for having assisted a man to commit suicide in September [see p. 39631]; on Oct. 22 he assisted in another suicide, his 19th, at his apartment in Michigan.

Four teenagers, ranging in age from 13 to 16 years, were indicted on Oct. 24 on charges of murder and attempted murder in connection with an attack on two British tourists in a rest area in Florida in September [see p. 39630].

Katherine Ann Power, a 1960s radical who had eluded the authorities for 23 years before surrendering in September [see p. 39631], was sentenced on Oct. 6 to eight to 12 years in prison after pleading guilty to charges of manslaughter and armed robbery.

The outbreak of at least 15 serious brush fires in southern California led President Clinton, on Oct. 28, to designate five counties as disaster areas; by the end of the month at least 60,000 hectares of land and 700 buildings had been destroyed.

■ Last article pp. 39629-31; reference article pp. R54-56.

## CANADA

### Crushing election defeat for ruling PCP

The Liberal Party of Canada, led by Jean Chrétien, won a decisive victory in the general election held on Oct. 25, securing 41 per cent of the overall vote and 177 of the 295 seats in the House of Commons, the lower chamber of the federal legislature. The Progressive Conservative Party (PCP), which had governed Canada since 1984, suffered its worst ever defeat and retained only two seats. [For 1988 election see p. 36425.]

Speculation that the scale of the PCP's defeat marked a watershed in Canadian political history was heightened by the manner in which the election exacerbated the conflict between English-speaking Canada and the predominantly French-speaking province of Quebec. This was illustrated by the dramatic success of two regional parties: the *Bloc Québécois*, led by former PCP Minister Lucien Bouchard and demanding sovereignty for Quebec, and the populist Reform Party led by Preston Manning, which opposed concessions to Quebec and demanded greater influence for the country's western provinces.

### Election campaign

When the 47-day election campaign began, opinion polls suggested that the PCP and the Liberals were commanding roughly equal levels of popular support. Kim Campbell, the PCP's new leader—and Canada's first woman Prime Minister—who had replaced the unpopular Brian Mulroney in June [see pp. 39502-03], appeared by far the most popular of any of the contenders for the premiership. As the campaign progressed, however, the PCP's erratic performance saw a dramatic collapse in support for the party and its leader. By contrast, Chrétien and the Liberals fought an almost flawless campaign which emphasized the party's commitment to reduce unemployment by adopting a Keynesian-style public works programme.

Whereas Campbell tried to capitalize upon her relative youth and inexperience, these qualities became liabilities as the campaign progressed. She seemed unable to focus the PCP campaign and made a series of spontaneous remarks to the press which were criticized as ill-considered, naive or, on occasions, insensitive. She also performed poorly in the televised debates between the party leaders on Oct. 3 and Oct. 4. The campaign ended on a sour note as, in its final days, Campbell was forced to withdraw a PCP advertisement which sought to make an issue of the birth defect which had left one side of Chrétien's face partially paralysed. The advertisement provoked a storm of public criticism and was repudiated by many PCP candidates.

The PCP was also dogged by the economic record of the Mulroney government, and its loss of support in Quebec following its failure to secure approval for either the Meech Lake or Charlottetown Accords, both of which had attempted to provide Quebec with greater autonomy within the Canadian federation [see pp. 37519-20; 39126; 39184].

The campaign was fought against a background of an unemployment rate of 11.2 per cent of the workforce, and a 1992 federal budget deficit of more than C\$35,000 million (US\$1.00=C\$1.3151 as at Nov. 1, 1993) or 5.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).

The replacement of Mulroney, a native of Quebec, by Campbell, who was from British Columbia and who had been seen to have difficulty when participating in a televised leadership debate conducted in French, had served only to erode further the PCP's position in Quebec.

### Election results

The 295 seats in the House of Commons were contested by a total of 2,155 candidates, representing 14 political parties and numerous independents. By the end of the campaign it appeared certain that the Liberals were poised to return to government, although whether the party would achieve an overall majority remained unclear. The scale of the party's success rapidly became evident, however, and its victory was assured before the closure of the polls in the western provinces. In the aftermath of the election, it remained the only truly

national political organization in that it was the only party to have won seats in all 10 of the country's provinces.

In accepting victory, Chrétien stated that the mandate of his new government was to "concentrate all our efforts on the economy, to create jobs, to build economic growth, [and] to give dignity to workers". He also acknowledged the frustrations which had led voters to support the *Bloc Québécois* and the Reform Party, and promised to "try to bring us to-





**Canadian election results**

|                  | Distribution of seats |                              |                   | Percentage of vote won |            |
|------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------|
|                  | Seats won in 1993     | Seats in outgoing parliament | Seats won in 1988 | 1993                   | 1988       |
| PCP              | 2                     | 154                          | 170               | 16.1                   | 43         |
| Liberals         | 177                   | 79                           | 82                | 41.6                   | 32         |
| NDP              | 9                     | 43                           | 43                | 6.6                    | 20         |
| Bloc             | 54                    | 8                            | —                 | 13.9                   | —          |
| <i>Québécois</i> |                       |                              |                   |                        |            |
| Reform Party     | 52                    | 1                            | —                 | 18.1                   | —          |
| Others           | 1                     | 2                            | 0                 | 3.7                    | 5          |
| Vacant           | 0                     | 8                            | 0                 |                        |            |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>295</b>            | <b>295</b>                   | <b>295</b>        | <b>100</b>             | <b>100</b> |

**Province-by-province breakdown of seat distribution after 1993 election**

|                                | PCP           | Liberals       | NDP          | Bloc<br><i>Québécois</i> | Reform<br>Party | Independents |
|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Newfoundland                   | 0 (2)         | 7 (5)          | 0 (0)        | —                        | 0(0)            | 0(0)         |
| Prince Edward Island           | 0 (0)         | 4 (4)          | 0 (0)        | —                        | 0(0)            | 0(0)         |
| Nova Scotia                    | 0 (5)         | 11 (6)         | 0 (0)        | —                        | 0(0)            | 0(0)         |
| New Brunswick                  | 1 (5)         | 9 (5)          | 0 (0)        | —                        | 0(0)            | 0(0)         |
| Quebec                         | 1 (63)        | 19(12)         | 0 (0)        | 54(—)                    | 0(0)            | 1(0)         |
| Ontario                        | 0 (47)        | 98(42)         | 0(10)        | —                        | 1(0)            | 0(0)         |
| Manitoba                       | 0 (7)         | 12 (5)         | 1 (2)        | —                        | 1(0)            | 0(0)         |
| Saskatchewan                   | 0 (4)         | 5 (0)          | 5(10)        | —                        | 4(0)            | 0(0)         |
| Alberta                        | 0 (25)        | 4 (0)          | 0 (1)        | —                        | 22(0)           | 0(0)         |
| British Columbia               | 0 (12)        | 6 (1)          | 2(19)        | —                        | 24(0)           | 0(0)         |
| Yukon/Northwest<br>Territories | 0 (0)         | 2 (2)          | 1 (1)        | —                        | 0(0)            | 0(0)         |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>2(170)</b> | <b>178(82)</b> | <b>8(43)</b> | <b>54(—)</b>             | <b>52(0)</b>    | <b>1(0)</b>  |

(Distribution after 1988 election in parentheses.)

gether by appealing not to what divides us, but to what unites us".

The most obvious loser in the contest was the PCP which, by being reduced to only two seats, fell 10 seats short of the level required to maintain its status as an officially recognized party within the House of Commons. With one exception, every member of the Cabinet lost their seats, with Campbell failing to secure re-election in her Vancouver constituency. The only survivor was Deputy Prime Minister and Industry Minister Jean Charest, who had lost to Campbell in the party leadership contest in June.

Campbell's personal humiliation was somewhat tempered by the dignified and self-deprecating manner in which she accepted the defeat. She assured supporters that the PCP would return as a political force within Canada, reminding them that the party had secured a greater share of the vote than the *Bloc Québécois*, but had failed to win a comparable number of seats because its level of support had been spread evenly across the country as a whole rather than being geographically concentrated. Under the party's leadership rules, Campbell's defeat automatically triggered a leadership contest. No date for this was set and it was considered unlikely that Campbell would stand as a candidate.

The other main casualty of the election was Canada's third national party, the New Democratic Party (NDP). Having shown signs of mounting a serious challenge to the two-party system in the 1980s—and becoming in the process the most successful social-democratic organization on the North American continent—the election saw the party's strength reduced from 44 seats to nine, thereby

forcing it, like the PCP, below the 12 seat threshold of formal recognition. As a natural ally of the Liberals on issues such as job creation, the severity of the party's defeat was seen as having been a distinct disadvantage for Chrétien.

The *Bloc Québécois* won 54 seats, all of them in Quebec. It became the second-largest party in the House of Commons and was expected to form the official opposition when the new Parliament convened. Speaking after the election Bouchard stated that "the *Bloc* will be positive and responsible in parliament, while vigorously pursuing sovereignty for Quebec". The result, he claimed, confirmed that "there are two countries inside this country".

Support for the Reform Party was also geographically concentrated, in this case in the western provinces, where it succeeded in capturing much of the right-wing vote which had hitherto been a part of the PCP's natural constituency. The party won 52 seats, 46 of them in Alberta and British Columbia, offering a simple but populist platform of balanced budgets, smaller government, a greater emphasis on law and order, and reduced immigration. Its leader, Preston Manning, the son of a former Premier of Alberta, restated his opposition to the country's alleged domination by Ontario and Quebec, and the special treatment offered by successive administrations towards the French-speaking province. He also promised that the Reform Party would

demand "vigorous austerity" to end Canada's budget deficits and would act as "the fiscal conscience of the nation".

■ Last article p. 39631; reference article pp. R33-34.

**MEXICO****Stimulus package**

The government, employers and trade unions on Oct. 3 renewed the Pact for Economic Solidarity and Growth (PECE) first established in January 1989 [see pp. 37078; 37274; 37849; 385235], until Dec. 31, 1994.

Based on an assumed inflation rate of not more than 5 per cent in 1994, the pact covered taxation, salaries, prices and foreign exchange rate policy. Taxation: income tax was to be abolished for those earning less than twice the minimum wage, and those earning up to four times the minimum wage would benefit from a reduction of the tax base; corporation tax was to be cut from 35 to 34 per cent. Salaries: the minimum wage was to be increased by an average of 9.5 per cent from Oct. 10, 1993, to a daily minimum of 15.69 new pesos, and to be increased again to 16.40 new pesos per day as of Jan. 1 1994; companies were to pay quality and productivity bonuses. Prices: industrial electricity and diesel fuel costs were to be reduced by 10-15 per cent annually, and there would be lower rail fares and reduced cargo rates at airports. Exchange policy: the existing policy was to be maintained without modification, limiting the daily maximum devaluation against the US dollar to 0.04 new centavos (about 5 per cent per year) (US\$1.00=3.1221 new pesos as at Oct. 4, 1993).

The government insisted that the pact would be financed with "real resources" generated through the fiscal surplus (estimated for 1993 at US\$6,000 million and as equivalent to 1.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)).

**Agricultural plan**

An initial investment of 11,700 million new pesos from the fiscal surplus was to finance a Pro-Countryside (Procampo) development plan, announced on Oct. 4 and designed to benefit 3,000,000 farmers, to re-activate and modernize the countryside and to stem migration flows to the cities.

A first, "temporary", phase of the plan would end price supports for basic grains and introduce direct cash subsidies for farmers according to the amount and the fertility of their land. The "permanent" phase would establish over a period of 15 years as from April 1995 a pricing system within the context of "market economy prices".

**Human rights protest**

More than 50,000 people marched through Mexico City on Oct. 2 to mark the 25th anniversary of the 1968 massacre of university students by the military in that city [see p. 23115].

Confronted by official secrecy, a Truth Commission, made up of noted intellectuals, was investigating evidence that more than 300 students had been murdered.

■ Last article p. 39631; reference article pp. 45-46.



## HAITI

### Deepening crisis

A military- and police-sponsored terror campaign during October by armed gangs known as *attachés* [see p. 39632] prevented the intended return of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Thousands of citizens fled from the capital, Port-au-Prince, and UN human rights staff and other foreign government personnel were withdrawn.

The UN-mediated July peace agreement [see pp. 39551-52] stipulated that Aristide was to resume office on Oct. 30, and that his return should be preceded by the resignation (on Oct. 15—but see below) of Armed Forces C.-in-C. Gen. Raoul Cédras and his fellow 1991 coup leader, the military police chief Col. Joseph Michel François. In a bid to save the peace plan, the UN on Oct. 30 reportedly invited Cédras, Aristide's interim Prime Minister Robert Malval [see p. 39591], and the presidents of the bicameral Congress, to further talks on Nov. 3-4. Meanwhile anti-Aristide hardline parties, led by the Alliance for the Liberation and the Advancement of Haiti (ALAH), claimed that Aristide's failure to return nullified the UN agreement, and announced (on Oct. 29) that they would themselves form a government on Oct. 31.

#### International response

In an address to the UN General Assembly on Oct. 28, Aristide called for tighter sanctions to cover all trade with Haiti, going beyond the existing embargoes on arms and oil which the Security Council had reimposed, under Resolution 873, on Oct. 13 (for imposition of sanctions in June see p. 39504).

The Organization of American States (OAS) reinstated a "non-obligatory" commercial embargo on Oct. 19.

US President Bill Clinton on Oct. 18 approved stiffer US sanctions covering all goods except food, medicine and other humanitarian aid. Also frozen were the US assets of military leaders, the business elite and leaders of the right-wing Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), closely linked with the *attachés* [see p. 39632].

Six US frigates, already mounting a blockade of Haiti, joined vessels from Canada, the UK, France, the Netherlands and Argentina to enforce the UN embargo from Oct. 19 onwards.

#### Cédras's refusal to resign without comprehensive amnesty

Aristide insisted on Oct. 28 that Cédras and François and their "allies" had to resign before they were granted an amnesty, under the July agreement. Cédras, however, responded on the same day that imposing such conditions on the amnesty (signed by Aristide on Oct. 4) was "unconstitutional" and breached the UN agreement.

The Oct. 4 amnesty, which Aristide had reportedly signed only after US pressure, covered all military and civilian persons who had committed "political breaches" between September 1991 and July 3, 1993. Cédras's refusal to resign until the Congress had approved a total amnesty for the military was



tantamount to an affirmation of military rule, since the Congress was unable to reach a quorum in October due to *attaché* intimidation. Pro-Aristide deputies of the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD), the largest party in both houses following the December 1990 elections, remained in hiding or in exile in the USA. Samuel Milord, a FNCD deputy kidnapped on Oct. 20, was feared murdered.

François, for his part, had earlier publicly dismissed the July agreement.

#### Assassination of Justice Minister

Guy Malary, Justice Minister in Malval's Cabinet, who was engaged on drawing up legislation to create a civilian-run police force, was murdered by *attachés* on Oct. 14. Malval's Cabinet was by this time effectively unable to function, reduced to operating under a permanent state of siege in the face of the intimidation campaign.

#### Alternative peace proposals

An alternative set of peace proposals, presented on Oct. 22 by an ad hoc anti-Aristide congressional "Crisis Committee" led by National Assembly President Antoine Joseph, were dismissed by Malval as unrepresentative of the Congress, but were welcomed by the US government and by Dante Caputo, the UN-OAS special envoy to Haiti, giving rise to increased speculation that the UN and the USA were prepared to make substantial concessions to see Aristide restored.

The proposals echoed Cédras's stance in that they made Aristide's return conditional on the Congress approving and enacting an amnesty law for the military, and a further law which would define separate roles for the army and police. The "Crisis Committee" also demanded the broadening of Malval's Cabinet to include "less radical" ministers, and urged Aristide to call on the international community to lift all sanctions.

Malval, who on Oct. 20 had threatened to resign if Cédras and François remained in their posts, now indicated that he was willing to broaden his govern-

ment to include military supporters, provided that he was not pressurized to do so.

#### US position on issue of intervention

While not ruling out military intervention to protect some 1,000 US citizens (and 8,000 of dual nationality) in Haiti, Clinton remained sensitive to domestic warnings of becoming embroiled in a "second Somalia" and to the threat that the crisis would increase the flow of "boat people" (15 of whom, picked up by the US Coastguard, were returned to Haitian police custody on Oct. 27).

In early October the State Department and the Defence Department had expressed reservations over US troop involvement in the latest UN-technical assistance mission [see p. 39632]. Opinion polls revealed general public opposition, and Republicans in the Senate attempted to limit Clinton's ability to send troops to Haiti unless US security or the lives of US nationals were threatened. A congressional briefing given by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on Oct. 20 reportedly included the allegation that Aristide was mentally unstable.

Clinton on Oct. 12 effectively ruled out further US troop involvement until the UN peace agreement was honoured. This position was taken in the light of the hostile reception which the USS *Harlan County* received from *attachés* when it docked in Port-au-Prince on Oct. 11, carrying 216 US and Canadian UN military engineers and training personnel. Local US embassy staff suffered harassment and the ship was ordered to withdraw. The voyage of a second US troopship was cancelled.

■ Last article p. 39632; reference article pp. R43-44.

## CUBA

### Relations with USA

Alan Watson, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, on Oct. 26 ruled out any relaxation of the US trade embargo [see p. 39136] and insisted that human rights and democracy remained at the "core of our policy to Cuba".

He was addressing the hardline Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which was committed to the overthrow of President Fidel Castro Ruz, and which had strongly supported the 1992 election campaign of President Bill Clinton in 1992.

The tone of the speech contrasted with September's co-operation agreements, which had led to Cuba handing over suspected drug traffickers [see p. 39632] and the USA agreeing to repatriate 1,500 Cubans, part of the 1980 Mariel boat exodus [see pp. 30474-75], who were currently serving sentences in US prisons.

Media predictions of a thaw in bilateral relations had also been fuelled by comments by Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina González, who was in New York in early October for the 48th UN General Assembly. Cuba, he claimed, was disposed to negotiate with the United States on the basis of "mutual respect", and wished "as never before, to become part of the world" and "to negotiate on everything, except our sovereignty, our independence and our ability to speak for ourselves". The language of the current Clinton administration



was "less aggressive" to Cuba, he said, but he warned that "as long as the existing external threat does not disappear . . . we cannot consider any changes beyond those which we are making now", a reference to the easing of state control over the economy in July and September [see pp. 39551; 39631].

#### Dialogue with exiles

Robaina had a meeting in New York on Oct. 10 with 150 representatives of more moderate Cuban-Americans who favoured negotiations with the Castro government.

Few details were released, but the meeting was reported as the beginning of a quiet process of rapprochement with the exiles; a second meeting was expected to take place in Havana, the Cuban capital, during the first three months of 1994.

#### Private US aid

Members of the 175-strong "Freedom to Travel" group, US citizens opposed to the trade embargo and the proscription on travel to Cuba, were officially received in Cuba on Oct. 10-17, but faced possible prosecution in the USA, prison sentences of up to 10 years and fines of up to US\$250,000.

The group, drawn from 25 states and 50 organizations, delivered donations and medicines worth US\$30,000. A US "Basta" (Spanish for "enough") flotilla, the second of its type [see p. 39408], made up of 15 ships crewed by some 70 US citizens, arrived on Oct. 17 carrying 50 tonnes of medicines, food, bicycles and bibles.

#### Internal opposition

The permanent committee of the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Cuba (COCC) on Oct. 8 defended its Sept. 14 pastoral letter calling on the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) to abandon its monopoly on power.

The letter called for a national dialogue with all sectors of Cuban society. It pointed to "moral decay" and "discontent, uncertainty and desperation among the population". It had been denounced by the state-run press and by the Fourth Congress of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), with a nominal membership of 7,500,000, which on Sept. 27 described it as "counter-revolutionary, opportunist and diversionary". Some lay Catholics, and the main Protestant and evangelical churches, had also implicitly condemned it in a statement on Sept. 28 which congratulated the government on its efforts to contain the current economic crisis.

In response to an address by Castro, who asserted that his regime would not tolerate the attempt by "US imperialists to divide the country", the CDR Congress approved a nationwide crackdown on "counter-revolutionaries" and "delinquent" elements. According to Western diplomats and opposition spokespeople, the police and Interior Ministry forces had swooped repeatedly on urban areas in recent weeks, arresting scores of youths accused of "vandalism" and of being intent on destabilizing the country.

#### Diplomatic relations with Colombia

It was announced on Oct. 28 that Colombia had resumed full diplomatic relations broken off in 1981 [see p. 31021]. The decision was

viewed as an important step towards Cuba's re-integration with Latin America.

■ Last article pp. 39631-32; reference article p. R37.

## ST LUCIA

### Strike by banana growers

Prime Minister John Compton, reversing his previous stance and making concessions in the face of strike action by banana growers, announced on Oct. 10 a review of prices paid to farmers and the dismissal of the board of the St Lucia Banana Growers' Association (SLBGA) which, he revealed, had outstanding debts of EC\$23,000,000 (about US\$8,500,000). He pledged commercial and multilateral assistance and a new structure for the industry.

Compton's about-face followed a strike on Oct. 5-7 by more than 2,000 banana growers represented by the Banana Salvation Committee pressure group, and a march on the capital, Castries, on Oct. 7, when two men were killed when police fired into a crowd of demonstrating farmers and their supporters. Five police and four civilians were injured as the crowd retaliated. The St Lucia National Youth Council, accusing Compton of authorizing the police action, called for an inquiry.

The striking banana farmers had demanded that the SLBGA, to which they sold their crops, pay them a minimum of EC\$0.30 per pound and abolish the low price "C" grade category of bananas. They had also demanded the removal of the SLBGA board, and rejected government efforts to avert the strike by offering them a greater say in SLBGA affairs and a review of its practices.

■ Last article p. 38905; reference article pp. R50-51.

## BERMUDA

### UBP election victory

The ruling United Bermuda Party (UBP) of Premier Sir John Swan, traditionally the party of business, achieved its eighth successive victory in a general election on Oct. 5, retaining its 22 seats in the 40-seat House of Assembly. The main opposition Progressive Labour Party (PLP), long identified with the trade unions and civil rights movements, won 18 seats, three more than previously.

Of the 34,500 people eligible to vote, 77.5 per cent did so. The UBP fielded a full slate of 40 candidates for the 20 two-member constituencies, compared with 36 for the PLP and eight for the National Liberal Party (NLP); there were five independent candidates.

The UBP's share of the overall vote fell sharply and there was a large increase in the PLP vote, attributed in part to the lowering of the minimum voting age from 21 to 18.

Prominent among defeated UBP members were Sir John Sharpe, Minister of Health, Social Services and Housing and of Legislative and External Affairs, ending a 30-year political career, and Gerald Simons, who was nominated for a seat in the Senate and re-appointed Education Minister. PLP gains

were at the expense of the independents (one of whom had been elected in 1989 as a UB member but had shortly afterwards left that party) and of the NLP, which lost its only seat with the defeat of its 70-year-old leader, Gilbert Darell.

■ Last article p. 38861; reference article p. R53.

## LATIN AMERICA

### Group of Rio summit

The Group of Rio, grouping together the Spanish-speaking South American countries, Brazil and Mexico, held its seventh summit on Oct. 15-16 in the Chilean capital, Santiago. It was also attended by representatives from Central America and from the English-speaking Caribbean.

Among those present was President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the first Bolivian head of state to visit Chile in 40 years, and President Alberto Fujimori of Peru, effectively excluded from the December 1992 summit [see also p. R59] following his April presidential coup. President Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina was absent through illness.

The concluding 30-point "Declaration of Santiago" (which Fujimori reportedly refused to sign because it was "too lengthy and vague in its phrasing"), described the region as "stable and dynamic" and linked progress on human rights, poverty and social development to the strengthening of democracy and promotion of economic liberalism.

Issues of free trade and unrestricted access to international markets dominated the proceedings. Despite fears about the region's treatment in the protracted General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks, the Group called on the international community, and especially industrialized countries, to conclude the Uruguay Round by the end of the year and to ensure a "global and balanced" settlement.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA—linking Mexico, the USA and Canada—see pp. 39045-46; 39234; 39591) was also supported, since it was expected to stimulate the hemisphere's trade relations to the eventual benefit of all the region's countries.

The sending of a formal letter to the US Congress, calling on it to ratify the NAFTA treaty, was blocked by Brazil on the grounds that this was tantamount to interference in US internal affairs. Analysts interpreted this move as part a deeper Brazilian strategy aimed at ensuring that Mexico did not use its membership of NAFTA as a licence to lead the Group of Rio and act as the chief mediator for the whole region.

The issue of Cuba also led to divisions. Mexico defended the principle of self-determination and non-interference, while the rest backed the communiqué which stated that "democracy is the system of government which should prevail and thrive in all countries of the continent, without exception". A separate declaration backed the reimposition of UN sanctions against Haiti if the authorities there refused to re-establish democracy [see p. 39680].



## G-3-CARICOM-Surinam summit

An historic summit between the Group of Three countries (G-3, namely Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), the 13-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Surinam, was held in Port of Spain, the capital of Trinidad, on Oct. 12-13. As a result of the meeting CARICOM joined the G-3 and Surinam in agreeing to support the ratification of NAFTA [see also above] on condition that the region's exports to the USA and Canada had parity with Mexican products for a three-year "grace period".

Mexico also stated its willingness to follow Colombia and Venezuela in working out a framework for freer trade with CARICOM and Surinam. Joint drug trafficking prevention and environmental protection agreements were signed, and CARICOM leaders announced that a document establishing the Association of Caribbean States, also to include Cuba, was expected to be signed in July 1994.

■ Last article p. 39554-55; reference article pp. R58-59.

## GUATEMALA

### Peace plan

The government presented to the UN on Oct. 6 a peace proposal designed to end the 33-year war with the guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG).

The plan envisaged (i) the creation of a Permanent Forum for Peace, operative at national, regional, departmental, municipal and community levels, to encourage public discussion on broad issues of democracy and justice, racism and individual and human rights, and with the URNG contributing to the forum via a re-established National Reconciliation Commission until it achieved legal status itself; (ii) "honest, efficient and immediate actions" by the government to strengthen and protect human rights, and to promote development and the reduction of poverty in regions most affected by violence, and government sponsorship and assistance for "responsible actions" by groups to achieve this end, backed by an appeal for support from the international community; and (iii) a resumption of negotiations with the URNG to achieve a ceasefire, to be followed by an amnesty, the disarming and demobilization of the URNG's forces, its return to mainstream politics, and its direct participation in the Permanent Forum for Peace.

Measures to launch the plan would include (i) the convocation of the Permanent Forum for Peace by the National Reconciliation Commission; (ii) a declaration on human rights, containing specific commitments to deal with violations at all levels, to reassure the national and international communities; (iii) modifications to the criminal code to punish those responsible for disappearances and executions; (iv) enactment of a new military and social service law to ensure that recruitment for obligatory national service was just and not discriminatory; and (v) a government commitment not to encourage the organization of or the provision of arms to new army-backed Civilian Self-Defence Patrols (PAC), "as long as there are no reasons to do so".

### UNRG rejection of plan

URNG leaders on Oct. 13 categorically rejected the plan.

They demanded the resumption of the previous stalled peace process [see p. 39456] and the dissolution of the PACs, while claiming that the latest plan was devoid of substantial "political and social content", that it ignored previous demands for immediate international verification on human rights, and that it was aimed at marginalizing the URNG's role in future negotiations and forcing the "capitulation" of the guerrillas.

Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú, speaking in the USA, also opposed the plan, calling it a "big step backwards".

Clashes between the URNG and the army escalated between Oct. 7 and 11, resulting in at least 30 dead and more than 50 wounded.

■ Last article p. 39633; reference article p. R42.

## NICARAGUA

### UNO-FSLN dialogue

Unprecedented talks took place on Oct. 5 and Oct. 8 between the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the National Opposition Union (UNO), once part of the ruling coalition but dominated by right-wing parties now hostile to President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and her inner Cabinet.

Both sides called for the removal of Chamorro's economic team and the implementation of a new, integral plan which would encourage production and investment and would generate employment and facilitate credits.

They also agreed that the army C-in-C., Gen. Humberto Ortega Saavedra, should step down as soon as a new military reorganization law was approved [see p. 39633]. Partial reforms of the Constitution and the possible creation of a constituent assembly were also discussed.

UNO on Oct. 13 suspended the holding of further talks, claiming that the FSLN had signed an agreement with Centre Bloc deputies (made up of UNO dissidents) which legitimized their role in the National Assembly and also allowed for Ortega to remain in his post.

UNO resumed "national dialogue" talks [see pp. 39456; 39633] with the government on Oct. 19.

### Renewed fighting

More than 2,500 troops were deployed in northern mountain regions on Oct. 15 against re-armed right-wing contras (*recontras*) of the 3-80 Northern Front, led by José Angel García Talavera [see p. 39539]. This followed the breakdown of a truce and the rebels' rejection of the government's August amnesty offer [see p. 39593].

■ Last article p. 39633; reference article p. R47.

## ARGENTINA

### Congressional elections

Elections on Oct. 3 to fill 127 of the 259 seats in the Chamber of Deputies resulted in a clear victory for the Justicialist Party (PJ—the Peronists) of President Carlos Saúl Menem, unprecedented for an incumbent in his fifth year of office.

Some 400 members of provincial legislatures and more than 3,400 other local officials were also elected.

The ruling Justicialist Party (PJ—Peronists) took 42.3 per cent of the vote, increasing the number of its seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 126 in all. The main opposition party, the centrist Radical Civic Union (UCR), won 30 per cent of the vote and lost one seat, leaving it with 83. Provincial parties, with 10.4 per cent of the vote, gained two seats. The right-wing nationalist Movement for Dignity and Independence (Modin), led by Aldo Rico, the cashiered lieutenant colonel who had led abortive military uprisings in 1987 and 1988, won 5.8 per cent and increased its representation by four seats to seven. The right-wing Union of the Democratic Centre (Ucedé) collapsed, attracting only 2.6 per cent of the vote and losing four seats, its representation thus falling to five, the same number as were held by Socialist Unity (US).

Significant Peronist victories were recorded in the capital, Buenos Aires, a traditional UCR stronghold, where the PJ's campaign was led by former Economy and Defence Minister Antonio Ermán González, a Menem confidant whose political career was thereby effectively rehabilitated; and in Buenos Aires Province, the country's most populous province. The government's only significant reverse was in the western city of Córdoba, which was retained by the UCR, and where the Peronist vote fell by 2 percentage points. The Córdoba result was nevertheless viewed by several analysts as advantageous to Menem since the campaign of the defeated PJ candidate was supervised by Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, long thought to harbour presidential ambitions.

Given the large measure of cross-party and public support for the government's anti-inflationary economic policies, the UCR had targeted its campaign on corruption in government and the judiciary, and the likely consequences for national security and the fabric of the state.

### Announcement of plebiscite on constitutional reform

Menem announced on Oct. 22 that a plebiscite on constitutional reform to enable an incumbent president to stand for a second term would be held on Nov. 21. Menem had regarded the elections as a sounding board for the possibility of his re-election in 1995, and the PJ's national congress on Oct. 13 interpreted the results as favourable.

Despite its victory, the PJ still lacked the two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies needed to approve the reforms. The Senate, where it did command such a majority, approved by 32 votes to 16 on Oct. 22 a bill proposing a constitutional amendment to allow the re-election of the president.



The UCR leadership was split over the reform proposals, which were strongly opposed by Fernando de la Rúa and by Eduardo César Angelóz, the Governor of Córdoba and Menem's challenger in the 1989 presidential election [see p. 36651], whose stature in the party was greatly enhanced following the Peronists' defeat in Córdoba.

The UCR faction more inclined to support the reforms included Federico Storani (whose defeat in the Buenos Aires Province elections effectively ended his bid for party leadership), José Genoud, UCR president Mario Losada, and the UCR Governor of Rio Negro province, Horacio Massaccesi. A UCR deputy Héctor di Tulio, who was attacked by his colleagues in the UCR congressional bloc for publicly declaring his intention to vote "yes" in the plebiscite, announced on Oct. 27 that he was resigning his seat.

#### Menem's heart surgery

Menem underwent emergency heart surgery on Oct. 14 to clear a blockage of his carotid artery. This prevented his attending the Rio Group summit in Chile [see p. 39681]. He was reported to have made an excellent recovery and left hospital on Oct. 18.

■ Last article p. 39635; reference article pp. R28-29.

## FALKLAND (MALVINAS) ISLANDS

### Elections to Legislative Council

A record 24 candidates contested elections to the eight seats on the Legislative Council, held on Oct. 14.

There were two four-member constituencies, Camp (where eight candidates stood) and Stanley (where there were 16 candidates). The successful candidates, who stood as individuals in the virtual absence of political parties, were William Luxton (with 228 votes), Eric Goss (144), Norma Edwards (136) and Richard Stevens (135) in Camp, and Charles Keenleyside (with 456 votes), John Cheek (356), Carol Teggart (245) and Sharon Halford (214) in Stanley.

On the eve of the elections Argentina's Foreign Minister Guido di Tella had claimed that the poll would produce an "enlightened" group of councillors more disposed to dialogue with Argentina. However, all the successful candidates favoured the minimum contact necessary with Argentina until it dropped its sovereignty claim over the islands.

■ Last article p. 39315; reference article p. R40.

## CHILE

### Presidential term

Legislation to establish a four-year non-renewable presidential term, put forward by the government of President Patricio Aylwin Azócar reached an impasse when different proposals were approved by the Senate (in which supporters of former military ruler and current Army C.-in-C. Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte held a strong position).

The 1981 Constitution, promulgated during the military regime (1973-90), provided for an eight-year presidential term. The Senate version approved on Oct. 14, while accepting that the term would be four years, provided that a second term would be permitted. The Senate vote was 29 to 10 with four abstentions, those voting against being senators appointed by Pinochet before he handed over power, and senators of the right-wing Independent Democratic Union (UDI). The right-wing party National Renewal (RN), by contrast, voted in favour, following intense negotiations with the ruling Coalition for Democracy (CPD).

The Chamber of Deputies voted by a large majority on Oct. 20 in favour of reducing the presidential term to four years, without a provision for re-election.

Aylwin's non-renewable term of four years, due to end in March 1994, had been specifically laid down by a constitutional amendment approved by referendum in July 1989 [see also p. 36811]. In August 1991 he had rejected a cross-party initiative to extend his term of office for a further two years [see p. 38388]. Aylwin's centre-left CPD was anxious to amend the Constitution regarding the presidential term before the next presidential elections, due in December 1993.

■ Last article p. 39635; reference article pp. R34-35.

## PARAGUAY

### Postponement of governability pact

The signing of a "governability pact" between the right-wing ruling Colorado Party (ANRPC) and the main opposition parties was suspended on Oct. 7 following a violent demonstration earlier that day outside the Congress in the capital, Asunción.

Lacking a clear majority in either house of the Congress following elections in May [see p. 39459], the government had agreed to discuss the "governability pact" with the opposition which wanted major political reforms [see p. 39595], especially the removal of the military, a major force in the Colorado party, from direct involvement in politics.

Opposition politicians claimed that Blas N. Riquelme, the Colorado Party president, along with the Army C.-in-C. Gen. Lino César Oviedo and Germán Franco Vargas, the Chief of the National Police, had orchestrated the trucking-in of more than 1,500 demonstrators, most of them allegedly drunk, who attacked congressional officials, legislators and journalists and blocked the entrance to the building. The police failed to intervene.

Riquelme stated that the Colorado leadership fully supported the demonstration, claiming that it was an expression of opposition to a draft bill intended to strip soldiers and police of their party membership.

#### Removal of Police Chief

In response to opposition protests, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy removed Vargas as National Police Chief on Oct. 9 and replaced him with Police Chief Superintendent Mario Agustín Sapirza Nunes.

■ Last article pp. 39594-95; reference article pp. R48-49.

## BOLIVIA

### Changes in military leadership

President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who took office in August [see p. 39593], replaced the armed forces commanders on Oct. 6 [for November 1991 appointments see p. 38572].

The Joint C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces, Gen. Oscar Vargas Lorenzetti, was replaced by Gen. Fernando Sanjines of the Air Force, and the C.-in-C. of General Staff, Gen. Hernán Lara, was replaced by Gen. Moises Chiriki. The new commanders of the army, air force and navy were respectively Gen. Reynaldo Caceres, Gen. José Pérez Reyes Ortiz and Vice-Adml. Julio Molina.

The appointments reportedly surprised the military, and an attempted mutiny by high-ranking officers was reported in the Miraflores garrison in the capital, La Paz, while there was serious unrest in the eastern city of Cochabamba among middle-ranking officers already reportedly disgruntled at not receiving their September salaries.

The replacements coincided with reports that the Armed Forces National Development Corporation (Cofadena), an industrial, agricultural and mining holding company and development organization owned by the armed forces, had participated in a complex operation involving the illegal purchase of arms in Portugal for transshipment to Bosnia or Croatia. The sale of ammunition produced in Cochabamba to a Portuguese company was also involved. The Attorney General's office was investigating civilian involvement, including that of a Portuguese and two Israeli nationals, and had asked the armed forces to investigate two generals and a former Defence Minister, Rear Adml. Alberto Sainz Klinsky.

■ Last article p. 39593; reference article pp. R31-32.

## PERU

### Constitutional referendum

A referendum was held on Oct. 31 on a new draft constitution, which had been approved by the Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD) on Aug. 31 [see p. 39635].

The new 206-article constitution allowed President Alberto Keinya Fujimori, who had carried out a constitutional coup (*autogolpe*) in April 1992 [see p. 38846], to stand for re-election in 1995. It reduced the Congress to a single chamber of 120 members, to be elected from a single national list. It also reintroduced the death penalty for terrorism (although its retrospective application to imprisoned guerrillas remained in doubt) and abolished free university education and the right to job stability. The CCD, controlled by Fujimori supporters, had initially approved these provisions as amendments to the 1979 Constitution in June and August [see pp. 39505; 39593].

Voting was monitored by a mission from the Organization of American States (OAS), but opposition political and labour groups claimed that their anti-referendum campaign had been seriously disrupted by the military and that the government had commandeered the media. Troops used water cannon and tear gas to disperse an anti-referendum



student demonstration in the capital, Lima, on Oct. 28. Early returns showed a 55.3 per cent "yes" vote.

#### Guzmán peace offers

Fujimori revealed on Oct. 1 to the UN General Assembly in New York that he had rejected a Sept. 15 written peace offer from Abimael Guzmán Renoso, the imprisoned leader of the Maoist Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) guerrillas, to end the 13-year civil war.

The offer was repeated in a second letter on Oct. 6, when Guzmán also conceded that the government had inflicted serious defeats on *Sendero* over the previous 18 months. He declined, however, to call on his supporters to disarm.

The authenticity of two government videos showing both Guzmán and his second-in-command Elena Reborado Iparaquirre reading and signing the texts was questioned by sections of the media. *Sendero* leaders at large in Lima dismissed them outright as fabrications. A large *Sendero* car bomb, which killed three people and injured 50 others in Lima on Oct. 22, was interpreted variously as a sign of support for Guzmán or a rejection of his peace offer by dissident *Sendero* members.

Doubts about the spontaneity of the peace offers also grew when it became known that a special "envoy" of Fujimori (believed to be his highly controversial security adviser Capt. Vladimiro Montesinos—see pp. 39266; 39458) had maintained a "systematic approach" to the guerrilla leaders with a view to their capitulation.

Opposition critics claimed that the timing of the peace offer and video releases was intended to influence the referendum vote.

■ Last article pp. 39593-94; reference article pp. 49-50.

## BRAZIL

### Corruption scandal

The National Congress on Oct. 18 agreed to set up a congressional investigating committee (CPI) following serious allegations of corruption in relation to the federal budget committee. President Itamar Franco said the same day that he was prepared to resign if the Congress approved early elections (otherwise not due until October 1994). Franco's comments caused near-panic among the business community and large falls on stock markets.

The corruption allegations involved Congress members and other politicians who were said to have accepted bribes to get construction projects included in the federal budget, and to have diverted funds to personal schemes. The source of the allegations was José Carlos Alves dos Santos, a former director of the congressional budget commission under former presidents José Sarney and Fernando Collor de Mello; the latter was currently in custody on murder, drug trafficking and counterfeiting charges. Collor, who had resigned in December 1992 to avoid impeachment, still also faced apparently unrelated corruption charges before the Supreme Court [see p. 39410].

Those accused by Alves dos Santos of involvement in corruption were 22 deputies (including Generalbaldo Correa, the leader in the Chamber of Deputies of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party—

PMDB), four senators (including Mauro Benevides, PMDB leader in the Senate, and Humberto Lucena, the Senate President), two ministers, Alexandre Costa (Interior and Regional Integration) and Henrique Hargreaves (Civilian Household of the Presidency), two former ministers, two former Social Welfare Ministry secretaries, three governors, and eight of the country's largest construction companies. Costa and Hargreaves tendered their resignations on Oct. 18; that of Hargreaves was accepted; he was not immediately replaced.

The 44-member CPI, which had 45 days to complete its inquiry, on Oct. 27 authorized the investigation of the bank accounts and tax records of those named and voted to open up their own accounts to inspection to avoid allegations of involvement in the scandal.

#### Threat of further allegations

Relatives of Paulo César Farias (known as "PC"), who was wanted for alleged corrupt fundraising for the disgraced Collor [see pp. 38909; 39188] and who fled the country in June, stated in late October that he had further information on the budget scandal which would be revealed "at the right movement". Farias arrived in London on Oct. 10.

#### Constitutional review

The corruption scandal threatened to block Congress's constitutional review which, under the 1988 Constitution, was required to be implemented within five years.

The review was opposed by left-wing parties, trade unions and church groups which feared that existing constitutional guarantees on social rights would be threatened. A Supreme Court judge sitting alone on Oct. 5 annulled on a technicality the opening congressional session on the reforms, but the annulment was reversed by a ruling of the full Supreme Court on Oct. 7.

In a bid to free the government's hand to deal with the economic crisis, the review centred on curbing the flow of federal tax revenues to states and local governments, on re-organizing and simplifying the tax system to boost revenues, and on lifting restraints on foreign capital investing in state-owned enterprises and bidding for public contracts.

A further controversial proposal—to set a minimum percentage of the national vote required for a party to gain representation in the Congress—was designed to reduce the number of parties represented in the Congress (from the current 19 to seven or eight) and thus to rid it of small parties accused of being obstructionist and vehicles for local interests.

#### Ministerial appointment

Dejandir Dalpasquale was appointed as the new Agriculture Minister on Oct. 6 [for resignation of his predecessor see p. 39634].

■ Last article p. 39634; reference article pp. R32-33.

## ECUADOR

### Privatization law

The National Congress on Oct. 22 finally approved a controversial privatization law after

nearly eight months of acrimonious debate. Privatization proposals had first been put forward in an economic reform package announced in September 1992 [see p. 39091].

The right-wing free-market government of President Sixto Durán Ballén, hampered by the lack of a congressional majority, was committed to reducing the size of the public sector, and to the wholesale privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation of numerous economic activities. Compensation was to be offered to public-sector workers who opted for voluntary redundancy.

The first candidates for privatization were the large state-run electricity, telecommunications and petroleum companies.

■ Last article p. 39554; reference article p. R39.

## VENEZUELA

### Coup allegations

The Defence Minister Gen. Radamés Muñoz León stated on Oct. 19 that rumours of coups and "conspiratorial attitudes", of which there had been several in recent months, had to end "once and for all" and that democratic rights had to be defended.

He was responding to accusations by José Vicente Rangel, a journalist and the presidential candidate of the opposition Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), that four generals had recently been involved in a conspiracy to stage a coup. Muñoz said that Rangel would have to provide names and evidence to a military court.

The government had itself announced on Sept. 29 that far left groups had been planning an insurrection the following day in order to goad the military into launching a coup and thus create social unrest. The government claimed to have foiled this plan, but refused to release the names of ringleaders or groups involved. Its claims on this occasion were given some support by reports that the military high command had met in urgent session on Sept. 28. Rangel, however, publicly rejected the government's version of events, accusing it of creating a climate of tension in order to justify the September repression of social protest at a time of economic crisis [see p. 39634].

■ Last article p. 39634; reference article p. R58.

## IN BRIEF

**DOMINICA:** Crispin Sorhaindo, Speaker of the House of Assembly and a former senior official of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), was elected by the House of Assembly as the new President on Oct. 4 and succeeded Sir Clarence Augustus Seignoret on Oct. 25.

**EL SALVADOR:** The Public Health and Social Welfare Minister, Col. Lisandro Vásquez Sosa, survived an assassination attempt by unknown assailants on Oct. 5. The murder on Oct. 25 of Francisco Velis, a member of the electoral secretariat of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), was attributed to right-wing death squads.



# ASIA - PACIFIC

## PAKISTAN

### General and provincial elections - Return of Bhutto as Prime Minister

A general election to the 217-member National Assembly held on Oct. 6 resulted in a hung parliament.

There were 201 contested seats (the remainder being reserved for minorities and women). The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won 86 seats, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML-N) 72, other parties a total of 28, and independent candidates 15.

The PPP's share of total votes cast was officially estimated at nearly 38 per cent, lower than the 41 per cent secured by the PML-N. Religious parties in the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) gained a little over 3 per cent, the *Islami Jamhoori Mahaz* (IJM) 2.2 per cent and the *Muttahida Deeni Mahaz* about 1 per cent of total votes cast.

The national turnout was low, at around 41 per cent, with voter apathy particularly marked in Sind province, the PPP's home base. In Karachi, Sind's largest city, voter turnout was put at about 10 per cent and as low as 2 per cent in neighbourhoods controlled by the Urdu-speaking migrants party, the *Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz* (Altaf group) (MQM-A), which had boycotted the polls in protest against alleged army discrimination against its candidates. (The MQM-A later suspended its boycott to contest provincial elections in Sind—see below.)

#### Provincial elections

Elections to 458 provincial assembly seats also took place on Oct. 9.

#### Pakistan provincial election results

| Party                | Baluchistan | NWFP | Punjab | Sind |
|----------------------|-------------|------|--------|------|
| PPP                  | 3           | 22   | 94     | 56   |
| PML (Nawaz)          | 6           | 15   | 106    | 8    |
| Awami National Party | 1           | 20   | 0      | 0    |
| PML (Junejo)         | 0           | 4    | 18     | 0    |
| MQM (Altaf)          | 0           | 0    | 0      | 27   |
| Others               | 21          | 7    | 5      | 3    |
| Independents         | 9           | 11   | 17     | 5    |
| Total seats          | 40          | 79   | 240    | 99   |

The PPP and its allies emerged with enough seats to form a government in Punjab, the country's largest province and home base of former Prime Minister Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, who had been expected to retain control of the province.

In Sind the PPP's comfortable majority remained secure, although one seat was won by Murtaza Bhutto, exiled brother of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, who had threatened to split the party [see p. 39600].

The PML-N and its allies secured the government of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), while in Baluchistan no single group emerged victorious.

#### Return of Bhutto as Prime Minister

Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as Prime Minister on Oct. 19 after winning a decisive vote of support in the newly elected National Assembly, with 121 votes against 72 for former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the only other contender. Eight MPs abstained, most of them affiliated to religious parties, which opposed the leadership of a woman.

Bhutto had been Prime Minister from December 1988 until her dismissal in August 1990 on charges of corruption which were never brought to trial [see pp. 37652-53; 37763-64; 38194].

Bhutto, who led a fragile coalition, promised in her acceptance speech to continue with economic reforms initiated by the caretaker government [see p. 39600], and to root out political corruption. Calling for an end to the political confrontation of recent years, she urged provincial governments to co-operate in the creation of a stable government at the centre. Her government faced one of the strongest oppositions in the country's history, led by her arch rival, Sharif. Both she and Sharif had firmly rejected, however, the attempts reportedly made by the caretaker government and the army to construct a "grand coalition", under which the two main party leaders would each hold the premiership for 2½ years.

#### New Cabinet

In what was regarded as a deliberate move away from using ministerial appointments as political patronage, Bhutto named an unusu-

#### New Pakistan Cabinet

Benazir Bhutto (PPP) Prime Minister;  
Finance; Commerce  
Farooq Ahmed Leghari (PPP) Foreign Affairs  
Muhammad Asghar (PML-Junejo) Industries and Production  
Aftab Shahban Mirani (PPP) Defence  
Naseerullah Babar (PPP) Home Affairs  
Sher Afghani Niazi (independent) Parliamentary Affairs  
V. A. Jafarey (no party affiliation) Financial adviser with Cabinet status  
Mohammad Afzal Khan (ANP) Minister without portfolio  
Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar (PPP) Minister of State for Commerce

ally small Cabinet. A notable omission was that of her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, whose controversial role during Bhutto's first tenure as Prime Minister had been subjected to intense public scrutiny.

#### Increased powers to Northern Areas

Prior to the elections the caretaker government had decided on Oct. 4 to delegate provincial powers to the Northern Areas, consisting of the three administrative districts of Baltistan, Gilgit and Hunza; its Commissioner, who headed a 16-member elected Northern Areas Council, would be accorded the status of a federal minister.

■ Last article pp. 39640-41; reference article pp. R78-79.

## INDIA

### Revised estimates of earthquake disaster - Relief assistance

The final death toll of the earthquake which hit the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in late September [see p. 39639] was given on Oct. 12 by Maharashtra Chief Minister Sharad Pawar as 9,748. Seeking to explain why earlier reports had cited much higher figures of about 30,000 dead, Pawar said that some 16,000 critically injured people had originally been presumed dead.

On Oct. 4 the union government pledged Rs 500 million (about US\$16,000,000) in relief assistance to earthquake victims and said that it would welcome foreign donations. Offers of rescue and relief aid came from several Western countries, the UN, and the World Bank, which was expected to grant more than US\$300 million to cover rehabilitation and rebuilding costs. On Oct. 6 Bhutan and Japan offered assistance, as did Pakistan (also on Oct. 6) and other Muslim countries including Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

#### Pakistan National Assembly results

| Party                                  | Elected seats |
|--|---------------|
| Pakistan People's Party                | 86            |
| Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)         | 72            |
| Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)        | 6             |
| Islami Jamhoori Mahaz                  | 4             |
| Awami National Party                   | 3             |
| Pakistan Islamic Front                 | 3             |
| Pakhtoonkwa Milli Awami Party          | 3             |
| Jamhoori Watan Party                   | 2             |
| Muttahida Deeni Mahaz                  | 2             |
| Baluchistan National Movement (Hai)    | 1             |
| Baluchistan National Movement (Mengal) | 1             |
| National Democratic Alliance           | 1             |
| National People's Party                | 1             |
| Pakhtoonkwa Qaumi Party                | 1             |
| Independents                           | 15            |
| Total                                  | 201           |



### Ruling on Bhopal disaster

The US Supreme Court on Oct. 4 refused to review a US appeals court ruling that victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster [see pp. 33647-48] lacked the legal standing to contest a US\$470 million settlement between the Indian government and the US-based corporation Union Carbide, implicated in the disaster. Actions filed in the US courts had claimed that the settlement was inadequate and that its acceptance had been due to the government's conflict of interest stemming from its part-ownership of the plant.

### Ruling on judicial appointments

The Indian Supreme Court on Oct. 6 ruled that the Chief Justice had primacy over the political executive in matters pertaining to the appointment and transfer of High Court and Supreme Court judges.

The ruling was expected to end the use of judicial appointments as political patronage, a measure resorted to most blatantly by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during her 1975-77 rule of emergency.

### Securities scandal developments

The UK-based Standard Chartered Bank, which sustained heavy losses in the May 1992 financial and securities fraud [see pp. 38913; 38967; 39008; 39053; 39145; 39194; 39270; 39467; 39512], became the first party to retrieve its funds after the National Housing Bank of India agreed on Oct. 1 to pay it a settlement of £25,900,000.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed new charges on Oct. 11 against 15 people including the Bombay stockbroker Harshad Mehta implicated in the banking scandal, alleging that they had conspired to cheat SBI Capital Markets—the merchant banking arm of the State Bank of India—of a sum of Rs 1,005 million.

On Oct. 12 the CBI announced that it had dropped its inquiries into allegations that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao had accepted undeclared campaign contributions from Mehta [see p. 39512], on grounds of insufficient evidence.

### Charges against Hindu opposition parties

The government on Oct. 5 filed charges against leaders of the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) and *Shiv Sena* for their involvement in the demolition in December 1992 of the Ayodhya mosque in Uttar Pradesh [see p. 39222].

### Creation of Human Rights Commission

Home Affairs Minister S. B. Chavan said on Oct. 7 that allegations of "excesses" by the security forces would "definitely" fall within the purview of the National Human Rights Commission which was established by the government on Sept. 29.

### New naval chief

Adml. V. S. Shekhawat took over from Adml. L. Ramdas as Chief of Naval Staff on Oct. 1.

## Developments in states

### Mosque siege in Kashmir

Indian security forces on Oct. 13 laid siege to the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, where Kashmiri separatists had taken refuge.

The 17th century shrine, said to hold a strand of hair belonging to the Prophet Muhammad, was regarded by Muslims as one of Islam's holiest sites. It was occupied by some 200 people, 50 of them believed to be armed Muslim rebels. The siege involved the withdrawal of water and electricity supplies, and it provoked immediate popular protest and the imposition of an indefinite curfew in Srinagar. Bloody protests called in defiance of the curfew led to the death of a reported 29 people on Oct. 22.

Negotiations with the militants began on Oct. 17 but failed to resolve the crisis. The government refused to accede to the militants' request to leave the shrine without surrendering their weapons. On Oct. 19 Army C-in-C Lt.-Gen. B. C. Joshi threatened to "fire out [the militants] and break their will". On Oct. 25 the state governor, Gen. (retd) K. V. Krishna Rao, said that there were no plans "at the moment" to storm the shrine, calming fears of a disastrous repeat of the 1984 attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab [see pp. 33221-24].

On Oct. 16 the Indian government claimed to have "hard evidence" that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had deliberately plotted with Kashmiri separatists to steal or damage the shrine's holy relic and lay the blame on India. Pakistan denied the allegations and accused India of committing "wanton sacrilege". On Oct. 18 each side ordered the expulsion of four of the other's diplomats, on charges of spying. [For May 1992 diplomatic crisis leading to mutual expulsions see pp. 38914; 38968].

In a separate development the state government on Oct. 23 ordered an inquiry into reports that paramilitary troops had massacred 38 Kashmiri separatist sympathisers in the village of Bijbehara, south of Srinagar, the previous day.

### Other states

Violent clashes between Bodo militants belonging to the separatist Bodo Security Force (BSF) and non-Bodo tribespeople in the Kokhrajara and Bongaigaon districts of Assam left 23 people dead, it was reported on Oct. 13.

Nekhlun Kuki, chief of the rebel Kuki National Army (KNA) involved in clashes with Naga tribespeople in Manipur [see pp. 39601; 39640], was killed in a gun battle with security forces in Senapati district on Oct. 12.

■ Last article p. 39639-40; reference article pp. R67-69.

## TAJIKISTAN

### Continuing border conflict

Sporadic fighting continued throughout October between forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) stationed along the Tajik-Afghan border [see p. 39599] and oppo-

sition forces operating from Afghanistan. On Oct. 5, border forces used helicopter gunships and artillery to repel an offensive launched two days earlier by some 400 opposition fighters close to the 12th border post, site of a massacre of border troops on July 13 [see pp. 39560-61]. In a further incident in the same sector on Oct. 21 around 70 opposition fighters were reportedly killed by border troops.

On Oct. 7 six border troops were captured by opposition forces close to a sector of the border in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region and taken into Afghanistan. They were released on the following day after the Tajik government delivered a formal protest to the Afghan government and the CIS border troops' commander threatened to shell opposition positions across the border.

■ Last article p. 39639; reference article pp. R83-84.

## UZBEKISTAN

### Further harassment of opposition

Samad Muratov, who had been elected first secretary of the opposition party *Erk* ("Freedom") on Sept. 25, was beaten up by unknown assailants in the town of Karshi on Oct. 3. This was the third such attack on a prominent opposition figure in 1993: in May Shukhrat Ismatullayev, co-chairman of the *Birlilik* ("Unity") movement, had been attacked by unidentified assailants on a street in Tashkent, the capital, and in September Shukrulla Mirsaidov, former Prime Minister and Vice-President, suffered a similar attack in Tashkent.

The deadline passed on Oct. 1 for political parties and movements to register in accordance with a decree issued in March. An application from *Birlilik* was apparently refused on the grounds that the movement no longer satisfied the requirement of having an office address. *Erk* reportedly did not attempt to re-register.

The Supreme Court on Sept. 23 sentenced five men to prison terms of between 10 and 15 years for treason. The basis for the charge was unclear, but the five had reportedly been arrested while illegally attempting to cross from neighbouring Tajikistan into Afghanistan. The authorities named them as members of an Islamic opposition group called *Adolat* ("Justice"), although *Adolat* sources denied this.

### Rafsanjani visit

President Rafsanjani of Iran arrived in Tashkent on Oct. 18 on the first leg of a tour of Muslim former Soviet republics, which was also scheduled to include Turkmenistan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Official talks in Uzbekistan concentrated on economic ties.

■ Last article pp. 39321; 39516; reference article p. R85.



## SRI LANKA

### Government offensive against LTTE

Official military sources claimed on Oct. 5 that some 800 rebels belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had been killed during the government's biggest military operation against LTTE bases in almost two years. Simultaneous reports said that about 118 soldiers had also been killed.

The heavy casualties followed a fierce government offensive launched in late September which culminated in the capture on Oct. 1 of the Killali lagoon crossing, some 14 km north of army bases in the Elephant Pass. The lagoon's crucial importance lay in its use as a conduit by LTTE forces on the Jaffna peninsula to maintain contact with the mainland. All other routes had been secured by the army.

On Oct. 4 the Defence Ministry ordered the withdrawal of government troops from Killali amid reports that it had been "taken aback" at the scale of army casualties.

#### Resignation of Bandaranaike

Anura Bandaranaike, son of former Prime Minister and party leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, announced his resignation as national organizer of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) on Oct. 11 amid reports of a family power struggle.

■ Last article pp. 39513; 39562; reference article pp. R81-R1

## BANGLADESH

### Court order protecting author

A court in Dhaka on Oct. 6 ordered police protection for the author Taslima Nasreen, after reports that she had received death threats from Muslim extremist groups which accused her of blasphemy. The campaign against Nasreen was led by the little-known Council of the Soldiers of Islam which had placed a US\$1,250 price on her head.

In mid-September dozens of Islamic groups had threatened to try Nasreen under Islamic law if the government failed to take action against the publication of her novel, *Lajja* ("Shame"), which depicted attacks on a Hindu family by Muslims in the aftermath of the December 1992 demolition of the Ayodhya mosque in Uttar Pradesh, India [see p. 39222]. The book had been banned since July.

#### Left-wing alliance

Ten left-wing political parties, including remnants of the Bangladesh Communist Party (BCP), announced the formation of a socialist alliance on Oct. 4.

■ Last article p. 39641; reference article pp. R60-61.

## BURMA

### Ceasefire agreement with KIA

An official announcement on Oct. 2 said that Lt.-Gen. Khin Nyunt, First Secretary of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), had signed a ceasefire agreement in the Kachin state capital, Myitkyina, with Maj.-Gen. Zau Mai, chief of staff of the 8,000-strong Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the military wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The agreement, ending almost 30 years of hostility between the Kachin and Burma's central authorities, was regarded as the most important victory for the country's ruling military junta since 1989, when Wa tribesmen, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the forces of Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and who had mutinied against the CPB leadership, became government-controlled militia forces.

The settlement came after months of secret negotiations. In April both sides were reported to have agreed to a ceasefire, although this was later denied by the Kachin. Kachin willingness to resume talks was apparently dictated by a series of recent setbacks triggered by diminishing arms supplies from the Kachins' former communist allies and an abortive Kachin military offensive against government strongholds in the north-west in mid-1992.

The Kachin had hitherto been the strongest insurgent force after the communists. Their agreement with the government left the Karen as the main insurgent group still challenging the government. On Oct. 5 Maj.-Gen. Bo Mya, president and chief of staff of the 5,000-strong Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and president of the dissident umbrella Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), criticized the Kachin for making a separate peace.

#### Amnesty report

The human rights organization Amnesty International in a report published on Oct. 8 accused the military government of widespread human rights violations. The report claimed that hundreds of political detainees had been tortured and summarily executed, and that those released in the previous 18 months, totalling about 2,000, remained subject to intimidation, military surveillance and restricted freedoms.

#### Agreement between rival warlords

The *Bangkok Post* of Oct. 15 reported that Chang Shee Fu (known as Khun Sa), wanted by the USA on charges of drug trafficking, and Chao Yelai, a rival "drug warlord" of the Wa community, had signed a ceasefire agreement.

The report said that Khun Sa had agreed to co-operate after realizing that heroin factories at his base in Shan state were having to rely on opium produced in Wa areas further north.

On Oct. 12 a US official spokesman had indicated that the USA sought low-level discussions with Burma to combat drug trafficking.

■ Last article p. 39641; reference article pp. R62-63.

## VIETNAM

### Preliminary border agreement with China

Vu Khoan, the Vice-Foreign Minister of Vietnam, and Tang Jiaxuan, a Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, signed a preliminary agreement on Oct. 19 which was designed to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the disputed Sino-Vietnamese border.

The ongoing border dispute, which also involved a stretch of the South China Sea, had led to the outbreak of unofficial hostilities between the two countries in 1979. Khoan hailed the agreement as the fruit of 20 years of bilateral talks, but warned that it was only a starting point on the road towards resolving the dispute.

#### Resumption of international lending

The IMF, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank resumed lending to Vietnam in October, following the decision of the USA in July to cease blocking international assistance, and the decision in September by 15 countries to clear Vietnam's debts to the IMF [see p. 39642].

Vietnam's prohibition from using IMF resources was lifted following the formal clearance of its IMF debt of SDR 100,200,000 (about US\$142 million) on Oct. 5. The IMF thereupon approved credits for Vietnam totalling SDR 157,080,000 (US\$223 million). Of this amount, SDR 12,080,000 (\$17,000,000) was to be provided as a first drawing under the IMF's new systemic transformation facility (STF), while a further SDR 145,000,000 (\$206 million) was to be made available over the next 12 months as a standby credit to support the government's 1993-94 economic programme.

The ADB approved a US\$76,500,000 soft loan on Oct. 26, its first credit to Vietnam since the end of the war in 1975. The interest-free loan, which was to finance irrigation projects and was repayable over 40 years with a 10-year grace period, was in addition to \$1,800,000 provided to help develop water resources.

Vietnam received on Nov. 1 two credits from the World Bank's soft loan affiliate, the International Development Association, repayable over 40 years with a 10-year grace period and a service charge of 0.75 per cent. One credit of \$70,000,000 was for primary education and the other, of \$158,500,000, was to upgrade the main north-south highway.

■ Last article p. 39642; reference article pp. R85-86.

## CAMBODIA

### Cancellation of peace talks - Election of president of National Assembly

It was announced on Oct. 25 that talks between the Cambodian government and the *Khmers Rouges* scheduled for November had been postponed indefinitely. The announcement, made by the country's co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, fol-



lowed a statement from his father, King Norodom Sihanouk, that he was unable to mediate in the talks because of ill health.

Ranariddh played down the importance of the development, arguing that recent *Khmer Rouge* statements, together with the organization's continuing military action, had meant that the talks would have had little chance of success.

The Cambodian National Assembly elected Chea Sim, as its president on Oct. 25, by 99 votes to 14. The leader of the Cambodian People's Party, he had been Assembly president for 10 years under the former communist regime.

#### Resumption of full IMF membership

The IMF on Oct. 4 reinstated Cambodia as a full member and approved a loan totalling SDR 6,250,000 (about US\$9,000,000) under its systemic transformation facility (STF) to support the government's economic and financial programme for 1993-94.

The action followed the settlement on Oct. 1 of Cambodia's overdue financial obligations to the IMF, totalling SDR 36,900,000 (about US\$52,000,000), facilitated by grants from members of a support group co-chaired by France and Japan [see p. 39642]. Although Cambodia was never declared by the IMF officially to be in suspension, relations were severed following the installation in 1975 of the *Khmer Rouge* regime. They were not renewed until the six-month period immediately preceding the reinstatement.

Cambodia's current quota in the IMF was SDR 25,000,000 (about US\$35,000,000).

■ Last article p. 39642; reference article pp. R63-65.

## SINGAPORE

### Opening of Official Secrets Act trial

In what was widely regarded as a test case for press freedom, two journalists, one of whom was Patrick Daniel, editor of the influential *Business Times*, and three prominent economists went on trial on Oct. 21 accused of violating the Official Secrets Act.

The five defendants were charged with illegally disclosing on June 29, 1992—before its official publication—Singapore's 4.6 per cent growth rate for the second quarter of 1992. If convicted, each faced a maximum of two years' imprisonment or a fine of S\$2,000 (about US\$1,270), or both.

■ Last article p. 39602; reference article p. R81.

## INDONESIA

### Golkar party congress

At the congress of the Functional Group Centre (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*—Golkar) on Oct. 25, Information Minister Harmoko was elected general chair of the ruling group. The only candidate for the post, Harmoko had been endorsed by Indonesian President Suharto in his capacity as head of Golkar's all-powerful Advisory Board.

Although technically Golkar was an amalgamation of occupational groups rather than a political party, it had been Indonesia's dominant political organization since its foundation in 1964. Harmoko was the first civilian to hold the post of chairman, and his endorsement by Suharto was interpreted as something of a slight for the military. Since the June 1992 general election [see pp. 38964-65], Suharto had made it clear that Golkar should work to counter its declining popular support by reducing its links with the military and displaying a greater commitment in the pursuit of democracy and social justice.

The military was offered some consolation with the choice of retired general Ari Mardjono as Golkar's new secretary-general after another single-candidate election, although Mardjono's academic background, and previous position as secretary to the Advisory Board, located him clearly outside the military mainstream.

■ Last article pp. 39642-43; reference article pp. R69-71.

## CHINA

### Internal security issues

A five-day working conference held by the State Security Ministry and attended by a majority of the standing committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politburo, including CPP general secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng, was held in Beijing on Oct. 5-10. The prevailing theme of the conference was that China's economic reforms and increasing integration in the international economy posed a risk of rising crime and increased threats to the country's security. Under such circumstances, it was concluded, it was imperative to maintain vigilance and to increase efforts to combat social disintegration.

#### Restrictions on satellite television access

Evidence of this growing concern over security was apparent in the adoption of new regulations—signed into law by Li Peng on Oct. 5 and published on Oct. 8—which were designed to limit severely the population's access to foreign television broadcasting.

The new law placed tight restrictions on the manufacture, import, sale and installation of satellite dishes, all of which would be subject to strict licensing. Although official statistics indicated that China had only some 41,000 satellite receivers, it was widely acknowledged that the real figure was in the millions. The proliferation of satellite dishes in recent years, both in private households and in restaurants, workplaces and other communal centres, had posed an increasing threat to the government's information monopoly.

#### Fresh regulations on economic activity - New publishing regulations

In a further move to control the consequences of China's more market-oriented policies, on Oct. 22 the State Council and the central committee of the CCP issued orders which forbade public officials from engaging in private busi-

ness ventures or from speculation on the stock market.

The directives acknowledged the growing public concern over corruption within the party and the state bureaucracies, and demanded that "misconduct that the broad masses of people resent strongly must be halted". In addition to restrictions on the activities of individual office holders, the new regulations sought to eradicate the recent tendency of public bodies to establish private economic enterprises. The new rules stated that "no party or government organization at any level may join or set up businesses; economic enterprises that have already been established must thoroughly sever ties with their original departments".

It was announced on Oct. 28 that the sale of official registration numbers for printed matter—including books, magazines and newspapers—had been prohibited. Although issued by the government, registration numbers had in recent months been increasingly sold by publishers for private profit. The banning of this practice was seen as further evidence of the government's determination to reassert complete control over the information industries.

#### Muslim unrest in Xining

It was announced by the Chinese authorities on Oct. 15 that security forces had crushed protests by Muslims in Xining, the capital of the central Qinghai province. The action was reported to have taken place on Oct. 7, but no indication was given of how long the protests had lasted.

The protests, which formed the worst confirmed unrest among China's Muslim population for three years [see p. 37373], were provoked by insulting references to Islam contained in a children's book. Although the book was immediately withdrawn and an apology issued, the matter served as a catalyst for the expression of wider Muslim discontent. An attempt by Muslims to travel to Beijing to hold a protest rally was reported to have been prevented by the authorities.

■ Last article p. 39638; reference article pp. R65-66.

## HONG KONG

### Continuing UK-China negotiations

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Douglas Hurd met Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qian Qichen at the UN on Oct. 1, but their talks failed to make any progress towards resolving the ongoing differences over the future of Hong Kong.

Hurd said afterwards that the current process of Sino-British negotiations could not continue "indefinitely", and that if no agreement was forthcoming then the UK would have to consider enacting constitutional reform in the colony without the consent of China. This message was underlined by Governor Chris Patten in his second state-of-the-colony annual address to Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco) on Oct. 6.



Expressing frustration over the fruitlessness of Sino-British negotiations since April 1993, Patten warned the Chinese government that "we now have only weeks rather than months to conclude these talks". The most pressing priority for the coming year, he stressed, was to reach an agreement with China on fair and open local elections in 1994 and legislative elections in 1995, as suggested in his democratic reform package unveiled in October 1992 [see p. 39143]. "Alas," he said, "we have still not succeeded in convincing Chinese officials that Hong Kong's extraordinarily modest aspirations for political development are legitimate."

The initial Chinese response to Patten's speech was much more muted than had been expected, an expression of "regret" contrasting sharply with the many vitriolic statements which had been directed at Patten over the past year. Relations deteriorated following the failure of the 13th round of talks on Oct. 11-13, however, with Patten taking issue with remarks made on Oct. 11 by the chief Chinese negotiator, Vice-Foreign Minister Jiang Enzhu. Choosing to translate Jiang's remarks as having expressed the view that it would be "no big deal" if the two sides found themselves unable to reach an agreement, on Oct. 12 Patten rebuked the Chinese delegation for its attitude to the talks and questioned its sincerity.

In what appeared to be an abrupt change of tactics, on Oct. 14 Patten offered to accede to a longstanding Chinese demand to discuss the 1994 and 1995 elections separately, despite having stressed as recently as in his Oct. 6 address that the two sets of elections should be considered "as a package".

The offer was given a cautious welcome by the Chinese government, and ensured that the 14th and 15th rounds of talks, on Oct. 20-21 and Oct. 27-28, were held in a more cordial atmosphere than had been the 13th. Nevertheless, no significant progress was achieved. Although the two sides agreed to meet again on Nov. 19-20, the head of the UK delegation, Sir Robin McLaren, acknowledged that there still existed "quite a gap" between the two sides, and he stated that he was "uncertain as to whether we can achieve an agreement".

■ Last article pp. 39638-9; reference article p. R67.

## TAIWAN

### Presidential address

President Lee Teng-hui gave an address on Oct. 10 to mark the country's National Day in which he contrasted the "economic miracle" achieved by Taiwan with the situation in mainland China where, he claimed, the "monopoly of power by corrupt privileged classes" had created a "gaping discrepancy between rich and poor". He described the continuing division of China as "an historical tragedy", and reiterated his government's commitment to future reunification, citing the establishment of private-sector contact be-

tween Taiwan and the mainland as an important step towards this goal.

### Sentencing of stock speculators - Financial reforms

A leading stock market speculator and 38 other people were convicted on Oct. 12 of breaking securities laws in Taiwan's largest ever stock scandal.

Lei Po-lung, known as "Big Hands", received a one-year prison sentence for his part in defaulting on payments in 1992 amounting to NT\$1,500 million (US\$1.00=NT\$26.8288 as at Oct. 11, 1993). The others, found guilty of share price manipulation and of acting as fronts for Lei's dealings, received prison sentences ranging from four to 10 months, some of which were suspended. Three people were acquitted on all charges.

Sweeping financial reforms were announced in Taiwan on Oct. 13, effective from Oct. 14, which were expected to increase the country's influence in international capital markets.

The new rules allowed companies to raise annual sums of up to US\$3,000 million overseas, bring it back to Taiwan and convert it into local currency. Previously, companies had been forced to use money raised overseas for external projects or purchases. The new rules also provided for an easing of restrictions on foreign investors' funds entering Taiwan.

■ Last article p. 39638; reference article pp. 82-83.

## NORTH KOREA

### Relations with South Korea and IAEA

Representatives from North and South Korea met at the peace village of Panmunjom on Oct. 5 for the first direct negotiations since January 1993 [see p. 39274], which took the form of working-level contacts concerning the possible exchange of special presidential envoys. Although no immediate progress was reported, further rounds were held on Oct. 15 and Oct. 25.

The talks had been proposed by the North Korean government on Oct. 2, without the preconditions which it had previously attached to any resumption of bilateral dialogue [see p. 39637]. Nevertheless, the North Korean delegation gave no indication that the government had softened its stance in its dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the latter's demands to inspect two nuclear sites suspected of containing evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme.

The North Korean government informed the IAEA on Oct. 12 that it would not engage in any further negotiations over nuclear site inspections, and that the only means of resolving the dispute was through direct talks with the USA. The IAEA confirmed on Oct. 29 that it had received written notification from the North Korean government denying access to the sites. The letter appeared to have been in response to the planned annual report of IAEA Director-General Hans Blix which was sched-

uled for presentation to the UN General Assembly in early November, and which was widely seen as a possible prelude to the imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council against North Korea.

### Relations with USA

Unofficial contacts between North Korea and the USA took place during October. It was reported that the two sides had discussed the possibility of normalizing relations, including the signature of a peace treaty to end the Korean War (the fighting had ended in 1953 with an armistice), in return for North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons programme and submitting to full IAEA inspection [see above].

In a gesture of goodwill, the North Korean government permitted a member of the US House of Representatives to leave the country on Oct. 12 via the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which constituted the de facto border with South Korea. Gary L. Ackerman, the Democratic chairman of the House subcommittee on Asia-Pacific affairs, was the first US citizen ever to cross the DMZ. He had arrived in Pyongyang on Oct. 9 and, during the course of his stay, had held talks with veteran President Kim Il Sung.

■ Last article p. 39637; reference article pp. R73-74.

## SOUTH KOREA

### Completion of financial anonymity reform

The prohibition on anonymity in financial transactions, announced in August as a means of combating corruption [see p. 39598], was completed on Oct. 12 with the passing of the deadline by which all bank accounts had to be registered under the real name of their owners. The deadline passed without incident despite fears that it might cause a financial crisis by provoking a mass last-minute withdrawal of funds from banks and stock accounts.

### Ferry disaster

More than 170 people were drowned on Oct. 10 when a crowded ferry capsized and sank in rough seas off the Puan county coast, some 220 km south-west of Seoul.

■ Last article pp. 39637-38; reference article pp. R74-75.

## JAPAN

### Visit by Russian President

Russian President Boris Yeltsin made an official visit to Japan on Oct. 11-13, during which he held several meetings with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and was received by Emperor Akihito. Although no dramatic progress was made about the outstanding territorial dispute between the two countries, both sides declared the visit to have been a success. Yeltsin stated that he was "very satisfied" with the trip, while Hosokawa described it as hav-



ing "opened a new page" in Russo-Japanese relations.

Yeltsin had cancelled two earlier scheduled visits, and the very fact that this one went ahead as planned was widely considered to have been a cause of some satisfaction. Furthermore, on Oct. 12 Yeltsin issued an unprecedented apology, which he reiterated on several occasions, for the "inhuman" treatment meted out to captured Japanese soldiers by the Soviet Union. An estimated 600,000 Japanese troops had remained interned in Soviet prisons and labour camps for many years after the end of the Pacific War in 1945, and an estimated 60,000 of them died in captivity.

There was limited progress on the dispute over the four islands (known in Japan as the Northern Territories, comprising Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets and in Russia as the southern Kuriles) which lay off the north coast of Hokkaido and which had been seized by Soviet troops in 1945. Their continued occupation had been the most important factor in preventing a normalization of relations between the two countries [see p. 39464].

Yeltsin recognized the importance of resolving the dispute and normalizing relations, and confirmed that Russia, as the "successor state" to the Soviet Union, would "execute the agreements and treaties that were concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union with respect to any issue". The remark was seen as significant as it implied that Russia would honour a 1956 declaration under which the Soviet government had offered to return Shikotan and the Habomai islets in return for the signature of a bilateral peace treaty [see p. 15196]. The 1956 declaration had been subsequently repudiated by successive Soviet governments, and its restitution was seen by many Japanese as the first step towards reasserting sovereignty over the four territories. Yeltsin also confirmed his intention to remove the remaining troops stationed in the four islands (half of the original number had already been removed), but declined to give any indication of when this would be achieved.

In a final communiqué, signed on Oct. 13, the two sides agreed that negotiations should be held to facilitate the signature of a peace treaty through a resolution of the outstanding dispute over the sovereignty of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets. The naming of all four islands in an official bilateral document was seen as an unprecedented Russian acknowledgement of the scope of the territorial issue. The communiqué suggested that the resolution of the dispute should be "on the basis of historical and legal facts and based upon documents produced with the two countries' agreement as well as on principles of law and justice". It also confirmed that agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union would be recognized as valid by Russia, and it was agreed to increase exchanges between residents of the disputed islands and Japan. Yeltsin and Hosokawa agreed to foster political dialogue by increasing high-level talks and through mutual visits by ministers and government representatives, and to co-operate in

the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The two sides also signed an economic accord which listed 11 sectors for increased co-operation, including nuclear power, space technology, environmental conservation, agriculture, transport and communications. A number of other documents, dealing with issues ranging from space exploration to regional co-operation and the provision of economic aid were also signed by the two leaders. It was expected that improved relations would increase the pace of the disbursement of aid worth almost US\$5,000 million already promised to Russia by Japan, of which only an estimated 10 per cent had thus far been provided.

Within days of Yeltsin's visit, Russo-Japanese relations were strained by the issue of the dumping of radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan [see p. 39715].

## Beginning of debate on political reform

Only 30 minutes after bidding farewell to Yeltsin on Oct. 13, Hosokawa attended the House of Representatives to participate in the debate on the political reform proposals which his government had unveiled in September [see p. 39636].

Faced with the prospect of an unknown number of members of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)—the largest grouping within the seven-party government coalition—voting to oppose any shift to single-member constituencies, it appeared far from certain that Hosokawa would be able to honour his commitment to secure approval of the reform legislation before the end of the year. In the event of failure, he had indicated that he would resign.

## Corruption scandals in construction industry

The revelation of corruption within Japan's construction industry, centring upon the bribing of local government figures by the country's leading building contractors, continued to accelerate during October. By the end of the month prosecutors had implicated 24 people in the scandal, including 16 executives from six major contractors, two prefectural governors and two city mayors.

The scandal had broken on June 29 with the arrest of a former Mayor of Sendai, Toru Ishii, and a number of officials from four major construction companies: Hazama Corp., Nishimatsu Construction Co., Mitsui Construction Co., and Shimizu Corp. Ishii was accused of accepting bribes worth the equivalent of \$952,300 in return for exerting his influence in awarding public works contracts in the city. Among those arrested was Harusuke Imamura, a vice-president of Shimizu. Despite his seniority, however, the Shimizu board claimed that he had acted without the authorization or knowledge of the company.

The governor of Ibaraki prefecture, Fujio Takeuchi, was arrested on July 23 for having accepted bribes

worth \$95,200 from Hazama. Later he was found to have accepted a total of \$523,800. Four Shimizu executives, including company chairman Teruzo Yoshino, were arrested on Sept. 20 for allegedly making payments to Takeuchi. Then, in late September, the Governor of Miyagi prefecture, Shuntaro Honma, was arrested on suspicion of having received \$190,400 from a fifth major contractor, Taisei Corp. Two provincial Taisei managers were subsequently arrested in connection with the case. Despite claims by the company that the men had acted without the approval of their head office, a vice-president of Taisei Corp., Takashi Hashimoto, was arrested on Oct. 4 in connection with the Honma case.

The scandal widened on Oct. 11 with the indictment of Yoshino and two members of the Shimizu board. It was also revealed that the Shimizu Corp. had made more than \$47,000,000 in unexplained payments over the past two years, much of which was believed to have been used for bribes and undeclared political donations. The day before the indictments a Shimizu regional financial manager, who had been questioned in connection with the affair, was rushed to hospital after attempting to commit suicide in a park outside the Tokyo prosecutor's office.

Shimizu was the largest Japanese construction company, and Yoshino had been, until his arrest, the chairman of the powerful Federation of Construction Contractors and the leader of a campaign to stamp out bid-rigging in the building industry. The scandal spread to the country's second-largest construction company, Kajima, on Oct. 21, when prosecutors arrested two branch executives on suspicion of having given bribes to Ishii. Prosecutors also raided the home of a Kajima vice-president in the search for evidence. The company's president stated his belief that illegal payments had been made, but expressed the view that those arrested had acted without the knowledge of their head office.

## Deferment of US trade sanctions - Confirmation of plans to import rice

An unexpected consequence of the scandal was the decision by the US government on Oct. 26 to suspend the imposition of unspecified sanctions against Japan.

The sanctions were to have been imposed on the grounds that the Japanese construction market was effectively closed to foreign competition. The announcement of a Japanese plan to open public works contracts to foreign bidding, together with the efforts to combat corruption within the construction industry as evidenced by the growing number of arrests, was interpreted as indicative of sufficient goodwill to postpone any retaliatory action.

Trading friction with the USA was also marginally soothed by the government's decision, reported on Oct. 14, to import 200,000 tonnes of rice before the end of 1993 [for easing of rice import ban see p. 39636].

Although the bulk of the imports were to be from Thailand and Taiwan, some was also to be purchased from the USA and China. The move followed an announcement on Sept. 30 that, owing to an exceptionally meagre rice harvest following the poor summer weather, the government had decided to authorize emergency imports of rice in order to ensure sufficient supplies.



There were reports in early October that, following negotiations with the USA, the government was about to announce its decision to comply with the longstanding US demand for a permanent lifting of Japan's prohibition of rice imports. On Oct. 16, however, Hosokawa described the reports of an imminent agreement as "absolutely untrue".

#### Mystery illness of Empress

Empress Michiko, the wife of Akihito, collapsed while walking in the palace grounds on Oct. 20, her 59th birthday. She regained consciousness after several hours but, although she suffered no loss of movement and could utter sounds, she was apparently unable to speak.

Reports that she had suffered a cerebro-vascular accident (stroke) were denied, and she was said to be fully mentally alert and was able to write. Although she cancelled most public engagements, she was seen being driven around the city and was able to wave at well-wishers. Prior to her illness the Empress had been subjected to mild but unprecedented criticism in the Japanese press for being extravagant, domineering and petulant. On the morning of her birthday she had declared herself to be "sad and bewildered" by the inaccuracy of such reports, and it was later suggested by palace staff that her inability to speak was symptomatic of this "deep sadness". Some reports suggested that Michiko had suffered a similar loss of speech 30 years earlier when she was having difficulties with her mother-in-law, Nagako, the wife of Emperor Hirohito.

■ Last article p. 39636-37; reference article pp. R69-70.

## AUSTRALIA

### Report by committee on republican status

The report of the Republic Advisory Committee, established by Prime Minister Paul Keating on April 28, was released on Oct. 5. It concluded that there were no insurmountable constitutional or legal problems associated with the removal of the monarch as the Australian head of state, and that such a move would have very little impact on the country's current system of government.

The Committee had been established under the chairmanship of prominent lawyer and republican Malcolm Turnbull in order to provide a factual context for the intensifying debate on the future of the monarchy in Australia. The two-volume report, described by Keating as "substantial, thorough and professional", was based on extensive and nationwide consultations. Keating, who was known to favour the creation of a republic prior to the centenary of Australian federation in 2001, announced the creation of a working party of senior ministers to study the report with a view to generating a paper for consideration by the Cabinet in the first half of 1994.

#### Government decision on Aboriginal land rights

After months of wrangling, the federal Cabinet agreed on Oct. 18 to a "new deal" on the issue of Aboriginal land rights in an attempt

to lay the foundation for an unprecedented process of reconciliation between white and black Australians. In announcing the breakthrough, Keating promised "historic legislation" to recognize native title to land, while not prejudicing the interests of farmers and mining companies.

The land rights issue had become a key political concern following the 1992 "Mabo judgment" which had recognized the claims by Aborigines to hold native title to land in the Torres Strait [see pp. 38966; 39515]. While not serving as a legal precedent, the judgment had greatly encouraged Aboriginal groups campaigning on the land rights issue by undermining the long-established legal precedent of *terra nullius*, the ruling which had held that Australia had been uninhabited at the time of its discovery by Europeans.

There followed months of negotiation with representatives of the country's 300,000 Aborigines and of mining companies, farmers and state governments, as the Keating administration sought to enshrine the essence of the Mabo judgment into effective legislation. After intense lobbying, mining leases granted before the end of 1993 were declared exempt from claims, as were most farming leases. Much of the land likely to be claimed under the proposed legislation, therefore, was vacant Crown land or unoccupied areas of the outback. Aborigines using the federal or state courts to lay claim to such areas would, under the terms of the Mabo judgment, have to demonstrate that they had shared a continuous association with the land. Keating also suggested that those Aborigines not able to lodge direct land claims could be compensated from a large but unspecified "social justice package".

In announcing his plans, the Prime Minister stated: "As Mabo was an historic judgment, this is historic legislation, recognising in law the fiction of *terra nullius* and the fact of native title. With that alone, the foundation of reconciliation is laid, because after 200 years we will at last be building on the truth."

#### Breaking of budget impasse

The political impasse associated with the 1993-94 budget (for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1994) was finally broken on Oct. 21 when the measure was approved by the Senate.

The unpopular budget had been unveiled in August and had received the approval of the House of Representatives in late September. However, attempts to force the measure through the upper chamber—where the ruling Australian Labor Party (ALP) lacked an overall majority—proved unsuccessful [see p. 39643]. The opposition to the budget centred upon two of its revenue-raising devices: a round of tax increases—beyond those which were to become effective immediately—which were due to come into operation in July 1995, and a proposal to increase the wholesale sales tax on wine from 20 to 31 per cent. Both measures were defeated in the Senate on Oct. 7.

After extensive negotiations with the minority parties—the Greens and the Australian Democrats—which held the balance of power in the upper chamber, it was announced on Oct. 19 that a compromise had been reached which would ensure the budget's approval. Under the terms of the compromise the government agreed to provide greater as-

sistance for the unemployed, increased child allowance for poor families and the removal of some education charges. It also agreed to allow the proposed wine tax increase to be examined by an independent inquiry.

■ Last article p. 39643; reference article pp. R87-88.

## ASIA REGIONAL

### ASEAN agreement on tariff reductions

The six-member Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed on Oct. 4 to begin implementing the common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) mechanism [see pp. 38729; R86] by early 1994. The decision followed agreement on a mutual tariff reduction scheme endorsed by ASEAN leaders in January 1992 as the first step towards the creation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008 [see p. 38729].

The CEPT, which should have become operational in 1993, had been blocked by Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The latest agreement gave some countries the option of cutting tariffs on selected products to between zero and 5 per cent from early 1994, while other countries would have the choice of commencing later in the year. No country was reported to have requested a delay until 1995 or 1996.

### New ADB president

Mitsuo Sato, vice-chairman of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, was named president of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on Oct. 6 to replace Kimimasa Tarumizu. Sato's nomination continued the tradition of appointing a Japanese national as president of the bank in recognition of Japan's position as the ADB's largest stockholder.

■ Last article p. 39560; reference article p. R86.

## IN BRIEF

**AFGHANISTAN:** President Burhanuddin Rabbani ended an 11-day tour of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Oct. 20.

**MALDIVES:** President Maumoun Abdul Gayoom, 56, was re-elected for a fourth consecutive term on Oct. 4 after winning more than 92 per cent of the votes cast in a national referendum in which he was the only candidate. He had been nominated by the Majlis on Aug. 23.

**NEPAL:** An agreement with Bhutan to categorize the bona fide status of more than 100,000 Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese origin was signed in Katmandu on Oct. 7 [see also p. 39562].

**PAPUA NEW GUINEA:** More than 60 people were killed by three earthquakes which struck the country on Oct. 13 and a fourth, measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale, which occurred on Oct. 16.



# EUROPE

## RUSSIA

### Suppression of Moscow rebellion

Serious armed clashes occurred in Moscow on Oct. 3-4 between forces loyal to President Boris Yeltsin, and rebels protesting against his suspension of Parliament on Sept. 21 [see p. 39648]. The rebel leaders surrendered in the early evening of Oct. 4, coming out of the burning parliament building, the "White House" (officially known as the House of Soviets). Tanks had been used in an intensified assault against them from 7 a.m. until noon, by which time Yeltsin's forces claimed to have taken the building's first four floors, and sporadic fighting had continued throughout the afternoon.

Leading opposition figures were detained under guard at the high security Lefortovo Prison in Moscow. On Oct. 15, charges of "organizing mass disorder", which carried a maximum prison sentence of 15 years, were brought against Aleksandr Rutskoi (who had been dismissed from his post of Vice-President in a Yeltsin decree of Oct. 3) and Supreme Soviet Chair Ruslan Khasbulatov. Charged with the same offence were Viktor Barannikov, Andrei Dunaev and Vladislav Achalov (who had been appointed by the Supreme Soviet to the posts of Security Service, Interior and Defence Ministers on Sept. 21). Among 11 other senior opposition figures charged were Gen. Albert Makashov and Viktor Anpilov of the radical nationalist National Salvation Front (NSF).

The *Independent* of Oct. 6 reported that 1,452 people had been detained in the vicinity of the

White House on Oct. 4-5, although on Oct. 7 Interior Minister Gen. Viktor Erin claimed that only 200 remained in custody. Boris Kagarlitsky, a writer and member of the Moscow City Council, alleged that many detainees had been beaten to extract confessions. On Oct. 29 the Itar-Tass news agency reported that Rutskoi had been admitted to the prison hospital, suffering from high blood pressure.

The Russian Ministry of Health said on Oct. 20 that a total of 145 people had been killed and that a further 240 were still "undergoing treatment". Some casualties had been among the hundreds of civilian onlookers who had gathered to observe the fighting from the nearby Kalinin Bridge. The Interfax news agency had said on Oct. 5 that during the night of Oct. 4-5 some 24 snipers had been killed, captured or disarmed after several clashes in central Moscow.

The first large-scale casualties had occurred on the night of Oct. 3, when some 300 rebels armed with light weapons, grenades and armoured cars, the vanguard of a much larger body of demonstrators said by the *Financial Times* of Oct. 4 to number some 40,000, attempted unsuccessfully to take control of the state television channel by force. Many of those involved were reportedly supporters of the NSF (described by Rutskoi on Oct. 3 as "patriots"), led by Makashov and accompanied by the NSF's leader, Ilya Konstantinov, and by Barannikov. Their fierce gun battle with Interior Ministry troops at the Ostankino television centre reportedly claimed at least 62 lives and left 400 injured. Broadcasting was interrupted for several hours (although a second state television channel continued to

broadcast from a secret location), but resumed at midnight.

#### Beginning of Oct. 3 rebellion

A tense 13-day stand-off between opposition supporters and forces loyal to Yeltsin had ended on the afternoon of Oct. 3.

About 7,000-10,000 demonstrators, some carrying firearms, clashed repeatedly with riot police in central Moscow. By 4 p.m. they had broken through the cordon of riot police around the parliament and rallied to hear the speeches of opposition leaders. Rebels also seized a building housing the offices of the

mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. Many of the Interior Ministry forces inside were forced to flee as rebels fired repeatedly into the building, and some 200 others allegedly defected to the opposition camp.

The *Financial Times* of Oct. 4 alleged that Rutskoi had told the crowd outside the parliament: "Form yourself into detachments before the White House. You'll be given arms: we'll take the mayor's office and then Ostankino." However, in an interview with a correspondent of the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* on Oct. 4, shortly before his surrender, Rutskoi denied issuing such orders and claimed that the storming of the Ostankino television centre had been "spontaneous". Interfax on Oct. 3 had cited Rutskoi as urging demonstrators to avoid violence, and calling for "order and calm". In contrast, on the evening of Oct. 3 Khasbulatov, buoyed by Yeltsin's failure to regain control of the streets of Moscow, had (according to Itar-Tass) declared that "today we must take over the Kremlin".


#### Failure of peace negotiations

Yeltsin warned on the evening of Oct. 3 that "the armed fascist rebellion [would] be suppressed" and that "the forces of civil war [would] not succeed". On the morning of Oct. 4 the US CNN news service reported that Rutskoi had requested talks; however, a government spokesman demanded the unconditional surrender of the rebels.

Earlier attempts to resolve the crisis peacefully had foundered when a deal struck on the night of Sept. 30-Oct. 1 was rejected by the Congress of People's Deputies (the supreme legislative body) in a vote on Oct. 1. The deal, which had been negotiated by Luzhkov, Presidential Chief of Staff Sergei Filatov and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets for the authorities, and by deputies Veniamin Sokolov and Ramazan Abdulatipov for the parliament, under the mediation of Patriarch Aleksii II at Moscow's Danilov Monastery, would have returned power supplies and limited telephone links to the White House in exchange for the surrender of most of the parliament's stockpile of weapons. There were reports that talks did continue at the monastery until as late as Oct. 3, but meanwhile the Congress of People's Deputies continued to demand the resignation of Yeltsin and the "power ministers" in favour of its own appointees, and the lifting of the blockade on the White House.

#### Response to crisis within Russia

In an appeal to "the Russian people" on the evening of Oct. 3, First Deputy Premier and Economics Minister Yegor Gaidar urged Muscovites to rally against the rebels in order to prevent a "bloody brown curtain" of fascism from falling on the country. However there were few reports of popular demonstrations of support either for the Yeltsin camp or in favour of parliament.





A telephone poll conducted on the evening of Oct. 4 by the Public Opinion Foundation found that when asked, "Whom do you support most: President Yeltsin or the Supreme Soviet?", 72 per cent of the sample opted for the former, and 6 per cent for the latter. A further telephone poll conducted in Moscow on Oct. 7 found that 40 per cent blamed Rutskoi, Khasbulatov and their followers for the violence, with a further 40 per cent agreeing that "all are to blame".

On Oct. 4 the executive committee of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions condemned "the criminal acts of the armed extremists in Moscow who have provoked bloody clashes" and urged members to keep calm. The Federation's leader Igor Klochkov, however, was forced to resign on Oct. 11 after accusations that he had supported the rebels [see p. 39648].

### Foreign responses

Western states quickly backed Yeltsin's decision to use force against the rebels on Oct. 3.

US President Bill Clinton said that it was "clear that the violence was perpetrated by the Rutskoi-Khasbulatov forces" and that "Yeltsin [had] bent over backwards to avoid the use of force". UK Prime Minister John Major said that Yeltsin "has our total and unequivocal support".

A joint statement released on Oct. 4 by six countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Ukraine, said that "blood has been spilt in Moscow and those guilty of this [the opposition rebels] have placed themselves outside the law."

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on Oct. 21 that his visit to Russia on Oct. 21-23 was intended "to confirm support for democracy in Russia, market reform and President Yeltsin".

### Role of military during rebellion

Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said on Oct. 8 that the military leadership had been persuaded to act decisively against the rebels because the latter had initiated the violence at the Ostankino television centre. Grachev also said that the Supreme Soviet's decision to appoint Ahalov as Defence Minister had "humiliated and insulted" him.

Yeltsin's senior military adviser Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov claimed on Oct. 18, however, that Yeltsin had been forced into "a fairly harsh discussion" at the Defence Ministry before Grachev had agreed to the assault. Volkogonov implied that "some state structures" might have defected "if the rebels . . . had continued to seize buildings" on Oct. 3. He also alleged that the Security Service Ministry had been reluctant to take part in the assault. (A statement by the Ministry on Oct. 1 had insisted that security service staff should not be "dragged into the political confrontation". However, the ministry claimed on Oct. 14 that it had remained loyal to Yeltsin, with agents in the White House providing Yeltsin with intelligence reports.)

Further evidence that military support for the assault had been limited came from analysis of the varied composition and relatively small size of the force used to storm the White House. Grachev said on Oct. 6 that 1,300 troops had been called into Moscow for the assault, including troops of the Dzerzhinsky Division and paratroops from various units. Correspondents noted that many of the units involved had not been under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence but were in fact subordinate to the Interior Ministry, the Security Service Ministry, or the presidential administration.

There were no reports that units involved in the assault had defected to the rebels.

### Signs of toughening of foreign policy in apparent "reward" for military

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev asserted on Oct. 8 that Russia must not lose "geopolitical positions which took centuries to conquer".

Kozyrev had argued on Sept. 30 that Russia held a special responsibility to intervene in former Soviet states to protect human rights, "particularly those of national minorities" (which were often composed of ethnic Russians).

Itar-Tass reported on Oct. 6 that Russia was pressing for the raising of limits on military forces in its North Caucasus military district, imposed as part of the November 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) [see p. 37838]. There were reports that Russia would unilaterally breach the treaty if the request was not granted.

Deputy Finance Minister Aleksandr Pochinok promised on Oct. 22 to find funds for "decent conditions" for troops. He also insisted, however, that future military spending must be reduced and that the size of the military should be scaled down.

### "Confusion" in Yeltsin's response to uprising

In an interview published in *Moskovskiy Komсомоlets* of Oct. 8, Grachev insisted that Yeltsin had "confidently [taken] charge" when the news of the rebellion reached the Kremlin, the seat of executive power. This contrasted with the claims made at a press conference on Oct. 7 by Sergei Parkhomenko, a correspondent of the liberal daily *Segodnya* who had been present at that time, but whose story had, he said, been censored.

According to Parkhomenko, presidential and government officials had been thrown into "panic" by news of the attack on the mayor's offices; Yeltsin had appeared to be "paralysed" by the crisis, and had not appeared "to be very lucid" (later reports claimed that Yeltsin had been ill); and calm had only been restored by the arrival of Mikhail Poltoranin, Head of the Federal Information Centre, and Gennady Burbulis, a longstanding Yeltsin ally, who had "[taken] Yeltsin's place" and had "[given] orders to everyone".

### State of emergency in Moscow

The state of emergency in Moscow, decreed by Yeltsin on Oct. 3, remained in place until the early morning of Oct. 18.

Under the state of emergency, rallies and demonstrations were banned and a nightly curfew was introduced, enforced by some 17,000 militiamen drafted into Moscow (most of whom had left by Oct. 19). Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Kulikov, who was appointed Commandant of the state of emergency in Moscow on Oct. 4, claimed on Oct. 19 that during the emergency period the rate of crime had been reduced by 26.6 per cent. The Moscow militia had arrested 90,000 people in the emergency period, according to the *Independent* of Oct. 19.

A public opinion poll published by *Izvestiya* on Oct. 17 showed 75 per cent of Muscovites as supporting the state of emergency and favouring its extension. Civil rights groups protested, however, claiming that police had used their temporary powers to harass non-Russians, particularly Caucasian traders and refugees from central Asia. On Oct. 17 Kulikov denied any racial bias in the crackdown, insisting that "all are equal before the law" and that "if my men behave roughly . . . they will be disciplined". The Interior Ministry admitted that 9,779 people had been expelled from Moscow under regulations requiring the registration of residence in the city.

### Reduction of regional power - Other internal developments

Yeltsin announced after the rebellion a series of initiatives aimed at restoring political potency to central institutions weakened by the long power struggle in Moscow, a period when regional and republican organs had grown in strength.

Many regional and republican leaders who had hoped to secure appointments to the Federation Council (the upper House of the Federal Assembly, the new legislature) were disappointed by a decree of Oct. 11, which declared that the Federation Council would be composed of representatives (two from each of Russia's 88 regions and republics) elected in nationwide elections to be held on Dec. 12.

A decree of Oct. 9 ordered regional, district and local soviets to transfer their powers to regional governors, who were appointed by Yeltsin. The decree also "recommended" that the councils dissolve themselves. A decree of Oct. 22 announced elections to reformed regional and local councils, to be conducted not later than March 1994. Councils were to be composed of no more than 50 deputies; they would be able to pass laws, but their legislation would be subordinate to federal law, and subject to the veto of regional governors.

Also on Oct. 22, Presidential Chief of Staff Sergei Filatov said that delegates to the Constitutional Conference had deleted all references in the draft constitution to republican "sovereignty". The President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiyev, protested that "this will not be a Russian Federation, but a Russian empire and a Russian monarchy".

The *Financial Times* of Oct. 28 reported that Yeltsin had ordered all regions and republics



immediately to pay all taxes due to central government, threatening the suspension of all credits and centrally distributed supplies from Nov. 1.

#### **Announcement of referendum on constitution**

On Oct. 16 Itar-Tass reported that Yeltsin had decreed that a referendum on acceptance of the draft constitution, which was scheduled for publication in November, would take place on Dec. 12, the day of the legislative elections.

#### **Controversy over media controls**

Publication of several opposition newspapers, including the leftist *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the nationalist *Den* and the centrist *Rabochiya Tribuna*, was suspended on Oct. 4 by the Ministry of Press and Information. *Pravda* was permitted to return to print on Nov. 1 only after the newspaper's editor agreed to resign.

Press censorship, whose introduction on Oct. 4 provoked several newspapers to publish blank spaces the following day where articles had been deleted by the censor, was lifted on Oct. 6. A First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko, appointed on Oct. 5 as acting Press and Information Minister and nevertheless urged newspapers to apply "self-censorship".

On Oct. 25 Poltoranin said that Yeltsin had ordered an investigation by the Procurator General into the "unjustified" closure of some newspapers. Poltoranin claimed that both he and Yeltsin were opposed to the censorship decree, which had been drawn up by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and that all but fascist newspapers would be allowed to reopen. Shumeiko retorted on Oct. 25 that censorship had not in fact been imposed, and accused Poltoranin of trying to drive a wedge between Yeltsin and the government.

As regards the broadcast media, Poltoranin declared his opposition on Oct. 28 to reported plans for an hour-long government programme every day, and to the banning of several controversial political programmes. During the period of confrontation between President and Parliament, the rebels had been enraged by the alleged bias of the state television channel Ostankino, which had issued a statement of support for Yeltsin on Sept. 22.

A presidential decree of Oct. 29 established an Information Court designed to "protect the mass media against unlawful interference in its activities during the election campaign". The Court would ensure press "independence" and allow election candidates equal access to media, but parties and blocs would have to pay for air-time.

On Oct. 20 the government awarded its press secretary, Valentin Sergeyev, a former journalist, ministerial rank as Chernomyrdin's plenipotentiary.

#### **Status of political parties**

Several opposition groups were suspended on Oct. 4-8 after allegedly playing a role in the rebellion. Those which remained suspended included the Russian Communist Workers' Party, but several others were legalized once again on Oct. 20, including the NSF, the Of-

ficers' Union, the Communist Youth Organization, and significantly, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia. The latter two parties were to be permitted to run in the legislative elections.

Altogether 10 electoral blocs and seven parties were reported to be planning to stand in the legislative elections on Dec. 12. [The formation of pre-electoral blocs, including Russia's Choice formed on Oct. 17, will be covered in the November News Digest.]

#### **Suspension of Constitutional Court - Dismissal of Prosecutor General - Introduction of trial by jury**

In a decree of Oct. 7 Yeltsin suspended the Constitutional Court, which, he claimed, had "placed the country on the brink of civil war by its hasty actions and decisions".

Nikolai Vitruk, who had become acting Chair of the Court after the resignation of Valery Zorkin on Oct. 6, argued on Oct. 13 that a reformed Constitutional Court should be reinstated after the December elections.

Procurator General Valentin Stepankov was dismissed on Oct. 5.

His replacement, Aleksi Kazannikov, a Yeltsin ally and environmental law specialist, was reported to have limited knowledge of criminal law. Itar-Tass reported on Oct. 22 that Kazannikov had dropped all charges against Poltoranin [see p. 39650] for lack of evidence.

On Oct. 27 Yeltsin decreed the reintroduction of trial by jury, abolished in 1917.

#### **Legalization of land sales**

The free sale and purchase of land was legalized in a presidential decree of Oct. 27, reversing an effective ban on such sales introduced by the Russian Congress of People's Deputies.

Agriculture Minister Viktor Khlystun told Itar-Tass on Oct. 27 that potential buyers would have to show evidence of "an agricultural education and some farming experience", and that "irrational" use of land could lead to its return to the state. Foreigners would not be permitted to purchase land, but would be allowed to rent it under certain conditions. The *Financial Times* of Nov. 1, however, said that the decree would permit foreigners to purchase land through joint ventures with Russian entrepreneurs.

#### **Abolition of state subsidies on bread**

State grain subsidies were removed in most Russian cities on Oct. 15.

An official spokesperson said that prices were expected to rise from about 137 roubles per loaf to about 250. An accompanying package of allowances was designed to mitigate the effects of the reform on the poor. Bread prices were expected to be freed in Moscow from late October.

#### **Rescheduling of debt to USA**

An agreement on rescheduling Russia's debt to the USA was signed by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin and US Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen on Sept. 30. It envisaged the repayment of US\$400 million by the

end of 1993 and the remaining \$1,100 million over next 10 years.

■ Last article p. 39648; reference article p. R121-22.

## **ARMENIA**

### **Conviction of Armenian for political murder in London**

Gagic Ter-Organizsian was convicted by the UK Central Criminal Court on Oct. 21 for the murder in London in February of Ruslan Outsiev, a senior official of the Russian Republic of Chechen, and his brother Nazarbek Outsiev. According to police, Ruslan Outsiev had planned to purchase arms intended for Azerbaijan, which was currently involved in conflict with Armenia.

Also linked to the case were Nkrich Martirosian, who had told police before his suicide in custody that he was a member of the Armenian security service, and Ashot Sarkissian, chair of the Armenian Chamber of Commerce, whom police described as a security service general, and who was assassinated in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, on Oct. 12.

■ Last article p. 39650; reference article p. R99.

## **AZERBAIJAN**

### **Election of Aliyev as President**

Geidar Aliyev was sworn in as President of Azerbaijan on Oct. 10, after securing 98.8 per cent of the vote in the presidential election of Oct. 3. The turnout was recorded as 97 per cent.

On Oct. 5 ousted President Abulfaz Elchibey reportedly claimed that the political crackdown since Aliyev took office as head of state on June 15 [see p. 39522] rendered the election invalid. None of the major parties had proposed candidates, and observers from the human rights organization Helsinki Watch reportedly described the election as undemocratic and claimed that the mass media had been dominated by "biased propaganda", according to Azerbaijan's Turan news agency.

### **Nagorny Karabakh**

#### **Iranian mediation in ceasefire**

A ceasefire between Azerbaijani units and troops from the Armenian enclave of Nagorny Karabakh came into force on Oct. 28 after diplomatic mediation by Iran (Iranian President Rafsanjani visited the Azerbaijani capital Baku on Oct. 27-28).

Despite an offer by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov on Oct. 18, to extend an earlier Oct. 1 ceasefire for up to six months "without precondition", there had been a resumption of fighting in southern Nagorny Karabakh on Oct. 23, and a further seizure of Azerbaijani territory in the Zangurulan region adjoining the Iranian border, forcing some 20,000 Azeri refugees to flee south to Iran.

■ Last article p. 39650; reference article p. R100.



## GEORGIA

### Military reverse for Gamsakhurdia rebels

Forces loyal to the Georgian President (Supreme Soviet Chair) Eduard Shevardnadze reversed a series of military defeats by Zviadist rebels (forces loyal to former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia) in what Shevardnadze described on Oct. 18 as "a battle between light and darkness".

The Black Sea port of Poti (along with an arsenal of heavy weapons) had fallen to Zviadist rebels, said to number some 10,000 in total, on Oct. 1. The rebels had then swept eastward, taking Samtredia, a strategic town controlling a vital railway junction, on Oct. 17 in fighting which reportedly claimed 40 lives. On Oct. 18 Shevardnadze had admitted that the army had "practically disintegrated". However, a counterattack by government forces, which began on Oct. 20, led to the recapture of Samtredia on Oct. 22 and of Poti on Oct. 25. By Oct. 31 only the town of Zugdidi was said to remain in rebel hands.

There were reports on Oct. 20 that Russian troops had been deployed in Georgia to secure vital road and rail links hitherto blocked by the Zviadist rebels. The Russian Defence Ministry denied on Oct. 25 that Russian troops had been involved in combat operations in support of Georgian government troops.

#### Decree approving CIS membership

On Oct. 22 Shevardnadze signed a decree formally approving Georgia's membership of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Shevardnadze said that despite the suspension of the Supreme Soviet (parliament) on Sept. 15, 120 of the Soviet's 234 deputies had signed a petition, of uncertain legal status, approving the decision to join the CIS.

Shevardnadze had insisted on Oct. 8, after meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, that CIS membership was "the last chance to save the country", and had claimed that there were "more reasons to trust the CIS and Russia" after Yeltsin's defeat of militant Russian nationalists [see pp. 39692-93]. Shevardnadze also claimed, on Oct. 11, that "at least 70 per cent" of Georgians backed his decision.

Irena Sarishvili resigned as a Deputy Prime Minister on Oct. 10 in protest at the decision to join the CIS. Sarishvili was replaced on Oct. 19 by Irakli Menagharishvili, who was himself succeeded as Health Minister by Avtandil Jorbenadze.

#### Creation of Security Ministry

Shevardnadze created by decree on Oct. 13 a Security Ministry, under Igor Georgadze, merging parts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the Information and Intelligence Service. Georgadze said on Oct. 26 that the

new ministry would work with other law enforcement agencies to combat banditry, illegal armed units and economic crime.

#### Abkhaz refugee crisis

Sarishvili claimed on Oct. 6 that 200,000 people had been displaced by the fighting in Abkhazia and that 20,000 refugees stranded in the mountain passes of the Svanetia region risked death from the cold. On Oct. 14 Ukrainian helicopters were deployed to assist in the evacuation of some 7,000 refugees stranded in Abkhazia.

■ Last article pp. 39650-51; reference article pp. R108-09.

## MOLDOVA

### Involvement of Dnestr fighters in Moscow rebellion

Commandos from the separatist Dnestr region were reported by the Russian media to have participated in the storming by anti-Yeltsin rebels of the Ostankino TV and Itar-Tass news agency buildings and Moscow City Hall on Oct. 3 [see pp. 39692-93]. "Several dozen" were said to have been killed or captured on Oct. 4 and 5.

Dnestr officials quoted by the Agence France-Presse news agency had said on Sept. 27 that they supported Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi.

On Oct. 3 Moldovan President Mircea Snegur sent a message of support to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, but was nevertheless reported to have been snubbed by him during a visit to Moscow on Oct. 18 and 19.

■ Last article p. 39651; reference article p. R117.

## UKRAINE

### Military doctrine

Parliament, meeting in closed session on Oct. 19, approved a national military doctrine.

In a significant change of wording the final document replaced the formulation in earlier drafts that "Ukraine does not consider any state as its adversary" with the statement that "Ukraine will consider its potential adversary to be a state whose consistent policy constitutes a military danger to Ukraine". Clauses dealing with Ukraine's nuclear arsenal made disarmament conditional on "appropriate actions" by other powers, including security guarantees. President Leonid Kravchuk told journalists during a break in the session that inadequate security guarantees from Western nuclear powers were the reason for Ukraine's delay in ratifying the START-I treaty. Nevertheless he reiterated the intention to comply with START-I by giving up 130 SS-19 missiles.

Kravchuk noted that START-I did not cover 46 SS-24 missiles based in Ukraine. Their status remained controversial following the conclusion of agreements between Ukraine and Russia on a range of defence and disarmament issues at the summit in the Ukrainian resort of Massandra in early Septem-

ber [see p. 39652]. On Sept. 21 a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman accused Ukrainian negotiators of having altered by hand the wording of the protocol on nuclear disarmament concluded at Massandra after it had been signed so that the SS-24 missiles were excluded from it. Ukraine responded by saying that Russian negotiators had misled their Ukrainian counterparts at the signing session by producing a text which was not what Ukraine had negotiated.

#### Cabinet appointments

Col.-Gen. Konstantin Morozov resigned as Defence Minister on Oct. 4 and was replaced on Oct. 8 by Lt.-Gen. Vitaly Radetsky.

It was reported that Morozov feared a split within parliament if he continued in the post. He was said to have alienated nationalist deputies with his support for the surrender of Ukraine's nuclear weapons, while pro-Russian deputies reportedly objected to his opposition to co-operation in military matters with other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states.

Parliament on Oct. 6 endorsed the appointment of Lt.-Gen. Andrii Vasylyshyn as Interior Minister, Hrihori Pyatachenko as Minister of Finance, Valerii Hubenko as Chairman of the State Border Guard Committee, and Col.-Gen. Yevhenii Marchuk as Chairman of the State Security Service. All had held the same posts in the previous government [for September motion of no confidence in previous government see p. 39651].

Among appointments made by presidential decree on Sept. 30 was that of Oleh Slyepichev as Minister of Foreign Economic Relations.

■ Last article pp. 39651-52; reference article pp. R126-27.

## BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

### Impasse on international mediation - Obstacles to UN humanitarian relief

Confronted with an effective impasse on their proposals for the partition of Bosnia, Lord Owen (the mediator for the European Communities—EC) and Thorvald Stoltenberg (the UN mediator) apparently accepted during October that at the Bosnian level they could do little more than wait for the respective Serb, Croat and Muslim protagonists to find their own basis for compromise. Meanwhile Owen and Stoltenberg, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, pursued discussions internationally on the idea of "globalization", which would involve focusing more broadly on the Serb-Croat conflict and on the former Yugoslavia as a whole, so that Bosnia's future would be addressed alongside issues such as Kosovo and Serb-held areas within Croatia. [In this context, see p. 39697 for the terms of the renewal of the mandate of the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, for a further six months to the end of March 1994.]

Differences persisted between Western countries, notably over US President Clinton's ad-



ministration's advocacy of lifting the arms embargo (to allow weapons supplies to Bosnian government forces), and the opposition of the UK, France and other EC members to using air strikes against Serb positions. Clinton criticized his European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in this regard on Oct. 18 [see p. 39714], but at the same time it was widely recognized that his administration would risk a rebuff in the US Congress if it were to seek to commit US ground troops. The impasse on the partition plan diminished, in any case, the immediate likelihood of any large-scale deployment of NATO forces in a peacekeeping role. The detailed military planning for a possible US-led 50,000-strong NATO force, begun in September before the Muslim rejection of the partition plan [see below], was completed in time for the NATO defence ministers' meeting in Germany on Oct. 20-21 [see pp. 39713-14]. By this time, however, even the limited objective of protecting the six "safe havens" had overstretched the existing UN forces, compelling UN commanders to withdraw personnel from some locations for redeployment elsewhere in Bosnia. On Oct. 3 the withdrawal of some Canadian UN personnel from Muslim-held Srebrenica encountered forcible resistance from Muslims who feared that they were being left more vulnerable to Serb attack. Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), launched in Geneva on Oct. 8 an appeal for \$696 million to avert the threat of starvation facing 4,260,000 people in the former Yugoslavia in the coming winter. At the same time there were increasingly frequent reports of attacks on UN aid convoys, accentuating the difficulties of the existing humanitarian operations.

French President François Mitterrand called on Oct. 25 for military protection, with US involvement, to force open an aid supply route from the Adriatic coast to the Serb-besieged Bosnian capital Sarajevo. On the same day, a Danish UN aid truck driver was shot dead by Muslim forces while his convoy was halted at a Croat checkpoint, and nine other aid workers were injured. This prompted Boutros-Ghali to announce on Oct. 26 the suspension of aid convoys to Mostar and central Bosnia until Croat and Muslim combatants in those areas could guarantee their safety. Earlier in the month, a representative of the UNHCR had suspended all medical evacuations from Sarajevo between Oct. 8 and 10, expressing outrage at the "cynical exploitation" on the part of Serb and Muslim forces, both of which had sought to prevent evacuations unless they favoured the injured from their own ethnic group. In western central Bosnia, aid convoys making repeated attempts to reach besieged Muslim enclaves at Maglaj and Tesanj eventually pulled back on Oct. 16, but the following day Serb forces gave fresh pledges of safe passage from Banja Luka.

The former UN commander in Bosnia, Gen. Philippe Morillon, warned in London on Oct. 11 that unchecked "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia was creating a situation where generations of refugees would go on fighting to recover their land. Unless

the war was stopped, he said, the ethnic factions would "continue to be overtaken by their most extreme supporters", and he suggested that it was "time to set up a provisional UN protectorate" to stop the war.

#### **Muslim stance on partition plan in late September - Vote of Bosnian Assembly on "conditional acceptance" - Croat and Serb rejection of conditions**

A 352-member Congress of Muslim Intellectuals, chaired by Alija Isakovic, convened in Sarajevo on Sept. 27-28, immediately preceding a session of the Bosnian Assembly or "rump" parliament on Sept. 28-29, to discuss the peace terms negotiated on the basis of the Owen-Stoltenberg partition proposals, which President Alija Izetbegovic characterized as leaving Bosnia a choice "between a just war and an unjust peace".

The Congress on Sept. 28 recorded 218 votes in favour of what was presented as "conditional acceptance", essentially meaning acceptance of the principle of a tripartite partition but rejection of the "map", i.e. the territorial division [see pp. 39605; 39645]. There were 53 votes for unconditional acceptance and 78 for outright rejection. This stance was mirrored in the Assembly vote on Sept. 29, with 58 votes for "conditional acceptance", four for acceptance and seven for rejection.

As was widely anticipated, the Bosnian Croat assembly on Sept. 30 and the Bosnian Serb parliament in Banja Luka on Oct. 2 rejected the "conditions" as unacceptable. Both went further in condemning the Muslim stance, construing it as indicating the Muslim disposition to pursue a more favourable balance of power by military means, and declaring that they were withdrawing "concessions" they had been prepared to offer in the negotiations in September [ibid.]. In the Croat case the main concession had been to allow for a Bosnian state to have access to the sea. In the Serb case, Serb forces now proposed to hold on to the territory they controlled (some 70 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the partition map had given them 52 per cent), and leave the Muslim side without guarantees either of port access to the river Sava at Brcko, or of corridors linking Muslim-held enclaves. Anxious to keep the partition proposals open, however, the Serb side offered a formula in which "territorial disputes can still be resolved by bilateral negotiations after the signature of the peace plan".

Izetbegovic, in an address to the UN General Assembly in New York on Oct. 7, advocated concentrating henceforth on a broader regional framework for peace. The partition plan, he said, amounted to "political vivisection" of Bosnia and would do nothing to undo the "ethnic cleansing" which had been carried out. Reports in succeeding days indicated renewed expulsions of Muslim refugees from Serb-controlled and Croat-controlled areas, notably at Bijelina in the north, which at the beginning of the fighting in 1992 had suffered some of the earliest "ethnic cleansing".

The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic rejected in mid-October a suggestion made by Izetbegovic on Oct. 16, for a Balkan conference on Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. Karadzic reiterated that he preferred to pursue agreement on the Owen-Stoltenberg proposals for partition.

#### **Signature of "treaties" with Croatia and Serbia by breakaway Muslim leader in part of Bihac enclave**

Muslims in part of the small north-western enclave of Bihac in late September declared a breakaway in protest against the Izetbegovic government's reluctance to sign a peace agreement. The "autonomous province of Western Bosnia" was proclaimed on Sept. 27 by a 400-strong assembly in Velika Kladusa, led by entrepreneur Filket Abdic, the head of the Agrokomere food processing concern [see also p. 39517]. Abdic was immediately denounced by the Bosnian Assembly as a traitor and dismissed from his post in the collective Bosnian presidency.

Pro-Abdic militia forces in Velika Kladusa, joined by local police, rapidly took control of the nearby town of Cazin and drove the Bosnian fifth army corps back to Bihac itself. There were reports of defections to the rebels as the fifth army moved in an unsuccessful attempt to crush the breakaway; more than 50 people were killed in clashes over the succeeding weeks.

On Oct. 21 and 22, visiting Zagreb and Belgrade respectively, Abdic signed "treaties of lasting peace" with Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and with Serb leader Karadzic. Abdic's willingness to reach "pragmatic" agreements of this kind, and his rejection of the centralist authority of the Izetbegovic government, was seen as a significant political challenge despite the small amount of territory involved.

#### **Changes in Bosnian government - Appointment of new Muslim Prime Minister**

On Oct. 25 Haris Silajdzic of the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action, hitherto Bosnian Foreign Minister, was named as Prime Minister in what some saw as a further symbolic move away from the notion of multi-ethnicity. [For dismissal in late August of previous Prime Minister, a Croat, see p. 39605.]

The Bosnian collective Presidency had, however, elected two Croats as well as one Muslim as new members on Oct. 20, replacing two Croats [for whose suspension see p. 39605] and Abdic.

#### **Sarajevo - Renewed Serb shelling - Operation against "gangster" Muslim commanders**

Although Karadzic said on Oct. 9 that Serb forces would not launch fresh attacks against Sarajevo, the Serb shelling resumed on Oct. 14 and intensified on the weekend of Oct. 16-17, when at least 13 people died. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Oct. 18 warned the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic of the possibility of NATO air strikes to prevent a Serb "strangulation" of the Bosnian capital.

An exchange of prisoners, scheduled to start on Oct. 20, was reportedly agreed during talks held between Bosnian government and Serb representatives, notwithstanding the renewed shelling of the city, at Sarajevo airport on Oct. 16. A prisoner exchange had also been part of the now defunct Sept. 16 Geneva agreement concluded between the two sides



in the context of negotiation on the Owen-Stoltenberg partition plan [see p. 39645].

Bosnian government forces launched in late October an operation within Sarajevo against growing "gangsterism" by their own army unit commanders. Ramiz Delalic, known as "Celo", was arrested after a gun battle on Oct. 26. The following day Musan Topulovic ("Caco") and 17 others died in fighting related to the crackdown, and 537 people in all were arrested. "Caco" had been blamed for the seizure of equipment from a UN team in mid-October, after which the UN had suspended, until Oct. 20, its technical assistance on work to restore water and power supplies.

#### **Muslim-Croat fighting - Prisoner exchange**

Some of the most intense fighting in Bosnia in October was once again that between (Muslim) Bosnian government forces and troops of the Bosnian Croat Defence Council (HVO), in central Bosnia around Vares in particular (where Muslim forces sought to open the road link from Sarajevo north to Tuzla), and also around Mostar, south of Sarajevo.

In fighting west of Vitez in early October, Muslims accused Croats of using prisoners as human shields in an attempt to break through government lines near Novi Travnik. Both sides nevertheless went ahead with an exchange of several thousand prisoners, commencing on Oct. 11, as agreed by Izetbegovic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Sept. 14 and confirmed on Oct. 7 by their respective Foreign Ministers.

On Oct. 23, as government forces began an offensive against Vares and captured the village of Kopjari, HVO troops attacked and destroyed the village of Stupni Do. Survivors gave dramatic accounts of a massacre, of bodies being thrown into burning buildings, and of some 80 dead; on Oct. 27 the UNPROFOR commander Gen. Jean Cot accused the HVO of a massacre and of "attempting to hide from us the atrocities they had committed". On Oct. 29 the UN Security Council issued a statement condemning the massacre of civilians in Stupni Do.

■ Last article pp. 39645-46; reference article pp. R101-102.

## **YUGOSLAVIA**

### **December date for Serbian elections**

Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia (which with Montenegro comprised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY), dissolved the Serbian People's Assembly on Oct. 20 and called an early general election for Dec. 19 [for last general election held in December 1992 see p. 39240]. His decision (which would not involve holding fresh presidential elections) was a pre-emptive move in the face of an attempt to bring a vote of no-confidence in the government [see p. 39646].

Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), accused Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) government of incompetence, economic mismanagement, racketeering and war crimes. The

*Financial Times* of Oct. 21 commented that Milosevic "needs to get rid of Mr Seselj, once his favourite 'opposition' politician who also commands a fierce paramilitary unit, in order to clean out nationalist extremists who would block a political compromise that might permit the lifting of sanctions". Debate on the no-confidence motion had begun on Oct. 7 but was adjourned on Oct. 18.

The ruling SPS currently commanded 105 seats in the 250-member Assembly and thus required support from the 73 SRS deputies [see also p. 39646]; the no confidence motion underlined the breakdown in unofficial co-operation between the two parties.

#### **Lifting of charges against Draskovic - Draskovic call for opposition unity**

On Oct. 6 the Belgrade public prosecutor's office dropped the outstanding criminal charge against Vuk Draskovic, leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), that he had obstructed and beaten a police officer at the time of his arrest in June. Other charges had been dropped upon his release in July [see pp. 39518; 39564].

Radio Serbia carried a report on Oct. 21 saying that Draskovic had joined Seselj and other opposition leaders in condemning the calling of premature elections, which he described as a "totalitarian move" by Milosevic aimed at re-establishing one-party rule, and against which all democratic forces should unite.

#### **Attack on Montenegrin President**

On Sept. 30 the car of Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic was pelted with stones and bricks in Cetinje (the former capital of Montenegro) by demonstrators who favoured independence from Serbia.

On Oct. 19 the two Liberal Alliance members of the Montenegrin government resigned; a minister without portfolio of the National Party had resigned earlier. On Oct. 27 it was reported that the SRS had set up a Montenegrin shadow cabinet headed by Drago Bakrac.

#### **Media restrictions**

During October *Magyar Szo*, the Hungarian-language daily newspaper in Vojvodina, was on several occasions unable to publish because of a lack of newsprint. Albanian language papers and broadcasting in Kosovo encountered similar problems.

#### **Kosovo-Metohija - Sandzak**

During October arrests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija continued.

Among those detained were members of the ministry of defence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo [see also p. 39646]. On Oct. 28, 19 ethnic Albanians were charged with planning an uprising. They were alleged to be members of the People's Movement for the Republic of Kosovo and of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo, claiming to represent Kosovo and ethnic Albanian parts of Montenegro and seeking to secede from Yugoslavia.

In Sandzak (a region spanning areas of Serbia and Montenegro, whose population had a slight Muslim majority), 25 members of the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Ac-

tion (SDA) were charged on Oct. 19 with posing a threat to the territorial integrity of the FRY and with possessing firearms, ammunition and explosives. Over 50 activists suspected of plotting to set up an independent Sandzak state had been arrested in late September.

#### **Danube blockade**

On Oct. 14 the UN Security Council condemned two Serbian organizations (White Rose and New Byzantium) for blocking the Danube, and criticized the Yugoslav government for doing nothing to stop these illegal acts. For the past three months the two organizations had held up shipping on the Serb section of the Danube [see p. 39606].

■ Last article p. 39646; reference article pp. R128-30.

## **CROATIA**

### **UNPROFOR mandate**

Resolution 871 of the UN Security Council, approved unanimously on Oct. 4, extended the mandate for the UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) until March 31, 1994. Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman had warned the UN General Assembly on Sept. 28 that Croatia would require the force to leave Croatia, unless its mandate was made more specific, particularly as regards disarming Serb militias [see p. 39647].

The previous UNPROFOR mandate, expiring on Sept. 30, was extended first for one day and then for a further four, to allow Security Council members to discuss Russian objections to the new draft resolution. Russia resisted linking sanctions against Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) to the resolution of the situation in Croatia, which would accord to Serbia a clear responsibility for controlling Serb militias in Croatia. A final complex compromise referred to sanctions only in that the international community would take account of the application of all relevant UN resolutions (i.e. including those on Croatia) before the "complete normalization" of relations.

The Croatian government expressed full satisfaction with Resolution 871 (which was, conversely, denounced by the Serbian media, by the self-declared government of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (RSK) and by the RSK parliament), highlighting its reaffirmation of Croatian sovereignty and territorial integrity, its references to restoring Croatian sovereignty over "pink zones" adjacent to Serb-held UN-protected zones, the creation of a separate UNPROFOR command structure in Croatia, and the mandate for UNPROFOR personnel to use all necessary measures, including force, to defend themselves.

#### **UN report on September killings by Croat forces**

A statement released on Oct. 7 after a three-week UN inquiry accused Croat forces of a "comprehensive scorched earth policy" in their Sept. 9 offensive against Serb-inhabited villages [see p. 39646]. Special UN human rights investigator (and former Polish Prime



Minister) Tadeusz Mazowiecki also referred, in a letter to Mate Granic, a Croatian Deputy Prime Minister, to evidence of arbitrary executions. UNPROFOR had recovered 67 bodies, of which 18 were mutilated, and 48 Serbs were not yet accounted for.

#### Parliamentary walk-out by opposition parties - Ruling party congress

The main opposition Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) led a walk-out from parliament on Oct. 6, protesting over autocratic behaviour by Tudjman's ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and in particular its refusal to deal with legislation on liberalization of broadcasting.

Joining the protest were the main regional autonomist parties (which Tudjman had attacked as unpatriotic in a speech on Sept. 24)—the Istrian Democratic IDS (Istria) and the Dalmatian Action Party (DA); a number of DA officials had been arrested the previous day.

The HDZ held a special two-day congress in Zagreb on Oct. 15-16.

Tudjman presented his party as the sole guarantor of Croatian independence and defined as the most important task the liberation of land controlled by Serb militias. He also proposed controversially that Jasenovac in southern (Serb-held) Croatia, the camp where the 1941-45 fascist *ustashe* Croat state had slaughtered Serbs, Jews and gypsies, should now commemorate "all the victims of communism", including *ustashe* officials executed as war criminals, and the Croatian dead in the 1991 war with Serbia.

The congress approved a new party programme defining the HDZ as a Christian Democratic party. Tudjman was re-elected as party president; the new deputy leader, Defence Minister Gojko Susak, was reportedly a hardliner, although Tudjman was credited with persuading other hardliners to withdraw in favour of moderates in the election of vice-presidents and the presidium.

#### Devaluation - Cabinet reshuffle

The Croatian dinar was devalued by 21 per cent from Oct. 5, and linked to the deutsche mark at DM 1.00=4,444 dinars, as part of a three-pronged attack on rampant inflation; wage rises would be restricted to 24.9 per cent for October and 4 per cent per month thereafter, and a 10 per cent import tax was introduced, with a simultaneous reduction in value added tax from 50 to 40 per cent.

Tudjman announced Cabinet changes on Oct. 12. Ivica Kostic became Deputy Prime Minister for social affairs; Nadežda Vidosevic took over from Ivan Cermak as Economy Minister; Andrija Hebrang took over Health from Juraj Njavro, who became Minister without portfolio; and Ivan Parac became Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in place of Josip Juras.

■ Last article pp. 39646-47; reference article pp. R103-104.

## SLOVENIA

### Arms scandal developments

The controversy over arms smuggling to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which material-

ized following the discovery of a large consignment of arms at Maribor airport in July [see pp. 39606; 39647], continued to dominate domestic politics in October.

The weekly *Mladina* published further allegations claiming that the arms shipments—which represented a violation of the UN embargo on arms exports to all the former Yugoslav states—were approved at the highest level in the summer of 1992. President Milan Kucan, Defence Minister Janez Jansa and the then Interior Minister Igor Bavcar were all said to have been involved. However, the current Interior Minister, Ivan Bizjak, who was in charge of an official investigation into the affair, denied any involvement by government officials.

On Oct. 18 Kucan declared in a newspaper interview that Slovenia had "never bought arms for sale to Bosnia-Herzegovina. . . . It has always only given assistance". He also said that he was involved in the affair only to the extent that he was President at the time when the decision to assist the two neighbouring countries was taken.

#### Police strike

The country's police force and some Interior Ministry staff went on strike on Oct. 8 in support of a claim for a 25 per cent wage increase. The government responded by tabling measures denying the right to strike to police officers, prison guards, flight controllers and customs officers. The legislation was adopted by the National Assembly in emergency session on Oct. 13. The police union thereupon called off the strike, but said that it would consider other forms of action to press its demands.

■ Last article p. 39647; reference article R123.

## MACEDONIA

### Continuing differences with Greece over name

On Oct. 15 the newly elected Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, whose Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) won the Greek general election on Oct. 10 [see p. 39705], announced that Greece was withdrawing from UN-brokered negotiations with Macedonia on the issue of that country's name.

The Greek stance was based on the fear that, in the volatile Balkan context, the adoption of the name Macedonia by the former Yugoslav republic could lead to territorial claims on the adjacent Greek province of Macedonia. However, the *Guardian* of Oct. 27 reported "indications" that "the new government [would] conduct its relations with Macedonia on a pragmatic basis". Macedonia was always referred to in Greece as Skopje, after its capital.

#### Chinese and Belgian recognition

On Oct. 12 China and Macedonia agreed to establish diplomatic relations, China recognising the latter as the Republic of Macedonia (not the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—the name used when Macedonia joined the UN on April 8, 1993—see pp. 39442; 39472).

On Oct. 21 Belgium recognized Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

backdating recognition to April 8, leaving Greece as the only European Community member state not to have done so.

■ Last article p. 39519; reference article p. R116.

## HUNGARY

### Law on 1956 uprising

A law to allow prosecution of crimes committed during the 1956 uprising, approved by the *Országgyűlés* (parliament) in February but whose first paragraph was rejected by the Constitutional Court in early October, was referred back to parliament by President Arpad Göncz on Oct. 14, and approved overwhelmingly in amended form on Oct. 19.

The amendment redefined the categories of offences not covered by the statute of limitations as those crimes considered in international law to be war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Chief Prosecutor's office announced on the same day an inquiry into possible proceedings over the killing of demonstrators outside the parliament building on Oct. 25, 1956.

#### Antall's treatment for cancer

Prime Minister József Antall, 61, announced on Oct. 4 that he was taking four weeks' sick leave from Oct. 6 for treatment in a German hospital for his long-standing lymph gland cancer.

Interior Minister Péter Boross acted as Prime Minister during Antall's absence, but the national board of the Hungarian Democratic Party (HDF or MDF) announced on Oct. 10 that Antall had been confirmed as head of the party list for elections due in 1994, and would thus continue as Prime Minister in the event of an HDF victory.

#### 1994 budget

Finance Minister Iván Szabó introduced the 1994 budget in parliament on Oct. 12, prefaced with forecasts on the likely 1993 outcome.

In 1993, he said, gross domestic product (GDP) would fall by between 1 and 3 per cent (compared with a fall of 12 per cent in 1991 and of 4.5 per cent in 1992), with drought-affected agriculture performing poorly and outweighing the growth in industry. Exports had fallen sharply; a budget deficit of US\$2,000-2,500 million was expected; and inflation would be around 22-23 per cent as in 1992.

The 1994 budget would include austerity measures aimed at reducing the deficit as a proportion of GDP, but the law on public employees, with a monthly minimum wage of 8,000 forints, would be introduced from the beginning of 1994 instead of being deferred until 1995, and there would be incentives for agriculture and significant investment in infrastructure.

■ Last article p. 39647; reference article pp. R111-12.



## POLAND

### Formation of "post-communist" government

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the two largest parties in the *Sejm* (parliament) following the September elections [see pp. 39644-45], on Oct. 26 formed a coalition headed by the PSL leader, Waldemar Pawlak.

The coalition parties, both with roots in the party structure of the former communist regime, held 303 of the 460 seats in the *Sejm* (lower house) and 73 of the 100 seats in the Senate. With the likely support of the Labour Union (UP), it would enjoy a two-thirds majority in both houses. This would be required for the passage of a new constitution, which was regarded as a "first priority".

#### Coalition negotiations

Coalition negotiations had been conducted by the SLD, PSL and UP after initial exchanges of views among the main parliamentary parties and an initial agreement between the SLD and PSL in late September [see p. 39645]. The main differences concerned aspects of economic policy and the allocation of ministerial posts. The UP withdrew from the talks when

#### Polish Council of Ministers

Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) Prime Minister  
Marek Borowski (SLD) Deputy Prime Minister (Economy); Finance  
Aleksander Luczak (PSL) Deputy Prime Minister (State Administration) and Education  
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD) Deputy Prime Minister (Social Policy) and Justice  
Michał Strak (PSL) Head of Council of Ministers Office  
Andrzej Olechowski (ind.) Foreign Affairs  
\*Andrzej Milczanowski (ind.) Internal Affairs  
Admł. Piotr Kołodziejczyk (ind.) Defence  
Mirosław Pietrewicz (PSL) Head of Central Planning Office  
Lesław Podkański (PSL) Foreign Economic Relations  
Andrzej Smietanko (PSL) Agriculture  
Bogusław Liberadzki (ind.) Transport and Maritime Economy  
Stanisław Zelichowski (PSL) Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry  
Leszek Miller (SLD) Labour and Social Policy  
Kazimierz Dejmek (PSL) Culture  
Jacek Zochowski (SLD) Health and Social Welfare  
Marek Pol (UP) Industry and Trade  
Andrzej Zieliński (ind.) Communication  
Wiesław Kaczmarek (SLD) Ownership Transformation  
Witold Karczewski (ind.) Head of Scientific Research Committee

\*Held same post in outgoing government.

the other two parties rejected its demand for a slowing down of the privatization process.

Both the SLD and the PSL were unequivocal in their support in principle for the market-based economy, and many leading SLD members appeared strongly committed to free-market reforms, but the PSL appeared to favour a more cautious approach and more government intervention, particularly to help farmers, its main constituency.

The two parties announced that they had reached agreement on policy issues on Oct. 14. They rejected President Lech Walesa's demand that he should be allowed to choose a Prime Minister from a list of three candidates. Walesa then withdrew this demand and formally nominated Pawlak—the choice of the coalition parties—as Prime Minister on Oct. 18. After another week of negotiations Pawlak announced the composition of the new Council of Ministers.

#### Government programme

At the swearing-in ceremony on Oct. 26 Pawlak outlined the new government's programme. Rejecting concerns that the free-market reforms introduced since 1989 would be reversed, he said that the coalition would continue with the construction of the market-based economy, but would seek to distribute the cost of reforms more equitably and provide more support for those who suffered as a result of them.

The government would introduce measures to reduce unemployment, increase welfare spending, give equal treatment to the public sector, reduce interest rates and extend debt relief to industry. Pawlak also reaffirmed Poland's desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as soon as possible.

#### New Council of Ministers

While the PSL provided eight ministers in the 20-member Cabinet compared with the SLD's five, the latter provided two of the three Deputy Prime Ministers and controlled the key economic ministries. Six ministers had no party affiliation and one was a member of the UP.

The independent ministers included Andrzej Olechowski, a former finance minister who was appointed Foreign Minister; Andrzej Milczanowski, who retained the post of Interior Minister; and Admł. Piotr Kołodziejczyk, who had been Defence Minister in 1989-91. Under the "small constitution" adopted in 1992 [see p. 39200], Walesa had the right to be consulted on the appointments to these three posts, and they were thought to reflect his wishes.

Pawlak, a former farm manager, was elected leader of the PSL in June 1991. He had been Prime Minister briefly in 1992—at 33 Poland's youngest—but resigned when he was unable to form a government [see p. 39017].

A substantial number of the new ministers had held senior posts during communist rule. Among them was Leszek Miller, the Labour Minister, who had been secretary of the PUWP/PZPR central committee.

The SLD leader, Aleksander Kwasniewski, did not join the government but became leader of the party's parliamentary group.

#### Election of Speaker

Jerzy Oleksy, an economist and deputy chair of the Social Democratic Party (SdRP), was elected Marshal (Speaker) of the *Sejm* on Oct. 14.

■ Last article pp. 39644-45; reference article pp. R118-19.

## ROMANIA

### Censure motion - Resignation of minister

The minority coalition government of Nicolae Vacaroiu survived a no confidence vote in the legislature on Oct. 25 on a motion introduced by the Democratic Party-National Salvation Front led by former Prime Minister Petre Roman.

In the Senate, the upper house, the motion was rejected by 66 votes to eight, with three abstentions, but 37 opposition senators refused to participate. In the 341-seat Chamber of Deputies, the motion was rejected by 155 votes to 128.

In introducing its censure motion, the third in 1993, the opposition argued that Vacaroiu should be replaced because he had in August appointed four ministers without parliamentary approval [see p. 39607].

It was announced on Oct. 22 that Vacaroiu had accepted the resignation of one of the four ministers appointed in August, Petre Salcudeanu (Culture). Salcudeanu complained at a subsequent press conference that he had been the victim of a hostile media campaign.

#### Ethnic tensions - Accusation against police

The interim leader of the Romanians' Federation of Romania, Gheorghe Raducanu, accused the government at a press conference on Sept. 30 of complicity in the deaths of three ethnic Romanians (Gypsies) at the hands of a mob in Transylvania 10 days earlier [see p. 39647]. Some reports said that armed police who had arrested and handcuffed two of the Gypsy victims stood by as the men were beaten to death. The human rights organization Amnesty International was reported to have protested to President Ion Iliescu.

■ Last article pp. 39647-48; Romanian admission to Council of Europe p. 39707; reference article pp. R120-21.

## SLOVAKIA

### Coalition agreement

The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) signed a coalition agreement on Oct. 19 with the Slovak National Party (SNS), whose leader Ludovít Černák had resigned as Economy Minister in March, partly to protest against the government's lack of support for an accelerated economic reform process [see



p. 39377]. No details were released, and the allocation of ministerial posts to the SNS remained to be finalized.

The HZDS had lost its parliamentary majority after eight deputies left the party in March-April [see p. 39428]. The new coalition would have 80 seats in the 150-member National Council.

#### Restitution of church property

On Oct. 27 the National Council adopted a law on the restitution of property to churches and religious communities.

The law covered buildings, farmland, forests and vineyards confiscated during communist rule (or after 1938 in the case of Jewish property). Property which was at present in private ownership would not be returned, nor would that administered by state co-operatives. The latter restriction was included at the insistence of President Michal Kovac, who had returned the bill after its initial adoption in September.

#### "Indiagate" affair

On Oct. 5 the National Council voted to establish a parliamentary commission to investigate what had become known as the "Indiagate" affair.

In September the daily newspaper *Sme* had alleged that several senior ministers had embezzled US\$22,000,000 paid by India to Slovakia as part of a debt-cancelling trade agreement. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar described these allegations as "absolute lies", and the paper subsequently admitted that it had not checked its sources before printing the story.

#### Military co-operation agreement with Hungary

Slovakia's Defence Minister Imrich Andrejčák and his Hungarian counterpart, Lajos Für, signed a bilateral co-operation agreement in Budapest on Oct. 4, covering the exchange of information on major troop movements, exchanges of military observers, and co-ordination of air defence and aviation in border areas.

■ Last article p. 39648; Czechoslovakia reference article pp. R104-05.

## BALTIC STATES

### Baltic Assembly meeting - US call for early withdrawal of Russian troops

The presidium of the interparliamentary Baltic Assembly met in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, on Sept 25 and 26. It proposed that recommendations of the Assembly should in future be sent to the parliaments of member countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in corporation into national law.

Presidents Lennart Meri of Estonia, Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia, and Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania, met US President Bill Clinton in Washington on Sept 27, before addressing the UN General Assembly in New York. Clinton expressed US support for early withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia, a call

repeated on Oct. 27 by Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, during a visit to the Baltic states.

Last article p. 39652; reference article R132.

## ESTONIA

### Pro-Yeltsin measures - Ministerial appointment

Prime Minister Mart Laar announced on Oct. 5 that the Interior Ministry was to suspend distribution of publications banned in Russia, including *Den*, *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. This was in accordance with the 1991 treaty under which Estonia agreed to prevent activities on its territory against the lawful Russian authorities. At the same time, the *Baltic Independent* of Oct. 8-14 reported, the government banned the activities of pro-Communist groups opposed to Russia's President Boris Yeltsin.

Peeter Olesk was sworn in on Oct. 12 as a Minister without Portfolio; his responsibilities were reported to encompass Ethnic Relations and Immigration.

■ Last article p. 39610; reference article p. R106.

## LATVIA

### Ban on pro-Communist organizations

The government was reported by the daily *Diena* to have banned on Oct. 6 three pro-Communist organizations—the Latvian Union of Communists, the Union to Secure Veterans' Rights, and the Latvian Association of Russian Citizens—alleging 22 acts of conspiracy.

The groups were said to be planning, if anti-Yeltsin forces in Moscow [see pp. 39692-93] were victorious, to kidnap Latvian leaders, intending to trade them for the former Latvian Communist Party's first secretary Alfred Rubiks, who was on trial in Riga for anti-Latvian activities [for his arrest see pp. 38373; 38465].

Russian officers in Riga were cited on Oct. 3 as saying that troops stationed in Latvia would remain neutral regarding the rebellion in Moscow.

#### IMF credit

The IMF on Oct. 27 approved credits totalling SDR 23,250,000 (about US\$32,000,000), of which SDR 11,600,000 (\$16,000,000) was available until March 1995 under a standby credit to support the government's economic and financial reform programme. An additional SDR 11,600,000 was available under the systematic transformation facility (STF).

■ Last article p. 39610; reference article p. R114.

## LITHUANIA

### Murder of journalist - Gangland killings

Vitas Lingys, deputy editor of the daily *Respublika* and a prominent crime reporter, was shot dead outside his home in Vilnius on Oct. 12.

The killing, generally assumed to have been carried out by one of the organized criminal gangs known as "the mafia", brought the number of such murders to 31 in 1993. On Oct. 7, five people were shot dead in a presumed mafia attack at a restaurant in Kaunas.

#### Government appointments - Arrest of soldiers

Lithuanian radio reported on Oct. 19 that Col. Jonas Andriskevicius, head of the national military academy, had been appointed C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces. Linas Linkevicius was appointed on Oct. 25 to the vacant post of Minister of National Defence, and Laurinas Stankevicius was appointed Minister of Social Welfare.

The previous Minister of National Defence, Audrius Butkevicius, had resigned after a mutiny in the Volunteer Home Guard in September [see p. 39652]. One report said that before the September mutiny, soldiers had been carrying on an unauthorised vigilante campaign against criminal gangs in Kaunas. Five members of the Home Guard were reported on Oct. 7 to have been arrested for the alleged theft of Kalashnikov automatic rifles.

#### IMF credit

The IMF on Oct. 25 approved credits totalling SDR 51,750,000 (about US\$72,000,000), of which SDR 25,875,000 (\$36,000,000) could be drawn until March 1995 under a standby arrangement. economic and financial reform programme. An additional SDR 25,875,000 was available under the systematic transformation facility (STF). The credits would support the government's stabilization programme for 1993-94 and its efforts to transform Lithuania's economy into a market system.

■ Last article p. 39652; reference article p. R115.

## EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

### German Constitutional Court ruling on Maastricht Treaty

On Oct. 12 the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVG) in Karlsruhe unanimously declared the Maastricht Treaty on European Union to be in conformity with the German Basic Law (constitution). Shortly afterwards President Richard von Weizsäcker, who had delayed signing the Treaty until after the ruling, signed it and despatched it to be deposited in Rome.

Although both chambers of the German legislature had approved ratification by substantial majorities



in December 1992 [see pp. 39244; 39483], the delay due to the Constitutional Court process meant that Germany became the last member of the European Communities (EC) to ratify the Treaty (the UK having done so in August—see p. 39574). It was to enter into force on Nov. 1 [see also below], nearly two years after its signature in December 1991 [see pp. 38657-59].

Although the court found that the objections raised were either inadmissible or unfounded, its 85-page ruling gave interpretations of the Treaty which were expected to influence the future development of European Union. German sovereignty was not deemed to be infringed since the Union was described as a confederation or association of states (*Staatenverbund*) rather than a "European state". The judges found that there was sufficient democratic control over the development of the Union but warned that an "over-preponderance of tasks and responsibilities" at European level would "weaken democracy at a state level". Fears that Germany was subjecting itself "to an automatic progress towards monetary union, which can no longer be steered" were dismissed, the *Bundestag* (lower house of parliament) having in any case stipulated that it be consulted on whether or not to proceed to the third stage of monetary union involving the introduction of a single currency [see p. 39244].

## Brussels summit marking completion of ratification process

On Oct. 29 the EC heads of state and government held an extraordinary session of the European Council in Brussels to mark the completion of the ratification process, and to reinvigorate the process of European integration.

A declaration on the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union stated: "On Nov. 1, 1993, the date of the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, Europe takes an important step. . . . The import of the Treaty consists of four simple ideas: greater economic prosperity. . . ; greater external ambition. . . ; greater effectiveness. . . ; [and] greater democracy. . . . Ratification has been the occasion for a true public debate on the construction of Europe, its aims and its methods. That debate has been salutary. It has revealed weaknesses. There are many to whom Europe seemed distant, anonymous and interfering. For that reason, we wish to intro-

duce greater transparency, openness and decentralization in our procedures. . . . It is now important to bring the Union Treaty to life. . . ."

The summit reached an agreement on the location of several new EC institutions, "which supplements the decision adopted in Edinburgh". The seat of the European Monetary Institute would be at Frankfurt (a choice initially vetoed in June 1992 by the UK), and Alexandre Lamfalussy (the current (Belgian) General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements) was nominated as its President.

The summit defined five areas for "joint action" in the field of foreign policy co-operation: (i) central and eastern Europe (on the basis of proposals made by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in June—see p. 39525); (ii) the Middle East (using political, economic and financial means to support the peace plan); (iii) South Africa (assisting preparation for monitoring the April 1994 multiracial general election); (iv) former Yugoslavia (contributing to the implementation of a peace plan and supporting humanitarian action); and (v) Russia (sending observers to the December parliamentary elections).

There was also a declaration on the situation in former Yugoslavia and on the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The summit also reviewed progress on enlargement negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, declaring the objective of completing negotiations by March 1, 1994, to allow these countries to accede on Jan. 1, 1995.

A key issue of discussion in connection with the enlargement negotiations concerned institutional reorganization. Franco-German proposals for institutional reform reported in the *Financial Times* of Sept. 29 included (i) a voting system in the Council of Ministers which would require both a majority of member states and a majority taking into account their populations (thus strengthening the position of the unified Germany); and (ii) a maximum 10-member Commission to be selected by the Commission President.

Extracts from the conclusions of the presidency on other matters are given below.

**Implementation of the treaty on European Union. Economic and monetary union.** "We confirm the aim of establishing an economic and monetary union within the period laid down in the Treaty, while recalling the specific position of two member states [UK and Denmark] as to their participation in

the final stage of EMU. The second stage of EMU will begin on Jan. 1, 1994. . . .

**Common foreign and security policy (CFSP).** "Common foreign and security policy is the framework which must enable the Union to fulfil the hopes born at the end of the Cold War and the new challenges generated by the upheavals on the international scene. . . . The CFSP will be developed gradually and pragmatically according to the importance of the interests common to all member states [see above for agreed areas of "joint action"].

**Justice and home affairs.** "The Treaty on European Union has introduced the principle of greater co-operation in justice and home affairs. The aim of such co-operation is [to] . . . provide citizens. . . not only with an assurance that the creation of an area without frontiers will not be achieved at the expense of their security, but that the latter will be guaranteed more effectively in future thanks to this systematic co-operation organized between the member states. . . .

**The social dimension.** "The Union Treaty offers new foundations for social policy, subject to the provisions of the protocol annexed to the Treaty. . . .

**Democracy and transparency.** "The new Treaty contains a number of provisions intended to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the Union. [These concerned greater powers for the European Parliament, decisions "taken as close as possible to the citizens", a regular dialogue between national parliaments and the European Parliament, a new Committee of the Regions (to meet for the first time not later than Jan. 15, 1994), a Commission report on the principle of subsidiarity, the foundations of a Union citizenship "which will complement national citizenship without replacing it", and elections to the European Parliament in June 1994 "which will allow everyone to vote in their country of residence, whatever their nationality".]

**Growth and employment.** "Our meeting in December will be mainly devoted to developing a strategy for growth, competitiveness and employment [to be presented by Commission President Jacques Delors]. In this connection we consider it more necessary than ever to do our utmost to reach a global, durable and balanced agreement in the Uruguay Round negotiations. . . . [see also pp. 39714]."

## Postponement of implementation of Schengen agreement

On Oct. 18 the nine "Schengen" states (the 12 EC states minus Denmark, Ireland and the UK) agreed to postpone from Dec. 1, 1993, to Feb. 1, 1994, the removal of systematic passport checks at airports because of technical problems with the Schengen Information System (SIS—set up on a police computer near Strasbourg) and because of a decision by the French *Conseil constitutionnel* (Constitutional Council) in August to the effect that new asylum legislation was incompatible with the Constitution [see p. 39612].

The stopping of passport checks was to have come into effect on Jan. 1, 1993. This was postponed until July 1 [see p. 39484] and on June 30 postponed again until Dec. 1. Italy and Greece were in any case

### Location of European Union institutions

| Institution  | Country     | City                     |
|--|-------------|--------------------------|
| European Environment Agency  | Denmark     | Copenhagen               |
| European Training Foundation                                       | Italy       | Turin                    |
| European Centre for Development of Vocational Training             | Greece      | Thessaloniki             |
| Office for Veterinary and Plant-Health Inspection and Control      | Ireland     | Dublin                   |
| European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction            | Portugal    | Lisbon                   |
| European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products           | UK          | London                   |
| Agency for Health and Safety at Work                               | Spain       | Exact location undecided |
| European Monetary Institute  | Germany     | Frankfurt                |
| Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (trademark office) | Spain       | Exact location undecided |
| Europol and Europol Drugs Unit                                     | Netherlands | The Hague                |
| Translation Service Centre for the European Commission             | Luxembourg  | Luxembourg               |
| Common Appeal Court for Community patents                          | Undecided   |                          |



to be allowed a longer period of adjustment for technical reasons.

#### Association agreements with Czech and Slovak Republics

On Oct. 4 the Czech and Slovak Republics signed revised association agreements with the EC [see p. 39525].

■ Last article p. 39657; reference article pp. R130-32.

## GERMANY

### Nomination of coalition presidential candidates

The congress of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the junior partner in the ruling federal coalition, on Oct. 15 nominated Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, 72, as the FDP candidate for the May 1994 presidential elections. Steffen Heitmann, 49, the controversial candidate of the other ruling party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), was formally nominated on Oct. 20 [see also p. 39652].

#### New Bundesbank president

On Oct. 1 Hans Tietmeyer, 62, was appointed president of the Bundesbank in place of Helmut Schlesinger, who was retiring. Tietmeyer, Bundesbank vice-president since 1991 [see p. 38198], would hold his post until Aug. 30, 1999. Johann-Wilhelm Gaddum was appointed vice-president.

#### Government move to Berlin

Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced on Oct. 12 that the transfer of the government from Bonn to Berlin would be completed by 2000. Although the move had been approved in June 1991 [see p. 38298], no date for completion of the process had been fixed at that time.

#### Arson attack on hostel

On Oct. 5 a Sri Lankan man, his German wife and their two young children died following an arson attack in the town of Bad Wildungen, near Frankfurt. Although there was no immediate indication of racist motivation, police said that they had begun murder investigations and were certain that the fire had been started deliberately.

On the weekend of Oct. 30-31, US sportsmen (two of them black) were taunted and beaten up by neo-Nazis at Oberhof in Thuringia, eastern Germany.

#### Conviction of border guard for murder

On Oct. 20 a former East German border guard, Rolf-Dieter Heinrich, was convicted by a Supreme Federal Court of "perfidious murder" and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for shooting dead an East German who had already surrendered and given up an attempt to escape over the Berlin Wall. Hitherto the heaviest verdict handed down for such an offence had been for manslaughter [see pp. 38736; 38782; 38977; 39652], and in convicting Heinrich the Court overturned the verdict

of a Potsdam court which in December 1992 had sentenced Heinrich had to six years in prison for manslaughter.

#### Mielke conviction

On Oct. 26 a Berlin court found Erich Mielke, 85, formerly head of the East German state security service (Stasi), guilty on two counts of murder and one of attempted murder and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment.

Mielke had already been found guilty in 1934, by a court established by the Nazi regime, of the murders in question, committed on Aug. 9, 1931, outside the Communist Party headquarters in Berlin. Although the court agreed that much of the testimony used in the 1934 trial was inadmissible, it found sufficient reliable proof of Mielke's guilt and ruled that a statute of limitations did not apply since the relevant files had been seized by Soviet authorities in 1947 and had only come to light after 1989.

The *Independent* of Oct. 27 commented that "the decision to try Mielke on such ancient charges, rather than more recent ones relating to corruption and human rights abuses, once again underlined the difficulty Germany's legal authorities are having in bringing East Germany's former leaders to trial" [see also p. 39652].

■ Last article pp. 39652-53; reference article pp. R109-10.

## LIECHTENSTEIN

### General election

In a general election on Oct. 24, only eight months after the last election in February [see p. 39336], the centrist Patriotic Union (*Vaterländische Union*—VU) made gains at the expense of both the Progressive Citizens' Party (*Fortschrittliche Bürgerpartei*—FBP) and the environmentalist Free List (*Freie Liste*—FL).

The VU leading candidate Mario Frick, 28, who had been Deputy Head of Government in the outgoing government, was expected to lead the new government. Markus Büchel, whose outgoing government had been toppled by his own FBP [see p. 39653], did not stand, the FBP list instead being headed by Josef Biedermann, 49.

#### 1993 Liechtenstein general elections

|  | Seats   |          | Percentage of votes |          |
|--|---------|----------|---------------------|----------|
|  | October | February | October             | February |
| VU   | 13      | 11       | 50.12               | 45.43    |
| FBP  | 11      | 12       | 41.34               | 44.19    |
| FL   | 1       | 2        | 8.54                | 10.38    |
| Turnout in October: 85.31 per cent (87.54 per cent in February). |         |          |                     |          |

■ Last article p. 39653; reference article p. R115.

## BELGIUM

### Protests at austerity measures

The socialist FGFB trade union federation called a protest rally attended by 35,000-

70,000 people in Brussels on Oct. 29 (the day of an extraordinary European Community summit in the city—see p. 39701) over government plans to freeze wages and reduce social security payments. The FGFB's withdrawal from negotiations on a social pact had prompted Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene to announce on Oct. 24 that his four-party Christian Democrat-Socialist coalition would impose its own austerity measures.

Since the August collapse of the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System [see p. 39610-11] the Belgian franc, traditionally closely linked to the deutsche mark, had come under repeated attack [see p. 39657], forcing an effective devaluation of around 7 per cent against the deutsche mark and Dutch guilder in mid-October. Belgium's public debt, which at 140 per cent of GDP was the highest in the EC, meant that debt servicing accounted for nearly 30 per cent of budget expenditure.

#### Refugee controls

The *European* of Oct. 7 reported that a record 3,000 people had sought asylum in Belgium in August 1993, and that 220 extra officials had been drafted to speed up processing asylum applications. Fingerprinting of asylum seekers had been introduced, to prevent multiple asylum applications. Local authorities such as those of the Ixelles and Molenbeek districts in Brussels were criticized for refusing to take more refugees.

■ Last articles pp. 39571-72; 39657; reference article pp. R100-01.

## NORWAY

### New government

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland announced a reshuffled Cabinet on Oct. 7, following the September general election in which the ruling Labour Party improved its position [see p. 39653].

The major posts remained unchanged. Jens Stoltenberg, 34, the son of former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, replaced Finn Kristensen as Minister for Industry and Petroleum and Energy, and Nils Olav Totland replaced Oddny Aleksandersen as Minister for Government Administration.

On Oct. 11 Kirsti Kolle Groendahl of the Labour Party and Edvard Grimstad of the Centre Party were elected president and vice-president respectively of the *Storting* (unicameral parliament).

#### 1994 budget

The minority Labour government presented a draft 1994 budget on Oct. 13. It provided for a budget deficit of NKr 46,400 million (representing 6.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)) as against one of NKr 51,500 million in 1993 [see p. R118]. The current-account surplus was expected to rise to NKr 35,500 million from NKr 25,300 million, largely because of higher oil production. (US\$1.00=NKr 7.0231 as at Oct. 11, 1993.)

■ Last article p. 39653; reference article p. R118.



## UNITED KINGDOM

### Conservative Party conference

The ruling Conservative Party's annual conference was held in Blackpool from Oct. 5 to 8.

The occasion was generally reported as allowing Prime Minister John Major to emerge more confident than had widely been anticipated. The conference had been held against a background of some tension within the party as press "leaks" provided pre-publication extracts from *The Downing Street Years* by the former Prime Minister Baroness Thatcher, a memoir in which she stoutly defended her 10½ years of premiership and launched sharp criticism against many of her former Cabinet colleagues.

Major on Oct. 7 called for a return to core Conservative values. The previous day, Home Secretary Michael Howard and Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley were both warmly received when emphasising a tougher stance on, respectively, law and order and alleged benefits abuse.

Howard presented a list of 27 proposed policy actions, including abolition of a defendant's "right to silence", the ending of repeated cautions of offenders, tighter bail conditions, stronger laws against trespass and squatting, tougher sentencing of juvenile offenders and an expansion of the prison building programme. Lilley devoted much of his speech to measures to restrict access to benefits by claimants from abroad and to reduce the scope for fraudulent use of benefits books. The next day Sir George Young, Minister for Housing and Planning, told the conference that in providing permanent accommodation local authorities would be relieved of the duty to give priority to the homeless (including homeless young single parents).

### Developments in arms-to-Iraq inquiry

The Scott inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the sale of arms and defence-related equipment to Iraq [see p. 39207] was presented on Oct. 7 with a potentially damaging memorandum drafted in December 1988 by a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence.

This document, which had not been made available during the 1992 trial of Matrix Churchill executives [ibid.], indicated that the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had agreed that in order to protect an intelligence source licences already granted to that company for the sale of machine tools to Iraq should not be revoked, even though the equipment was believed to be destined for defence-related use.

On Oct. 12 William Waldegrave, a Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1988-90 and now Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with responsibility for the civil service and "open government", disclosed in evidence to the inquiry that intelligence reports about the use being made by Iraq of some British exports had in certain instances been withheld from ministers.

He also effectively agreed that it had been misleading of him to have told the inquiry that no exports to Iraq of dual-use equipment had been allowed if

it was believed that they were to be used to produce weapons.

### Reopening of coal mine closure review

British Coal announced on Oct. 20 the activation of the Modified Colliery Review Procedure, with a view to the possible closure of more of its 30 remaining mines including some of its 19 "core" pits. The same day Energy Minister Tim Eggar announced an extension to April 30, 1994, of the scheme of enhanced redundancy terms for miners leaving the industry.

British Coal's first closure announcement, in October 1992 [see p. 39159], had foundered over lack of consultation [see pp. 39245-46]; in May 1993, however, the High Court had ruled that British Coal was now legally entitled to close any of the 10 pits on its original closure list [see p. 39256], and moreover half of the pits on its further list of 19 vulnerable pits had been closed by October.

### Collapse of trial of "Birmingham Six" police

A High Court judge on Oct. 6 stopped the trial of three former officers of the West Midlands police (charges against a fourth having already been dropped), charged in May 1992 with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice in connection with the investigation and trial of the "Birmingham Six" following the bombing of two public houses in Birmingham in 1974 [see p. 26871].

In March 1991 the Six had been released and their life sentences quashed after the Appeal Court had found their 1975 convictions unsafe and unsatisfactory [see p. 38111]. The judge in the present case based his action on the massive publicity and debate generated by the trial and release of the Birmingham Six, and on the narrowness of the grounds for the perversion of justice charges, which related principally to whether notes of interviews with the suspects were or were not made contemporaneously. [For the acquittal in May 1993 of three former Surrey police officers charged over the "Guildford Four" case, see p. 39480.]

### Anti-BNP violence

Violence erupted at Welling, in south-east London, on Oct. 16 when police sought to prevent demonstrators from marching past the effective headquarters of the right-wing and racist British National Party (BNP), and some 30 people were arrested for alleged public order offences. [For the capture by the BNP in September of a hitherto Labour-held seat in the London borough of Tower Hamlets, see p. 39654.]

The march was organized principally by the Anti-Nazi League (relaunched in January 1992) and Youth Against Racism in Europe. A separate demonstration, organized by the Anti-Racist Alliance and supported by the Labour Party and a broad range of trade union and other movements, passed off peacefully in central London the same day.

■ Last article p. 39654; reference article pp. R127-28.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

### Shankill bombing and revenge killings - Political initiatives

An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb attack, directed against leading members of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) meeting above a shop in the Shankill Road, west Belfast, instead killed 10 people in the shop (including one of the bombers, Thomas Begley) and injured 59. Revenge shootings in the ensuing week claimed the lives of six Catholic civilians, and seven people (Catholics and Protestants) were killed on Oct. 30 in an attack on the Rising Sun public house at Greysteel, Co. Derry, by two masked Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) gunmen. Two Catholics and one Protestant had died in shootings earlier in the month.

In a House of Commons statement on Oct. 25 Sir Patrick Mayhew, the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said that "no political purpose, whatever it may be, will be advanced by a single inch through the use or the threat of violence", but that "this atrocity surely reinforces the challenge to all the participants, including the two governments, who are currently involved as constitutional politicians in the urgent search for a solution to Northern Ireland's political problems". The scheduled Oct. 27 meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was postponed as a mark of respect for the dead.

The Shankill bombing focused attention particularly on the relationship between the IRA and Gerry Adams, president of *Sinn Féin*.

The dialogue [see pp. 39433; 39654] between Adams and John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), had been criticized by Loyalists in particular in that it involved treating *Sinn Féin* as a prospective participant in a political solution, representing a Republican viewpoint, rather than shunning it as a "political front for IRA terrorism". The bombing (which an IRA statement conceded had gone "tragically wrong") gave occasion for widespread calls for Adams to condemn it and to call for an immediate cessation of violence, but instead he fuelled controversy by helping to carry Begley's coffin at the latter's funeral on Oct. 27, and Hume said that he understood the political reasons for his having done so. On Oct. 31 Hume made it clear in a television interview that "what we are asking the two governments to do [i.e. in the still unpublished Hume-Adams report—see p. 39654] is to create the framework in which agreement can take place and to commit themselves—particularly the British government for a change—to actually promoting agreement rather than . . . issuing statements of condemnation all the time while people continue to die".

It was reported on Oct. 25 that the UK Home Secretary, Michael Howard, had on Oct. 19 indefinitely excluded Adams from entering the British mainland, on the grounds that the government was satisfied that he had been or was concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. (Adams had been invited by Tony Benn,



the Labour MP for Chesterfield, to address a meeting at the House of Commons in London.) Also on Oct. 25 the Prime Minister John Major, speaking in Cyprus [see p. 39714], responded angrily to a suggestion from Adams that a positive response to the Hume-Adams initiative could lead to an IRA ceasefire, saying that "I am not going to do deals with people who plant bombs and kill innocent people".

#### **Publication of joint set of principles by UK and Irish Prime Ministers**

After the Irish government had discussed the Hume-Adams report, and Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring had outlined on Oct. 27 a set of "guiding principles" which could form the basis of a peace initiative backed by the Irish government, notably including the consent of the people of Northern Ireland for any change in the status of the province, Major and Reynolds held a meeting on Oct. 29 at the Brussels European Community summit [see p. 39701]. Their joint statement excluded any possibility of adopting the Hume-Adams report as a basis for peace, but suggested that they would "respond imaginatively" to a cessation of violence, and set out a joint set of six principles as follows:

- (1) The situation in Northern Ireland should never be changed by violence or the threat of violence.
- (2) any political settlement for Northern Ireland must depend on consent which was freely given in the absence of force or intimidation.
- (3) There could be no talks between the two governments and those who used, threatened or supported political violence.
- (4) There could be no secret agreements or understandings between the governments and organizations which supported violence "as a price for its cessation".
- (5) Those claiming a serious interest in advancing peace in Ireland should renounce for good the use of or support for violence; and
- (6) If and when a renunciation of violence had been made and sufficiently demonstrated "new doors could open" and both governments would wish to respond "imaginatively" to the new situation which would arise.

A special Anglo-Irish summit was arranged for December, with a view to laying the basis for a new political negotiation involving the Northern Ireland parties.

#### **Continuation of mainland IRA campaign**

The IRA continued its campaign of attempting to bomb mainland targets in London and elsewhere in the south of England.

There were four small explosions in north-west London on Oct. 2, five more in north London early on the morning of Oct. 4, and three more in the same area on Oct. 8, causing widespread disruption to traffic and public transport. On Oct. 12, armed police discovered an IRA bomb cache in a flat in the Tottenham area of London, and arrested two men (six others having been arrested the previous day in north London and Staffordshire). Train services throughout the south of England were severely disrupted by railway bombs at Reading in Berkshire

on Oct. 24, and at Brill in Buckinghamshire on Oct. 25.

#### **Convictions in mainland bombing cases**

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) members Eamonn O'Donnell and Sean Cruickshank were on Oct. 5 sentenced to 20 years' and 15 years' imprisonment respectively for firebombing shops in Leeds in June 1992. Patrick Kelly was sentenced in London on Oct. 19 to 15 years' imprisonment for attempted murder and 25 years' imprisonment for conspiracy to cause explosions. Kelly had been arrested in London in November 1992 when two policemen in a routine check stopped a lorry containing explosives; one policeman had been shot and injured, Kelly had been arrested, but his accomplice had escaped.

Nessan Quinlivan, who escaped in July 1991 from Brixton Prison in London while awaiting trial for involvement in IRA actions [see p. 38356], was on Oct. 7 sentenced to four years' imprisonment by the anti-terrorist special criminal court in Dublin, after being found guilty of possessing a weapon and ammunition when arrested in Ireland in April 1993.

■ Last article p. 39654; reference article p. R128.

## **IRELAND**

### **National Development Plan**

Albert Reynolds, the *Taoiseach* (Prime Minister), unveiled an ambitious six-year Ir£20,000 million (about US\$28,000 million) National Development Plan (NDP) on Oct. 11. Its aim, he said, was "nothing less than the transformation of Ireland".

The government expected to create as many as 200,000 new jobs as a result of investment under the plan, which envisaged an average 3.5 per cent annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) during the 1994-99 period. Funding for the NDP would be secured from the government (Ir£8,000 million), European Community (EC) structural and cohesion funds (Ir£8,000 million) and the private sector (Ir£4,000 million).

Public-sector investment would be weighted towards training, energy, telecommunications and development of small and medium enterprises. Private-sector investment would be concentrated in the industrial sector. EC funds would be channelled primarily towards training and towards upgrading of the road and rail network.

#### **Replacement of O'Malley as Progressive Democrat leader**

Desmond O'Malley, 55, resigned as leader of the opposition Progressive Democrats on Oct. 5. Described by the *Independent* of Oct. 6 as one of the "heavy hitters" of Irish politics, O'Malley had formed the Progressive Democrats in 1985 following his expulsion from *Fianna Fáil* [see p. 34758].

Announcing his resignation, O'Malley said that there were "absolutely no internal or external factors, personal or political" which had forced him to take the action.

On Oct. 12, the 10 Progressive Democrat *Dáil* deputies elected as O'Malley's successor Mary Harney, 40, the co-founder of the party

and hitherto deputy leader, who thus became the first woman to lead a major political party in the Irish Republic.

■ Last article p. 39526; reference article p. R113.

## **FRANCE**

### **Industrial unrest - Strike by Air France workers**

Industrial unrest involving thousands of public-sector workers crippled services across the country in the latter part of October and brought the national airline to a virtual standstill. The disturbances, the worst faced by the government of Prime Minister Edouard Balladur since it took office in March [see p. 39381], forced the government to make concessions which fuelled speculation about its ability to push through reforms needed to sustain its ambitious privatization programme.

The first signs of public-sector discontent emerged on Oct. 12 when a strike called by transport and telecommunication workers severely disrupted rail travel and paralysed the state-owned enterprise France Telecom. The strike had been called to protest against the government's economic policy and its plans to reform employment law [see pp. 39612; 39655; see also below].

#### **Strike by Air France workers**

A two-week national strike, launched on Oct. 12 by freight staff at Air France, resulted in violent clashes between strikers and riot police at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle and Orly airports in Paris and disrupted hundreds of international and domestic flights. The strike escalated sharply after it was joined on Oct. 18 by ground staff. Workers were protesting against the government's plans to cut some 4,000 of Air France's 63,000 jobs in an effort to reduce debts estimated at F 50,000,000 a day.

On Oct. 24 the government announced that it was withdrawing its restructuring programme for Air France amid reports that it was seeking to pre-empt a threat by ground staff at Air Inter, Air France's domestic subsidiary, to extend the strike. In an interview with French radio the same day, the Budget Minister Nicolas Sarkozy said that the government would consider injecting money into Air France to cover its losses. On Oct. 26, Air Inter workers ignored the government's offer of reconciliation by going ahead with their strike.

The government's announcement withdrawing its restructuring proposals coincided with the resignation of Bernard Attali, chairman of Air France, who said he was resigning over the suspension of a programme which was "indispensable to the company's survival". Attali was replaced on Oct. 25 by Christian Blanc, former chair of the Paris bus and transport authority (RATP), and a close adviser to Socialist President François Mitterrand. On Oct. 27 the Force Ouvrière union, representing about 35 per cent of Air France ground staff, called on its mem-



bers to return to work; some ground staff militants were reported, however, to have voted to continue the strike.

On Oct. 25 the government accepted the resignation of Jean-Cyril Spinetta, chairman of Air Inter. Spinetta was reported to have resigned in protest against plans to deregulate domestic air routes. He was replaced by Michel Bernard.

### Approval of employment law

The National Assembly on Oct. 5 approved a five-year programme aimed at job creation and at the reduction of unemployment, standing in September at a record 11.8 per cent.

If passed—the law still awaited approval by the Senate—there would be an effective cut in the SMIC (minimum industrial wage) paid to young workers, currently F 4,900 (about US\$865) a month, and a progressive shift in welfare costs from company payrolls on to the state budget [see pp. 39612; 39655]. More flexible arrangements would be introduced for Sunday trading and there would be top-up payments for people taking a job paying less than the value of unemployment benefits.

### Election of Rocard as PS leader

Former Prime Minister Michel Rocard was elected leader of the Socialist Party (PS) on Oct. 23.

Rocard won 80 per cent of the 587 votes cast in a secret ballot for the post of first secretary at the party's congress in Paris. Rocard said afterwards that he would lead a list of PS candidates for the June 1994 elections to the European Parliament on condition that women were allocated half the number of places.

■ Last article p. 39655; reference article pp. R107-08.

## SPAIN

### Galician elections

The right-wing Popular Party (PP) won a clear victory in the elections to the Legislative Assembly of the autonomous region of Galicia on Oct. 17.

*El País* described the margin of victory as the greatest by any party in any election since Spain's return to democracy. The result was also the worst result ever for the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), which had defeated the PP in the June general election [see p. 39528]. Widespread disillusionment with the government's handling of the economic crisis was seen as the chief reason for the PSOE's defeat.

The PP, led by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 71, a former minister under the Franco dictatorship and President (prime minister) of the Galician *Xunta* (government) for the previous four years, increased its vote to 52.21 per cent (from 44.08 per cent in 1989) and won 43 seats (38 in 1989) in the 75-seat regional parliament. The PSOE won 23.47 per cent (32.53 in 1989) and 19 seats (28 in 1989).

The centre-left Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), with 18.67 per cent of the vote (8 per cent in 1989), won 13 seats (five in 1989) and was placed ahead of the PSOE in five of the seven major towns on the region.

Eight other parties failed to win a seat.

### 1994 Budget - Interest rates

The government's budget for 1994 was approved by 178 votes to 157 in the Congress of Deputies on Oct. 21.

Passage of the budget had required the support of the nationalist Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU) alliance and the Canaries Coalition (CC—see p. 39432). The CiU, saying that it had acted in the interests of national stability, demanded further cuts in public spending. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), also courted by the government in protracted pre-budget negotiations [see p. 39655], abstained.

In an effort to stimulate investment, the Bank of Spain lowered interest rates by 0.25 percentage points to 9.25 per cent on Oct. 22.

### Political reform package - Dialogue with PP

In an attempt to achieve wider consensus with opposition parties, the government on Oct. 22 presented a package of reforms, representing its political programme over the coming months, designed to "stimulate democracy", to combat fraud and to bring politics closer to the people.

The programme envisaged reforms in the regulation of political parties and their finances, electoral law, the justice system, regulations covering both houses of the *Cortes Generales* (parliament), and state television (RTVE).

The government and the PP confirmed on Oct. 28 that they had agreed to initiate negotiations on formulae to confront the economic crisis.

### ETA assassination - Royal visit to Basque country

Gen. Dioniso Herrero Albinana, head of the medical branch of the Spanish air force, was shot dead in Madrid by masked gunmen of the Basque separatist organization ETA on Oct. 19.

Julio Iglesias Zamora, a businessman kidnapped by ETA who had become the focus of a resurgent peace movement in the Basque country [see p. 39612], was freed on Oct. 28, reportedly after a ransom had been paid.

Amid tight security King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia visited the Basque country on Oct. 5.

The visit, the King's fourth in 18 years, was seen as a gesture of solidarity with local businessmen subject to "revolutionary tax" extortion demands from ETA [ibid.].

■ Last article p. 39655; reference article pp. R123-124.

## ITALY

### Coup attempt allegations

Relations between the government and the armed forces were strained by a new scandal in October when senior military figures were accused of plotting a coup and organizing a bombing campaign.

Defence Minister Fabio Fabbri initially dismissed claims by one Donatella di Rosa, who told magistrates and the media in early October that during a year-long liaison with Gen. Franco Monticone, the head of the elite Rapid Intervention Force, she had learned of his prominent role in a coup attempt planned for spring 1994, and of the stockpiling of weapons around the country, as well as of the activities of the Armed Phalange, a shadowy organization which had claimed responsibility for several recent terrorist bombings.

On Oct. 13, however, Fabbri suspended Monticone and five other senior army and secret service officers. Monticone's immediate superior, Gen. Biagio Rizzo, was also suspended for failing to understand the "gravity" of the case. This in turn prompted the resignation of the army's Joint Chief of Staff member, Gen. Goffredo Canino, on Oct. 22.

### Reorganization of secret services

President Oscar Scalfaro announced on Oct. 19, after calling an unprecedented meeting with senior ministers and military officers, that the two intelligence services, the civilian SISDE and the military SISMI, would be reorganized under a single authority directly responsible to the Prime Minister.

Scalfaro's action came amid mounting evidence linking members of the intelligence services to acts of terrorism and organized crime. A SISDE section chief was arrested on Oct. 16 on charges of subversion and transporting explosives, relating to the discovery in September of a (fuseless) bomb on an express train, and two suspected members of the Camorra, the Neapolitan Mafia, were arrested in the same case.

### Investigation of magistrates

On Oct. 20 five magistrates in Palermo, the Sicilian capital, were officially informed that they were under investigation for "presumed association with the Mafia". Some 20 magistrates in the Naples region were also among those currently under investigation, suspected of links with the local Camorra.

### Developments in party financing scandals

The former Prime Minister and general secretary of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Bettino Craxi, agreed on Oct. 10 to co-operate with magistrates investigating the interlinked party financing scandals.

Craxi had resigned from his party post in February [see p. 39337], denying all charges against him, but now said that he would tell "all I know as a historic witness of this era in Italian politics".

On Oct. 28 the trial opened of Sergio Cusani, a financier at the centre of the Enimont affair, which had involved the largest single payment to political parties so far discovered [see pp. 39573].

Cusani was charged with false accounting and illegal financing of political parties. This was the first case to come court in the course of the investigations on party financing.

On Oct. 13 the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament, voted to abolish members' parliamentary immunity in cases of



criminal charges. The bill still required approval by the Senate. The abolition of immunity would enable magistrates to question the more than 100 deputies suspected of corruption.

#### Protests against austerity budget

The main trade union federations called a general strike on Oct. 28 to protest against the spending cuts included in the draft 1994 budget [see p. 39656].

The strike paralysed the public services, banks and much of industry, and demonstrations were held in all the main cities. Police officers and soldiers also joined the protest by working to rule. The general strike had been preceded by a week of strikes in the transport sector.

#### Confidence vote

The government called and won a confidence vote on Oct. 29 on the retention of the so-called "minimum tax" on the self-employed.

This measure, seen by its supporters as a key weapon in the fight against tax evasion, had been due to lapse at the end of the month.

■ Last article p. 39656; reference article pp. R113-14.

## GREECE

### Pasok election victory

The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), led by Andreas Papandreou, won the early general election on Oct. 10 and returned to office after four years in opposition. It gained 46.3 per cent of the vote, an increase of 8.3 percentage points compared with the last election in April 1990 [see p. 37388], while the hitherto ruling right-wing New Democracy (ND), led by Constantine Mitsotakis, gained 39.3 per cent, a loss of 7.6 percentage points. Pasok won 170 seats in the 300-member Vouli (Assembly) and ND 111.

Political Spring (POLA), founded by former Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras [see pp. 39657], won 4.9 per cent and 10 seats, having campaigned for an end to the domination of Greek politics by the "dinosaurs"—Papandreou and Mitsotakis—and taken a hard line on the issue of the name of the

#### Greek election results

|   | Percentage |      | Seats |       |
|---|------------|------|-------|-------|
|   | 1993       | 1990 | 1993  | 1990* |
| Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) | 46.9       | 38.6 | 170   | 124   |
| New Democracy (ND)                      | 39.3       | 46.9 | 111   | 152   |
| Political Spring (POLA)                 | 4.9        | -    | 10    | -     |
| Communist Party of Greece (KKE)*        | 4.5        | -    | 9     | -     |
| Left Coalition (Synaspismos)            | 2.9        | 10.2 | 0     | 21    |
| Others                                  | 1.5        | 4.3  | 0     | 3     |

\*After seat reallocation by decision of the Supreme Court.

\*KKE contested 1990 election within Synaspismos.

#### New Greek Cabinet

- \*Andreas Papandreou Prime Minister
- \*Anastasios Peponis Minister to the Prime Minister's Office
- Gerasimos Arsenis Defence
- \*Karolos Papoulias Foreign Affairs
- \*Apostolos Tsokhatopoulos Interior
- \*Georgios Yennimatas National Economy and Finance
- Georgios Moraitis Agriculture
- \*Evangelos Yiannopoulos Labour
- Dimitris Kremastinos Health and Social Security
- Georgios Kouvelakis Justice
- Dimitris Fatouros Education and Religion
- \*Melina Mercouri (f) Culture
- Georgios Katsifaras Merchant Marine
- \*Stelios Papathemelis Public Order
- Konstantinos Triaridis Macedonia and Thrace
- Kostas Skandalidis Aegean
- Kostas Laliotis Environment and Public Works
- Kostas Simitis Industry, Commerce, Energy and Technology
- Ioannis Charalambous Transport and Communications
- \*Member of previous Pasok Cabinet.
- Women are indicated by (f).

former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia [see also below].

Of the two smaller left-wing parties, the orthodox Communist Party of Greece (KKE) did significantly better than its poll ratings over the previous two years had suggested, while the Progressive Left Coalition (*Synaspismos*) narrowly failed to obtain the 3 per cent required for representation. The KKE had contested the 1990 election within *Synaspismos*, but had left the alliance the following year [see p. 38357].

The election result was widely seen as a remarkable personal triumph for Papandreou. His first period as Prime Minister had ended in 1989 amid accusations of economic mismanagement and a series of corruption scandals and personal crises [see pp. 36562; 36738]. He was subsequently charged with embezzlement, but was acquitted [see p. 38739]. Aged 74, he was known to be in poor health and made only four public appearances during the election campaign.

The ND's defeat was generally attributed to voters' dissatisfaction with the government's management of the economy, the austerity programme which had led to wage and job cuts in the public sector, allegations that Mitsotakis had used his office for personal gain, and criticism of what was perceived as his soft stance on the Macedonia issue [see pp. 39328; 39387; 39519].

Pasok's manifesto disowned much of the left-wing and populist programme which the party had pursued while in office in the 1980s. It described the party as "social democratic" and committed to a "society with a human face, stressed the importance of Greece playing a constructive role in the European Communities (EC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and called for good relations with the USA. Like POLA, the party did adopt a

strongly nationalist line on Macedonia and on relations with neighbouring Turkey.

#### New Cabinet

The new 46-member government (including junior ministers) was sworn in on Oct. 13. Several senior ministers had served in the last Pasok government and some returned to their previous posts, including Karolos Papoulias (Foreign Affairs), Georgios Yennimatas (Economy and Finance) and Melina Mercouri (Culture). Among controversial appointments were those of Papandreou's wife Dimitra as head of his private political office, and of his personal physician, Dimitris Kremastinos, as Health Minister.

#### Economic programme

In a speech to parliament on Oct. 23 Papandreou announced that the government's economic and social priorities were restoring welfare spending, reducing inflation and interest rates, cancelling the planned privatization of the state telephone company, and combating tax evasion. At the same time, however, he stressed the need for fiscal discipline.

The speech was seen as an attempt to deflect concern that Pasok would revive the high-spending policies of the 1980s. "The world has changed, and the government must adapt to the new reality," Papandreou declared.

#### Resignation of Mitsotakis as ND leader

On Oct. 26 Mitsotakis announced his resignation as ND party leader, a post he had held since 1984.

■ Last article pp. 39656-57; reference article p. R111.

## TURKEY

### Appointment of new ministers

Cabinet changes involving the replacement of the Interior and Defence Ministers were announced on Oct. 24.

Nahit Mentese, hitherto Education Minister, was appointed Interior Minister, replacing Mehmet Gazioglu who was named a Minister of State. Mehmet Golhan, hitherto a Minister of State and a close adviser to Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, was appointed Minister of Defence, replacing Nevzat Ayaz who became Minister for Education.

The changes, particularly Gazioglu's replacement, came apparently in response to mounting criticism of the government's handling of the Kurdish insurgency in the south-east. Reports said that Ciller had come under pressure from President Suleyman Demirel and army hardliners to adopt a tougher stance on the Kurdish question after allegedly expressing a preference for a "Basque model" involving a degree of autonomy for the south-eastern provinces. On Oct. 12 Ciller denied that she favoured such a model.

#### Escalation of PKK offensive

In what was regarded as a dramatic escalation of its conflict with security forces in the south-east, the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was blamed by the government on Oct.



22 for the death of Brig.-Gen Bakhtiar Aydin, commander of government forces in the south-east, during a rebel assault on the town of Lice earlier that day.

The PKK denied any involvement in the killing of Aydin, the highest-ranking officer to die in the clashes to date.

The PKK did, however, admit to the killing on Oct. 21 of at least 22 women and children in a village in Siirt province. The PKK said that the attack had been aimed at state-employed guards who were using women and children as human shields. The attack was the third of its kind by the PKK; in early October, 33 people had been killed in two other villages in Siirt province, including 10 women and children.

On Oct. 27 President Demirel said that almost 10,000 people, including civilians, security forces and Kurdish rebels, had been killed between 1984 and October 1993 in the insurgency.

#### PKK "ban" on journalists and political parties

The PKK strengthened its grip on rebel-held territories in the south-east by declaring a ban on Oct. 15 on all Turkish newspapers and on activity by Turkish and foreign journalists.

Justifying this action, the PKK said that the press had colluded with the government in its coverage of the Kurdish insurgency. On Oct. 19 five national dailies responded to the ban by ordering the closure of their regional offices in the south-eastern city of Diyarbakir.

On Oct. 24 the PKK also prohibited campaigning by Turkish political parties in the south-east.

Earlier, Kurdish rebels had been implicated in the abduction of the south-eastern provincial leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), the junior partner in the ruling coalition.

The US company Mobil Oil announced on Oct. 14 that it was suspending its operations in the south-east, and claimed that it had been subjected to extortion attempts by the PKK. In August seven of the company's employees had been abducted by the PKK.

#### Ciller's visit to USA - Helicopter purchase

Ciller held talks in Washington with US President Bill Clinton during a visit on Oct. 14-21.

A joint communiqué issued on Oct. 16 said that both leaders had instructed their governments to "conduct an in-depth review of Turkey's situation in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait". Turkey had reportedly pressed for an exceptional lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq to allow the re-opening of the oil pipeline running between the two countries. Losses in Turkish toll tariffs resulting from the closure of the pipeline were currently estimated at around US\$20,000,000 a month.

An agreement for the purchase by Turkey of 20 Super-Puma helicopters worth US\$235,000,000 manufactured by the Franco-German consortium Eurocopter was signed in Ankara on Oct. 8.

■ Last article p. 39657; reference article pp. R125-26.

## CYPRUS

### Calling of elections in TRNC

A growing political crisis in the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was partly defused on Oct. 20 when President Rauf Denktaş dissolved the Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (parliament) and called an early election for Dec. 12 (elections were not due until August 1995).

Essentially the crisis revolved around a clash of views between Denktaş and his Prime Minister, Dervis Eroglu, over the conduct of the negotiations on the Cyprus problem, with Eroglu adopting a much harder line on concessions to the Greek Cypriot side. The rift had been formalized in July 1992, when dissident members of the ruling National Unity Party (UBP) had formed the breakaway Democratic Party (DP) with Denktaş's support.

Throughout 1993 the DP and other opposition parties called for fresh elections to resolve the deadlock. In September all opposition deputies resigned from parliament in protest at the terms of a new electoral bill which was seen as favouring the UBP, in particular by including a loosely worded provision for the largest party to be allocated an unspecified additional number of seats in the Assembly. Denktaş had strongly opposed this provision, returning the bill unsigned on Sept. 8 and threatening to call a referendum unless the number of proposed additional seats was made more specific. The legislation was eventually adopted on Oct. 20 and, despite their misgivings about the electoral system, the opposition parties subsequently declared that they would take part in the elections.

On Oct. 27 it was announced that Denktaş had become a member of the Democratic Party (DP).

#### Cypriot leaders' meeting with Hurd

On Oct. 20, on the eve of the Commonwealth summit in Nicosia [see p. 39713], the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Douglas Hurd hosted a lunch for Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides and Denktaş to explore options for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The meeting was the first between the two leaders since the suspension of the UN-sponsored talks in New York in June [see p. 39530].

The meeting took place at a sensitive time in UK-Cypriot relations. After a junior minister at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office had suggested in September that a "confederal" solution to the island's division should be examined, senior Greek Cypriot leaders had claimed that UK policy favoured the Turkish-Cypriot position. Only two days before the lunch, Hurd cancelled a planned separate meeting with Denktaş, at Clerides's insistence.

#### Clerides's address at UN - Meeting with Ciller

Addressing the UN General Assembly on Oct. 5, Clerides called for concerted international action to solve the Cyprus problem, accusing the Turkish-Cypriot side of "intransigence" and Turkey of "complete defiance" of UN resolutions on Cyprus.

At a Council of Europe summit meeting in Vienna on Oct. 8, Clerides and a senior diplomat held separate talks with the Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller. No details were released about the contents of the discussions, which were described as "informal".

#### Reorganization of UNFICYP

Some 350 Argentine troops joined in mid-October the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), currently staffed mainly by Austrian and British forces. This completed a restructuring and reorganization of UNFICYP, whose strength would be maintained at around 1,400 troops. The UN General Assembly had approved on Sept. 14 the Security Council's May 27 decision that assessed payments by all members, rather than voluntary contributions, should be the basis for funding UNFICYP. [For earlier developments see pp. 39482; 39530.]

■ Last articles pp. 39530; 39657; reference article p. R104.

## COUNCIL OF EUROPE

### Romanian accession

Romania was formally accepted as the 32nd member of the Council of Europe on Oct. 7, after a vote on Oct. 4 (in which the Hungarian representative abstained because of concerns over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania—see p. 39647 for bilateral September discussions on this issue).

A large majority of the Parliamentary Assembly had on Sept. 28 approved Romania's accession but called for guarantees on judicial independence, press freedom, minority rights and the decriminalization of homosexual behaviour.

#### Vienna summit

The Council of Europe held its first summit meeting on Oct. 8-9 in Vienna, attended by heads of state or government from all member states except for the UK and Greece, and by representatives of applicant states (Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Latvia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine).

In a move to reduce the time taken for cases to go through the European Court of Human Rights (currently an average of five years), the summit approved the merger of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Court to form a single body which would sit continuously. A protocol implementing this reform would require approval by each member state. The summit also voted to draw up an agreement on the principles governing the protection of national minorities, and approved a resolution against racism and xenophobia.

■ Last article p. 39530; reference article p. R130.



**IN BRIEF**

**ALBANIA:** President Sali Berisha signed into law on Oct. 18 a new press law adopted by the People's

Assembly on Oct. 11, despite criticism from journalists' organizations and opposition groups over restrictions on freedom of the press.

**AUSTRIA:** Legislation banning insider trading, and providing for severe fines and prison sentences

of up to two years, came into effect on Oct. 1; the state prosecutor was henceforth allowed to freeze accounts in cases where illegal financial actions were suspected, while a voluntary "compliance code" was agreed with banks and issuing houses.

# MIDDLE EAST - ARAB WORLD

**MIDDLE EAST****First Israeli-PLO meetings**

In October Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began to implement the peace agreement which they had signed on Sept. 13 [see pp. 39658-62], holding a number of meetings in Egypt.

**Arafat-Rabin meeting**

PLO chair Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin held their first-ever working meeting on Oct. 6 in Cairo. The meeting, arranged at Rabin's initiative, was also attended by Egyptian President Mubarak.

The two sides agreed to open talks on implementation of the accord on Oct. 13, and to establish a general liaison committee, a technical committee (which would deal principally with Israel's military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area), an economic committee and a regional co-operation committee (the latter also to include Jordanian and Egyptian representation). A further series of talks would continue under the framework of the 22-month-old Middle East peace talks. At least two of the committees would convene in Egypt, thereby satisfying Israeli demands to shift elements of the peace process from Washington to the Middle East.

According to Arafat, Rabin agreed that the committees would discuss the contentious issue of the status of Jerusalem. Arafat's statement surprised many observers, however, as both sides had originally agreed to postpone discussion of the Jerusalem issue until late in the peace process.

**Meeting of liaison committee**

The joint PLO-Israeli liaison committee met in Cairo on Oct. 13. The delegations were headed by Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister, and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazan) for the PLO. The committee agreed to meet every two or three weeks in Cairo to discuss progress on implementation of the accord.

**Meetings of technical committee**

The technical committee met in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Taba on Oct. 13-14, Oct. 20-21 and Oct. 26-28. The committee was established to prepare a protocol for Israel's military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, scheduled to start on Dec. 13 and end on April 13, 1994. The delegations were headed by Nabil Shaath for the PLO and deputy chief of staff Maj.-Gen. Amnon Shahak for Israel.

At the first meeting sub-committees were established to deal with security (including the status of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories) and "con-

fidence building measures" (including the issue of the estimated 12,000 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons).

The *Financial Times* of Oct. 29 stated that the technical committee had made "steady progress" during its three meetings in October. The two sides were reported to be in broad agreement on the establishment of a Palestinian police force. However, the Palestinian delegations was reported to have disagreed with Israeli proposals to provide security for up to 5,000 Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip.

**Release of Palestinian prisoners - Easing of closure order on occupied territories**

On Oct. 19 Israel freed its longest-held Palestinian political prisoner, Salim Zrei, a *Fatah* commander who had been in detention for 23 years.

At the Taba talks on Oct. 20-21, Israel agreed to a phased release of Palestinian prisoners, and 617 "low-risk" prisoners were released on Oct. 25-26. There was some confusion over whether *Hamas* members would also be freed, the PLO having demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all Palestinian prisoners, including *Hamas* members.

Israel announced in a "goodwill gesture" on Oct. 22 that it was easing a closure order imposed on the occupied territories in April [see pp. 39436-37]. However, most Palestinian men would still be barred from entering Israel.

**Approval of peace agreement by PLO Central Council**

The PLO Central Council approved the Israeli-PLO peace agreement on Oct. 11, at the end of a two-day meeting in Tunis attended by about 80 of the Council's 107 members.

Some PLO factions boycotted the meeting in protest at the peace agreement, notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Prior to the meeting, the PFLP, the DFLP and other Damascus-based rejectionist groups had held lengthy discussions with *Hamas*, but had failed to produce a common strategy to oppose the peace agreement.

Prior to the Council meeting it was reported that the PLO had arrested several officials at its headquarters in Tunis; PLO officials were quoted as saying that the arrests followed two foiled attempts on Arafat's life. However, other Palestinian sources claimed that the arrests were a pre-emptive step by Arafat aimed at marginalizing critics of the accord.

Radio Monte Carlo reported on Oct. 12 that the Council had approved the agreement by 63 votes to eight, with nine abstentions. Most prominent among those who voted against it were Shafiq al-Hut, the former PLO representative in Lebanon who had resigned from the PLO executive committee in August [see pp. 39614-15], Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani, director of the PLO Higher Council of Education and Culture, Abu Ahmad Halab, the Palestine Liberation Front representative, and Nasif Awwad, the Arab Liberation Front representative. Three high-ranking members of *Al-Fatah* abstained, including Farouk Qaddumi.

The Council also approved that part of the agreement which called for the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority to manage the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the five-year transitional period.

**Economic issues****Palestinian aid conference**

A donor conference of 47 governments and organizations held in Washington on Oct. 1 attracted pledges of some US\$2,000 million to finance the five-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule [see pp. 39660-61 for details on financing of peace agreement]. Some US\$600 million would be made available for 1994. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Oct. 1 hailed the conference as "a striking success". However, Arafat said that the pledges were not enough and that the Palestinians needed at least US\$5,000 million.

The European Communities (EC) agreed to provide US\$577 million through the EC Commission and the European Investment Bank. The USA pledged US\$500 million, 75 per cent in grant form, aimed particularly at promoting private-sector development. Japan would provide US\$200 million in 1994-95, Saudi Arabia US\$100 million in 1994 and the Scandinavian countries some US\$150 million over an unspecified period. Israel offered US\$75,000,000—one-third in grants and the remainder in credits. The World Bank would provide US\$50,000,000 through an International Development Association concessionary credit, mainly for Gaza, and a US\$35,000,000 World Bank Trust Fund loan to prepare investment projects. In addition, projects worth US\$250 million were proposed by the UN Development Programme for 1994. Other countries which agreed to provide financial or technical assistance included Austria, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

The conference created an ad hoc liaison group comprising the USA, Canada, the EC, Japan, Russia, Norway and Saudi Arabia. Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PLO were given associate membership of



the group, which would convene at the World Bank European Office in Paris every three to six months.

The PLO agreed to establish a Palestine Emergency Development and Reconstruction Authority to administer the aid.

#### **PLO-Jordanian economic pact - Joint Israeli-Palestinian investment - Palestinian bank**

In early October the PLO and Jordan concluded an economic co-operation pact. This envisaged the creation of a free trade-regime between Jordan and the Palestinian entity, and initial Jordanian supervision of Palestinian monetary policy.

The *Middle East Economic Digest* of Oct. 22 reported that Koor Industries, one of Israel's leading companies, and a group of Palestinian investors represented by Jawid Ghossein, head of the Palestine National Fund and a member of the Palestinian National Council, had agreed to establish a joint investment company in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

A group of Palestinian businessmen in the West Bank were reported to have launched a share flotation in mid-October for the first Palestinian commercial bank, to be based in Ramallah.

## **Diplomatic developments**

### **Jordan-Israel meeting**

Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan held talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in Washington on Oct. 1. This was the first ever official meeting between high-ranking Jordanian and Israeli officials, and followed the signing of an Israel-Jordan "common agenda" for future negotiations in mid-September [see p. 39661].

The two sides agreed to establish a joint economic committee. During a briefing to a committee of the *Knesset* (Israeli parliament) on Oct. 11, Peres said that he and Hassan had discussed the possible merging of Jordanian and Israeli seaports on the Gulf of Aqaba and the creation of a joint international airport.

The Oct. 1 meeting was also attended by US President Clinton, who later publicly announced his support for a debt relief programme for Jordan. Jordan's foreign debt totalled some US\$7,000 million, of which around US\$1,000 million was owed to the USA.

### **Tour by US special co-ordinator**

Dennis Ross, US "special co-ordinator" for the Middle East peace talks, toured the region in mid-October [see p. 39614 for his July tour], visiting Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Tunisia.

The tour appeared to be aimed primarily at facilitating a breakthrough in the stalled Israeli-Syrian track of the Middle East peace talks. However, Ross failed even to reach agreement on a date for the opening of a 12th round of talks.

### **Multilateral talks**

A meeting of the refugee committee of the multilateral strand of the Middle East peace

talks took place in Tunisia on Oct. 12-14 [see p. 39485 for previous meeting in Norway].

The meeting was attended by an Israeli delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin who agreed to increase the number of Palestinians who could return from exile to 5,000 a year.

The water committee held a meeting in China on Oct. 26-28.

## **Unrest in occupied territories**

During October *Hamas* confirmed its rejectionist stance by carrying out a number of attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets in the occupied territories. However, the number of violent incidents recorded throughout the month was significantly lower than during September [see p. 39662].

Two members of *Hamas* were killed during an Israeli security operation in the Gaza Strip on Oct. 2. The operation was the most comprehensive since the signing of the PLO-Israeli peace accord on Sept. 13.

In a letter to Rabin, Arafat criticized the Israeli action, along with the arrest of six Black Panther (*Fatah*) leaders in the West Bank on Sept. 29 [see p. 39662], claiming that it violated the spirit of the peace accord. However, in a statement issued on Oct. 3 Rabin said he had instructed the army to continue to target all Palestinian "terror forces".

*Hamas* responded to the Israeli operation on Oct. 4 when a suicide bomber drove a car laden with explosives into a bus near the West Bank settlement of Beit El, injuring 29 Israeli settlers. The following day Israeli troops shot dead a *Fatah* gunman in the Gaza Strip.

Two Israeli civilians were abducted and killed in the West Bank on Oct. 9. Rival claims of responsibility for the killings were issued by the PFLP and Islamic *Jihad*, both rejectionist factions.

On Oct. 15-16, *Hamas* members killed four Palestinian "collaborators" in the Gaza Strip, two of whom were *Fatah* members.

Assad Saftawi, a leading *Fatah* figure in the Gaza Strip and a close friend of Arafat, was assassinated in Gaza City on Oct. 21.

*Hamas* guerrillas killed two Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip on Oct. 24. In a statement issued after these killings, *Hamas* announced that it had declared war on the occupying Israeli forces and vowed to turn Gaza into a "mass graveyard" for Israeli soldiers and settlers.

A Jewish settler from Beit El was killed by *Hamas* on Oct. 29. The killing provoked violent demonstrations by Jewish settlers throughout the West Bank.

■ Last article pp. 39658-62.

## **ISRAEL**

### **Visit by Rabin to China**

Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin paid a visit to China on Oct. 10-15, the first by an Israeli premier. The two countries had established

diplomatic relations in January 1992 [see p. 38740].

Rabin held talks with a number of Chinese leaders, including Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin. Civil aviation and consular agreements were signed and the Chinese side reiterated its support for the Israeli-PLO peace accord signed in September 1993 [see pp. 39658-62]. According to some reports, the two sides discussed the issue of Chinese arms sales to Syria and Iran.

### **CIA allegations of close Sino-Israeli military links**

On Oct. 13 Rabin rejected as "total nonsense" US allegations that Israel had been selling arms and advanced military technology to China for over a decade.

The US Senate governmental affairs committee had released on Oct. 12 details of a written testimony supplied to it in early 1993 by R. James Woolsey Jr, Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stating that Israeli arms sales to China had amounted to "several billion dollars" and had included "advanced military technologies that US and Western firms are unwilling to provide". He also said that Israel and China "appear to be moving towards formalizing and broadening their military, technical co-operation".

### **Visit by Rabin to Indonesia, Singapore and Kenya**

After leaving China on Oct. 15, Rabin paid an unexpected three-hour visit to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, for talks with President Suharto.

The Indonesian authorities stressed that Suharto had received Rabin solely in his capacity as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nonetheless, the visit by Rabin to the world's most populous Muslim nation was widely regarded as a diplomatic triumph for Israel.

The talks between Rabin and Suharto were described as friendly, and included discussion of the Middle East peace process. Following the meeting, Indonesian officials expressed scepticism over the possibility of the two countries establishing diplomatic relations in the near future.

Rabin also visited Singapore (Oct. 15-16) and Kenya (Oct. 16-17), countries with which Israel had relatively close relations.

### **Re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Burkina**

The Voice of Israel radio station reported on Oct. 5 that Israel had re-established diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Burkina [see p. 39662 for re-establishment of relations with Gabon and Mauritius in September].

### **Reduction in US loan guarantees**

The US government announced in early October that it was deducting US\$437 million from a US\$2,000 million loan guarantee package for fiscal 1994 (starting Oct. 1, 1993).

The package was part of a controversial arrangement approved in October 1992 under which the USA had agreed to provide US\$10,000 million in loan guarantees over a five-year period in support of Israel's settling of immigrants [see p. 39166]. The deduction was carried out in accordance with a



penalty clause which stated that the annual US\$2,000 million figure would be cut, dollar for dollar, by the sum which Israel had spent during the previous fiscal year on settlement activity in the occupied territories.

#### Indictment of Der'i on corruption charges

Aryeh Der'i, the former Interior Minister and a leader of the Sephardic Torah Guardians (*Shas*), was stripped of his parliamentary immunity from criminal prosecution by a vote in the *Knesset* (parliament) on Oct. 13, and formally charged in a Jerusalem district court on Oct. 14 for fraud, taking bribes, falsifying documents and violating the public trust. Der'i had resigned from the Cabinet in mid-September after the Supreme Court called for his dismissal over corruption allegations [see p. 39662].

■ Last article p. 39662; reference article pp. R138-39.

## JORDAN

### Government appointments

Field Marshal Sharif Zaid ibn Shaker, Prime Minister from November 1991 until May 1993 [see pp. 38596-97; 39486], was appointed as Royal Court Chief on Oct. 14. Shaker replaced Khaled al-Karak, who was appointed as an adviser to King Hussein.

Also on Oct. 14 Mohammad Affash al-Adwan was appointed as Minister of Tourism and Antiquities, in place of Yanal Hikmat.

■ Last article p. 39662; reference article pp. R139-40.

## SYRIA

### Visit by UK Foreign Secretary

Douglas Hurd, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, paid an official visit on Oct. 22-24 to Syria, the highest-level visit by a UK official since the two countries restored diplomatic relations in 1990 [see p. 37873].

Hurd held talks with President Hafez al-Assad and Foreign Minister Farooq ash-Shar', focusing on bilateral relations and the Middle East peace process. In an interview with journalists on Oct. 23, Hurd described UK-Syrian relations as "strong and growing".

■ Last articles pp. 39534; 39618; reference article pp. R144-45.

## LEBANON

### Visit by Prime Minister to France - Aid protocol

Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri visited France on Oct. 14-15, when he held talks with senior officials, including President François Mitterrand.

The two sides signed an aid protocol for 1993-94 under which France would provide Lebanon with the equivalent of some US\$30,000,000 of assis-

tance—US\$15,000,000 more than the 1992 package. The 1993 aid package consisted of grants, concessional loans and guaranteed commercial loans.

#### Continuing violence in southern Lebanon

Throughout October there were frequent clashes between Israeli forces and those of *Hezbollah* and radical Palestinian guerrillas in Israel's self-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon. The fighting was generally small-scale and was concentrated in the eastern sector of the zone. According to Israeli sources, as many as 13 *Hezbollah* and Palestinian fighters were killed during the clashes. A number of Israeli soldiers were injured but *Hezbollah* reports of Israeli fatalities were uncorroborated.

On Oct. 9 an armed member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command was killed by Israeli naval personnel while attempting to reach Israeli territory from Lebanon on a high-speed water scooter.

■ Last article pp. 39662-63; reference article pp. R140-41.

## IRAQ

### Disarmament talks with UN - UN weapons inspection - Talks on lifting of oil embargo

Iraq handed over a list of foreign arms suppliers at the end of follow-up disarmament talks on Oct. 1-8 in Baghdad [see pp. 39616; 39663] with the UN Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The decision followed a warning by Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the Special Commission, who had indicated that he would not recommend lifting the embargo on Iraqi oil sales—urgently demanded by the government [see below]—until he had ensured long-term monitoring of Iraq's weapons programmes and a full account of its suppliers. No decision on the lifting of UN sanctions was expected before the UN had established the comprehensiveness of the list.

On Oct. 8 the state-owned Iraqi News Agency (INA) reported that Iraqi officials had submitted the list only after the Special Commission and the IAEA had signed a letter promising "to use the information on suppliers for technical purposes . . . and [to] maintain confidentiality of records".

#### UN weapons inspection

More than 50 international weapons experts conducted the largest UN investigation yet into declared and undeclared Iraqi weapons sites on Oct. 1-30 amid unconfirmed reports that Iraq had resumed proscribed defence programmes.

#### Talks on lifting of oil embargo

Inconclusive talks on the lifting of the UN oil embargo were held in New York on Oct. 6

between UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz [see p. 39663 for their September meeting]. In a report to the UN Security Council afterwards Boutros-Ghali said that Iraq continued to reject UN terms for the sale of Iraqi oil under UN Resolutions 706 and 712 [see pp. 38406; 38452], which involved close monitoring of oil sales and the purchase and distribution of humanitarian aid supplies.

UN sanctions were cited as the principal reason for a sharp increase in mortality rates of children under five and people over 50 between August 1990 and September 1993, according to fresh statistics released by the Ministry of Health on Oct. 20.

#### Allegations of chemical weapons use

The UN Special Commission on Iraq began an investigation on Oct. 23 into allegations that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Shia dissidents operating in the southern Hammar marshes in late September.

In testimony given to the Tehran-based Gulf War Victims research group, Shia refugees alleged that Iraqi troops had fired chemical shells in the north-eastern sector of the Hammar region, and had threatened to fire chemical weapons at the three marsh settlements of al-Hayadir, al-Abbad and al-Mahyat. On Oct. 23 Kuwait Radio cited Shia opposition groups as saying that 3,000 people had been killed by chemical weapons in the south.

According to international human rights groups at least 600 people died in a government "campaign of purification" launched in the south in late August [see pp. 39616; 39663].

Ahmad Chalabi, president of the executive committee of the opposition Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its chief spokesman, claimed on Oct. 18 that his organization had become a well-established body inside Iraq. In mid-October the INC was reported to have successfully distributed copies of the party newspaper, *al-Mutamar* ("The Congress") in Baghdad and other government-controlled areas.

#### Gulf war compensation claims

The UN Compensation Commission established in January 1992 [see p. 38742] disclosed on Oct. 1 that more than 2,200,000 claims for damages resulting from Iraq's occupation of Kuwait had been filed against Kuwait; the total amount expected to be filed was US\$15,000 million. The first company claim for compensation was lodged in January 1993 [see p. 39292].

#### Opening of interests section in France

An Iraqi interests section was opened at the Moroccan embassy in Paris on Sept. 30. Iraq had severed diplomatic relations with France in February 1991 [see p. 37982], and France stressed that this action did not indicate a change in its position towards Iraq.

Deputy Prime Minister Aziz visited Paris for medical treatment on Oct. 17-23.

■ Last article p. 39663; reference article pp. R137-38.



## IRAN

### New Finance Minister

The *Majlis* (legislature) on Oct. 6 confirmed Morteza Mohammadkhan as Economic Affairs and Finance Minister, relieving Javad Vahaji of his responsibilities as caretaker Finance Minister [see p. 39616]. Former Finance Minister Mohsen Nourbakhsh, whose reappointment had been put forward by President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani but rejected by the *Majlis* in August [ibid.], remained Vice-President in charge of Economic Affairs.

Mohammadkhan, 48, had been nominated by Rafsanjani on Sept. 29. Head of the Customs Office since 1989 and a former aide to Nourbakhsh, he was expected to continue economic reforms favoured by Rafsanjani and Nourbakhsh.

The *Majlis* on Oct. 24 approved a bill banning civil servants from making unauthorized contacts with foreigners.

### 1994 budget

The 1994 budget announced by the Plan and Budget Organization on Oct. 3 proposed further privatization, the regulation of trade tariffs, and increased aid for private-sector investments. It also retained the policy of guaranteeing the purchasing price for several important agricultural products.

### Talks with Iraq

Talks held on Oct. 17-21 in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, between senior Iraqi and Iranian officials aimed to resolve outstanding issues resulting from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. These discussions, planned in September during a meeting in New York between the two countries' foreign ministers, were the first high-level contacts in three years [see p. 37873].

Among the issues dominating the Baghdad talks were differences over the number of prisoners of war still held by each side. Iran said that Iraq still held 5,000 Iranians, a claim denied by Iraq which retorted that several Iraqis were still being detained by Iran [see p. 39214]. Other discussions focused on the number of aircraft flown by Iraq to Iran during the 1991 Gulf conflict reportedly to prevent their capture and destruction [see p. 37936]. The *Guardian* of Oct. 27 reported that Iraq claimed to have sent 148 aircraft whereas Iran maintained that only 22 had landed. Iran also revived its demand for Iraqi compensation amounting to US\$1,000 million for Iranian losses sustained during the Iran-Iraq war.

### Controversy over talks with Germany

The trial opened in Berlin, Germany, on Oct. 28 of five people accused of murdering four senior officials of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, also known as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDPI) in a restaurant in Berlin in September 1992 [see p. 39116-17].

The hearing was surrounded by controversy centring on allegations that a senior German security officer, Bernd Schmidbauer, had discussed details of the trial during security co-

operation talks in Bonn with the Iranian Information and Security Minister, Hojatolislam Ali Fallahiyan, on Oct. 6-7. Schmidbauer denied the allegations. The UK and the USA meanwhile expressed concern over claims made by Fallahiyan that Iran and Germany had collaborated on joint intelligence operations for two years.

On Oct. 21 Germany announced that a German businessman, Gerhard Bachmann, arrested in Iran on Oct. 9 on charges of spying, would be freed "soon".

### Attack on Norwegian publisher

William Nygaard, the Norwegian publisher of *The Satanic Verses* by the Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie, was shot and wounded by an unknown gunman outside his home in Oslo on Oct. 11.

This was the third such attack against one of Rushdie's associates since the February 1989 *fatwa* issued by the late Ayatollah Khomeini pronouncing a death sentence on Rushdie and anyone connected with the distribution of his book [see pp. 36450-51]. On July 4, 1991, Rushdie's Italian translator had been stabbed and wounded in Milan, Italy; eight days later his Japanese translator had been stabbed to death in Tokyo [see p. 38363].

Reacting to the latest attack, Rushdie demanded international condemnation of the "gangster terrorist" state of Iran. On Oct. 14 Iran denied that it was behind the shooting of Nygaard.

High-level talks on Sept. 19-20 aimed at upgrading diplomatic relations between Iran and the UK [for September 1990 resumption of relations see p. 37727] failed to make substantial progress after Iran reiterated its unwillingness to lift the 1989 *fatwa* against Rushdie.

■ Last article pp. 39616-17; 39665; reference article pp. R136-37.

## YEMEN

### Political crisis - Re-election of Saleh as President

A political crisis erupted in October over the election of a new Presidential Council in Yemen. The crisis reflected the lingering tension between the two main political parties in unified Yemen, the General People's Congress (GPC—which had ruled North Yemen prior to unification in 1990) and the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP—which had ruled South Yemen).

On Oct. 11 the House of Representatives, the Yemeni legislature elected in April 1993, elected a new five-member Presidential Council, which in turn re-elected as its chair, and therefore as the country's President, Lt.-Gen. Ali Abdullah Saleh of the GPC.

#### Yemen Presidential Council

Lt.-Gen. Ali Abdullah Saleh (GPC), Ali Salem al-Bid (YSP), Abdel Aziz Abdel Ghani (GPC), Salim Salih Muhammad (YSP), \*Abdul-Majid al-Zindani (*al-Islah*).

\*New member.

The election took place in the absence of Vice-President Ali Salim al-Bid (leader of the YSP), who had retreated to his southern power base in Aden in August after a dispute with President Saleh. Bid's refusal to travel from Aden to the capital, Sana'a, had led to speculation that the presidential election would not be held and that, under the terms of the constitution, the presidency would pass to the Speaker of the House, Shaikh Abdullah bin Hussain al-Ahmar, leader of the conservative, tribal Yemeni Reform Group (*al-Islah*). However, Ahmar agreed not to block the election after the GPC agreed to give one of its three Council seats to *al-Islah*.

Although the depleted Council unanimously re-elected al-Bid as Vice-President, he was not sworn in.

### Visits by Sultan of Oman and French President

Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman paid his first visit to Sana'a on Oct. 2-4 for talks with President Saleh. The visit was a sign of the recent improvement in relations between the two countries.

During the visit, Oman agreed to provide US\$21,000,000 to finance the construction of a road link between the two countries.

President Mitterrand of France visited Yemen on Oct. 17-18 for talks with President Saleh and Prime Minister Haider Abu Bakr al-Atas.

■ Last articles pp. 39535; 39579; reference article pp. R146-47.

## EGYPT

### Swearing-in of President Mubarak for third term

President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak was sworn in for a third six-year term in office on Oct. 13. Mubarak had become President in 1981, following the assassination of President Anwar el Sadat [see p. 31253], and had been renominated for a second term in 1987 [see p. 35673].

Mubarak's uncontested renomination by the ruling National Democratic Party had been approved by the People's Assembly (legislature) on July 21 [see p. 39578], and was approved by 94.91 per cent of the valid votes cast in a national referendum held on Oct. 4. The Interior Ministry claimed a turnout of 84 per cent of Egypt's 18,900,000 eligible voters, but this was regarded with scepticism by many observers.

In his inauguration speech on Oct. 13, Mubarak referred to several issues which he said would be the central themes of his third term, including economic reform, reducing unemployment and the fight against terrorism.

### Cabinet changes

On Oct. 13 Mubarak invited Atef Sidki, Prime Minister since 1986, to form a new Cabinet. Sidki appointed a number of new ministers, but the key portfolios—Interior, Defence, Finance, Agriculture, Planning and Cabinet Affairs—were unchanged.



### New Egyptian Cabinet

- +Atef Sidki Prime Minister; International Co-operation
  - Kamal Ahmed Ganzouri Deputy Prime Minister; Planning
  - Yusuf Amin Wali Deputy Prime Minister; Agriculture, Animal Wealth, Fisheries and Land Reclamation
  - Amal Abdel-Rahim Osman Social Insurance and Social Affairs
  - +Soleiman Metwali Soleiman Transport, Communications and Civil Aviation
  - Mohammed Mahir Osman Abazah Electricity and Energy
  - Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi Sulayman Defence and Military Production
  - Mohammed Sawfat al-Sharif Information
  - Amr Mohammed Moussa Foreign Affairs
  - +Atif Mohammed Mohammed Ubayd Public Business Sector; Minister of State for Administrative Development and Environment Affairs
  - Mohammed Galal Abdel-Dahab Supply and Internal Trade
  - Mohammed Ahmed al-Razaz Finance
  - Mohammed Ali Mahjub, *Waqfs* (Religious Endowments)
  - Farouk Seif al-Nasr Justice
  - Farouk Hosni Culture
  - \*Ahmad Radwan Jum'ah Mansur Cabinet Affairs and Follow-up
  - Mahmud Sayyid Ahmed Sharif Local Government
  - Hussein Kamil Baha al-Din Education
  - Hamdi Ali Abdel-Wahab al-Banbi Petroleum
  - Gen. Hussein Mohammed al-Alfi Interior
  - \*Mohammed Salaheddin Hasaballah Housing and Utilities
  - \*Mamdouh Beltagui, Tourism
  - \*Mahmoud Mohammed Mahmoud Economy and Foreign Trade
  - \*Mohammed Abdel-Hadi Radi Public Works and Water Resources
  - \*Ali Abdel-Fatah Health
  - \*Ibrahim Fawzi Abdel-Wahed Industry and Mineral Resources
  - \*Ahmed al-Amawi, Manpower and Employment
- Ministers of state**
- Youssef Boutros-Ghali Prime Minister's Office for International Co-operation
  - \*Maher Mehran Housing Affairs and the Family
  - \*Kamal Shazli People's National Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs
  - \*Mohammed Zaki Abu-Amer People's National Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs
  - \*Mohammed Ibrahim Suleiman New Communities
  - \*Phenice Kamel Gouda Scientific Research
  - \*Mohammed al-Ghamrawi Daoud Military Production
  - \*New appointment.
  - +Altered responsibilities.

Mubarak failed to broaden his government by including representatives from the key opposition blocs. In an interview with the Cairo daily *Al-Ahram* of Sept. 30, Mubarak had said that during his third term he would begin a "broad national dialogue" involving "all political parties and forces which adhere to democracy and reject violence and terrorism". These remarks had prompted speculation that he was planning to bring the moderate fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood into the government.

### New central bank governor

Sidki appointed a new governor of the Central Bank of Egypt on Oct. 13. Isma'il Hasan Mohammed, hitherto chair of the Bank of Alexandria, replaced Mohammed Salaheddin Hamid who had served in the post since 1986 [see p. 35224].

### Visit by Mubarak to USA and France

Mubarak visited the USA and France in late October, holding talks with US President Clinton and French President Mitterrand which centred on the Middle East peace process. He reportedly received assurances from Clinton that future aid would be maintained at current levels.

According to the *Middle East Economic Digest* of Nov. 5, the USA currently provided annual economic aid of US\$815 million, military aid of US\$1,300 million and concessionary loans for food imports worth some US\$200 million.

### Continued Islamist violence

Islamic fundamentalist militants killed at least four police officers in attacks during October. For their part, the security forces continued to arrest large numbers of suspected militants. The anti-Islamist campaign was currently under the command of the Interior Ministry, but in an interview with *Al-Ahram* published on Oct. 11, Defence Minister Tantawi stated for the first time that the armed forces were prepared to intervene as the last line of defence against Islamist organizations seeking to topple the Mubarak regime.

Three members of the Vanguard of Conquest or so-called New Jihad (*Tala'i al-Fath*) were sentenced to death on Oct. 14, and 19 others received prison sentences [see p. 39617 for opening of trial in August].

Two US and one French tourist were shot dead by a lone gunman in a Cairo hotel on Oct. 26. Three other people were wounded in the attack. Prime Minister Sidki said on Oct. 27 that the culprit was "deranged" and was not a member of an Islamist organization.

■ Last article p. 39664; reference article pp. R135-36.

## LIBYA

### Reported coup attempt

According to reports in the Western media, forces loyal to Libyan "revolutionary leader" Col. Moamer al Kadhafi managed to suppress an extensive uprising by members of the armed forces in the second week of October.

Although the official Libyan media made no mention of the unrest, the reports were circumstantially supported by a speech given by Kadhafi in Misurata (one of the centres of the insurrection) on Oct. 17 in which he condemned "treachery" against his regime at some length and likened "the traitors" of October 1911 [those Libyans who had supported the invasion of the Italian colonialists] with those of October 1993.

The *Middle East Economic Digest* of Nov. 5 reported that more than 3,000 military personnel, from Tarhounah in the east to Tobruk in the west, had been involved in an insurrection lasting for three days. The most serious clashes occurred near Misurata and Tobruk, where rebellious army units were attacked by loyalist air force pilots. Among those reportedly arrested following the collapse of the coup was Maj. Abdel Salem Jalloud, Kadhafi's senior adviser and the "Libyan number two".

According to this report, the "most plausible explanation" of the coup attempt was that it was arranged along tribal lines and was directly linked to the ongoing Lockerbie crisis [see p. 39618]. Reports of tension between the Qadhathfa clan (of which Kadhafi was a member) and Jalloud's Megarha tribe were commonplace [for June 1987 conflict see p. 35219]. Tension was believed to have been heightened in recent months because of Jalloud's alleged opposition to any attempts by Kadhafi to hand over to the West the two Lockerbie suspects, both of whom belonged to the Megarha tribe.

The *Guardian* of Oct. 25, while acknowledging that the failed uprising was the "violent culmination of a long-standing power struggle within the regime", nonetheless concluded that Jalloud had been excluded from the plotting.

■ Last article p. 39618; reference article pp. R141-42.

## ALGERIA

### Establishment of CND

On Oct. 13 the ruling junta, the High Committee of State (HCS), established an eight-member Committee for National Dialogue (CND) to lay the groundwork for a gradual transition to an elected government. The inclusion of three army officers on the CND marked the first occasion that the HCS had openly included the military in the political process.

While the army was widely regarded as the chief power-broker in Algeria, it had generally avoided playing an overtly political role. According to some commentators, the move to bring the army into the political process was a concession to the opposition, which had demanded that the military act as a guarantor to the transition to democracy.

The three military members of the CND were: Maj.-Gen. Mohammed Touati, a Defence Ministry councillor; Maj.-Gen. Tayeb Deradji, inspector-general of land forces; and Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Senhadji, director-general of military infrastructure. The other five members were civilians, including the chair Youcef Khatib.

### Executions - Attacks by Islamists - Targeting of foreigners

Death sentences on 13 Islamic militants were carried out on Oct. 11 [for executions carried out in August see p. 39618].



During the first half of October Islamic militants assassinated three journalists, two professors and a leading paediatrician; in addition the killing of a number of foreigners appeared to signal a new phase in the Islamist campaign. As in previous months, a number of security officials and Islamists were also killed.

The first serious incident involving foreigners had occurred in September when Islamists kidnapped and killed two French civilians [see p. 39665]. On Oct. 19, gunmen shot dead two Russian military advisers and wounded a third in the Sahara desert town of Laghouat, some 340 km south of Algiers. A previously unknown group, the United Company of Holy War, claimed responsibility for the attack. The Algerian authorities also blamed Islamists for the death of a Colombian, a Peruvian and a Filipino working for an Italian company, who were kidnapped at Tiarat on Oct. 19 and found dead on Oct. 21. Three French consulate workers were kidnapped in Algiers on Oct. 24, in an attack claimed by the Islamic Armed Group; they were freed unharmed on Oct. 30-31 by the Algerian security forces in an operation during which six Islamists were killed.

President Mitterrand of France disclosed on Oct. 25 that the French government was considering the evacuation of its estimated 76,000 nationals from Algeria.

■ Last article pp. 39664-65; reference article pp. R133-34.

## MOROCCO

### Opening of new parliament

On Oct. 8 King Hassan opened the first session of the newly elected Chamber of Representatives, the Moroccan legislature, amidst continuing negotiation on the formation of a new government [see pp. 39535-36; 39665 for elections held in June and September].

After consultations on Oct. 3-4, the *Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires* (USFP) and the *Istiqlal*, the principal components of the leftist opposition *Bloc Démocratique*, announced that they would not enter into a coalition agreement with the ruling centre-right coalition *Entente Nationale*. The *Entente Nationale* had emerged as the largest bloc after the elections, despite strong gains by the *Bloc Démocratique*.

### Resignation of opposition leader

The decision by the USFP and *Istiqlal* came a week after the resignation of the USFP leader, Abdherahman el-Yousifi. Although Yousifi claimed to have resigned in protest at the actions of the authorities in the run-up to and during the general election, commentators claimed that the move reflected deep divisions within the Moroccan left.

■ Last article p. 39665; reference article p. R142.

## WESTERN SAHARA

### Postponement of peace talks

A second round of UN-sponsored talks scheduled to take place between the Moroccan government and the Polisario Front in New York on Oct. 25 was postponed at the last minute.

The two sides had held a first ever round of direct talks in El Aaiún, the Western Saharan capital, in July 1993 [see p. 39579]. Polisario declined to take part in the New York talks

after the Moroccan government had included former Polisario members in its delegation.

■ Last article p. 39665; reference article p. R146.

# INTERNATIONAL

## DISARMAMENT

### Chinese nuclear test

A Chinese underground nuclear explosion on Oct. 5 at the Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang province, 1,500 km west of Beijing, was justified by China as an act of "self-defence". Alluding to the "development and possession of a small number of nuclear weapons", a Chinese official spokesman said that China's testing programme had been "extremely limited" in scope compared with those of other major nuclear powers, and that China remained committed to a global test ban treaty by 1996.

The Chinese test was the first by any country in more than a year. China had said on July 5 that it would exercise "restraint", following an appeal by US President Bill Clinton for all recognized nuclear powers to cease tests pending negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty [see p. 39580]; the Geneva Conference on Disarmament had mandated its ad hoc committee to begin such negotiations in August [see p. 39619].

In October 1991 Russia became the first nuclear power to announce a moratorium on testing [see p. 38553], followed by France in April 1992 [see p. 38890] and the USA in September 1992 [see p. 39121]. Both Russia and the USA had since extended their bans [see pp. 39169; 39580]. The UK continued its policy of limited nuclear testing [see p. 39169].

### International reactions

US President Clinton reacted immediately to the Chinese test by ordering the US Department of Energy, responsible for nuclear warheads, to prepare for a "possible" resumption of testing. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed "deep regret" over China's action, saying that it would hamper talks on a global test ban treaty. UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that his country would seek to "co-ordinate" its nuclear testing policy with the USA. In an official communiqué on Oct. 6 France announced that it would consult with Russia, the UK and the USA to "examine the consequences" of China's underground test, but made no mention of a resumption of French nuclear testing.

### Weapons dismantling agreements with former Soviet republics

France and Russia signed an agreement in Paris on Oct. 20 on the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons, with French assistance worth some US\$70,000,000. A similar agree-

ment between the two countries had been signed in November 1992 [see p. 39216].

A joint statement issued on Oct. 24 after a two-day visit to Kazakhstan by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that Kazakhstan had agreed to ratify the 1992 Lisbon protocol [see p. 38937] by the end of 1993. The dismantling of Kazakhstan's nuclear weapons, as required under the protocol, was to be facilitated by US assistance to Kazakhstan totalling US\$80,000,000.

On Oct. 25 US Secretary of State Christopher and the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko signed an agreement in Kiev under which the USA offered US\$175 million to cover the cost of dismantling of 176 former Soviet strategic nuclear missiles still stationed in Ukraine. The agreement was aimed at giving effect to the Lisbon protocol [ibid.], as yet to be ratified by Ukraine, which would oblige Ukraine to accede to START-I [see p. 38320] and become a non-nuclear power by dismantling or transferring all nuclear weapons to Russia.

■ Last article p. 39580; 39619; reference article pp. R150-51.

## NATO

### Meeting of defence ministers

Defence ministers from member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met informally in Travemünde, Germany, on Oct. 20-21.

A press statement described this as the first meeting of its kind and said that ministers had focused on five main issues—the situation in the former Yugoslavia; NATO's future role in peacekeeping; transatlantic solidarity and the development of a European security and defence identity; the future of defence-related co-operation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe [see below]; and the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Reports said that the USA had reaffirmed its promise to commit "significant forces" to the UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had outlined plans to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction through greater co-operation in tracking trade in arms and anti-ballistic missile systems.

Prior to the meeting US President Bill Clinton had antagonized his European NATO allies with sharply worded criticisms during a US television interview on Oct. 18. His comments had been directed at the refusal of members of the European Communities (EC), especially France and the UK, to lift the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims or to



conduct air strikes against Serbian positions. On Oct. 19 a spokesman for the UK Prime Minister John Major said that there were bound to be disagreements in a "mature relationship".

#### Renewed call by former Warsaw Pact countries for NATO membership

Fresh appeals from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for early membership of NATO met with a cool response amid reports that NATO had bowed to Russian pressure to delay eastern and central European admissions. [For earlier requests from Warsaw Pact countries and the formal application of Albania see pp. 38541; 38554; 38841; 39250].

Speaking at a press conference marking the end of the defence ministers' meeting on Oct. 21, US Defence Secretary Les Aspin said that the question of new membership had been considered in the context of a US proposal for a series of limited defence arrangements between NATO and individual eastern European countries, to be known as "partnerships for peace". Underlining the merits of this plan, which was said to have been unanimously endorsed, Aspin said that it would lay the "military groundwork" for the eventual integration of new members into NATO. Ministers were careful, however, to avoid any suggestion that the proposed arrangements amounted to the kind of security guarantees demanded by some former Warsaw Pact countries [see p. 38541].

Responding to reports of Russian pressure, Aspin denied that delays in admitting former Warsaw Pact countries showed deference to Russian opinion. "It is not that we are afraid of Russian threats," he said. In late September Russian President Boris Yeltsin had written to leaders in France, Germany, the UK and the USA, warning that the opening of NATO membership to the former communist states of eastern and central Europe would be in violation of the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany [see p. 37717].

On Oct. 27 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said in London that Russia would continue to oppose NATO membership of the former Warsaw Pact allies. He called instead on eastern European countries to join Russia in transforming the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) into a fully fledged regional organization to ensure peace and stability in Europe.

On Oct. 11 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania expressed the wish to join NATO.

#### New NATO commander

Gen. George Joulwan was appointed on Oct. 4 as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe (SACEUR).

Joulwan, 53, who served in Europe in the late 1980s, had been chief of US forces in Latin America since November 1990, overseeing anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism operations. He succeeded Gen. John M. Shalikashvili (appointed in April 1992—see p. 38889), who had been nominated in August as Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff [see p. 39589].

■ Last article p. 39538; reference article p. R154-55.

## COMMONWEALTH

### Heads of government meeting

The 29th biennial Commonwealth heads of government meeting (CHOGM) was held in Limassol, Cyprus, on Oct. 21-25, attended by representatives of 47 of the Commonwealth's 50 member states [for 28th CHOGM in Zimbabwe see p. 38552].

Queen Elizabeth II opened the meeting in her capacity as head of the Commonwealth. Only 16 Commonwealth member countries (including the UK) still had the British monarch as their head of state; 29 were republics (including all the African member countries) and five (besides the UK) were national monarchies.

Preparations for the summit were marked by demonstrations by Greek Cypriot protesters, denouncing Queen Elizabeth for not pardoning Eoka guerrillas executed in 1955 for leading a revolt against British colonial authorities in Cyprus. The Queen, who received a key to the city of Nicosia on Oct. 19, was denied a similar honour in Limassol, the city council voting against the award apparently in deference to Eoka sympathizers. On Oct. 20 (Greek) Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides issued a statement condemning the protesters and distancing the government from their actions.

#### Communiqué

In their final communiqué issued on Oct. 25 Commonwealth leaders hailed recent developments in South Africa and endorsed the lifting of sanctions although they stressed that "the arms embargo would remain until a new post-apartheid government was established" [see also pp. 39622; 39670]. Plans were announced for a Commonwealth Observer Mission to monitor the general election in South Africa scheduled for April 1994, and agreement was reached on welcoming "a non-racial and democratic South Africa" back into the Commonwealth [see pp. 17987-90 for South Africa's announcement in March 1961 of withdrawal from the Commonwealth].

Leaders deplored the continuation of the civil war in Angola and expressed concern at the delays in implementing the October 1992 peace accord in Mozambique [see p. 39671]. They reiterated support for the territorial integrity of Belize and called for "the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces and settlers" from northern Cyprus invaded by Turkey in 1974.

The communiqué expressed disquiet at the continuing debt problems of many developing countries and "called for measures to cut the debt burden to sustainable levels and for the full implementation of the Trinidad Terms [see p. 37892]".

In a separate statement issued on Oct. 22, Commonwealth leaders announced that a Commonwealth ministerial mission would call on "key participants" involved in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to "urge them to negotiate positively and flexibly to reach final agreement" by the Dec. 15 deadline. Reports said that the mission had been expressly designed to include members of the francophone grouping, including Canada and Mauritius, so as to intensify friendly pressure on France to

drop its resistance to aspects of the Uruguay Round.

Reports indicated that Cameroon's application for Commonwealth membership would be accepted at the next biennial summit in 1995, provided that that country made sufficient progress towards democracy.

■ Last article p. 38552; reference article p. R149-50.

## NOBEL PRIZES

### 1993 awards

South African State President F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress (ANC), were jointly awarded the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize on Oct. 15. The Nobel Committee of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) said that the award was in recognition of "their work for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations of a new democratic South Africa". The Committee expressed the hope that their "constructive policy of peace and reconciliation" would act as an example for the resolution of "similar deep-rooted conflicts elsewhere".

The release of Mandela in February 1990 after 27 years in prison [see pp. 37232-34] had initiated a negotiations process between the de Klerk government and the ANC which had resulted in June 1993 in the scheduling of non-racial democratic elections for April 1994 [see pp. 39497; 39542].

Previous South African Nobel Prize laureates were Chief Albert Luthuli, then ANC president, in 1960 [see p. 18431], and Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 1984 [see p. 33253].

The other Nobel prizes for 1993 announced by the relevant Swedish academies between Oct. 7 and 14 were: (i) **Chemistry**—Kary Mullis, a US scientist, and British-born Canadian Michael Smith for inventing a technique for reprogramming the genetic code using synthetic DNA; (ii) **Economics**—Robert Fogel and Douglass North, US economists, for their work using statistical methods to re-examine economies of the past; (iii) **Literature**—the novelist Toni Morrison, the first black US writer to receive the honour, in the citation for which the Swedish Academy described her as a "literary artist of the first rank"; (iv) **Medicine or Physiology**—Richard Roberts, a UK scientist, and Phillip Sharp, a US scientist, for discovering independently in 1977 that a gene could be several units rather than one continuous segment, and for thereby advancing the treatment of cancer and genetic diseases; and (v) **Physics**—Russell Hulse and Joseph Taylor, US astronomers, for discovering proof of gravitational waves, thus proving one of the consequences of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity.

■ Last article p. 39171.

## GATT

### EC-US talks on farm subsidies

Talks in Brussels between the European Communities (EC) trade commissioner Sir Leon Brittan and the US Representative for Trade



Negotiations Mickey Kantor on Oct. 13-14 failed to break the impasse over farm subsidies holding up the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The talks, the first round of which took place in late September [see p. 39666], had sought to obtain a more liberal reading of the EC-US accord on agriculture signed in November 1992 [see pp. 39176-77].

Restating US opposition to any further concessions on the agreement, Kantor said that his side had also rejected a recent French proposal for a partial interim agreement, in time for the Dec. 15 GATT deadline, which would exclude agriculture, films and television. In September France had expressed reservations about the extension of free trade in film and television distribution [see p. 39666].

Subsequent crisis talks in Brussels between Kantor and the French Foreign Trade Minister Gérard Longuet on Oct. 15 also failed to resolve outstanding differences. Afterwards Kantor said that the problem of farm exports should be addressed by the EC "internally". His remarks were construed by observers as suggesting that the EC should make further changes in its common agricultural policy (CAP) to accommodate the provisions of the 1992 EC-US farm accord.

#### Failure of steel talks - Rise in trade disputes

A meeting in Geneva on Oct. 5-8 involving 36 steel producing countries failed to reach agreement on a multilateral steel pact. The outcome of the talks, formally separate from the Uruguay Round, was deemed to be crucial for the elimination of duties on imported steel to facilitate a broader tariff-cutting agreement due to be concluded by the Dec. 15 GATT deadline. Earlier in 1993 the USA had imposed duties on certain imported steel products which, it claimed, were being dumped or heavily subsidized [see p. 39580].

Requests for consultation under the GATT disputes panel rose to 26 in the 12 months to September, from 11 in the previous year, according to a report submitted to the GATT Council of Representatives by GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland on Oct. 27. However, the number of disputes panel recommendations adopted by the Council fell from eight to one in the preceding 12 months.

■ Last article p. 39666; reference article pp. R151-52.

## UNITED NATIONS

### Payment of US arrears

The USA announced on Oct. 6 that it had paid the UN outstanding dues totalling US\$533,000,000. Remaining US dues amounted to US\$472,000,000, comprising US\$284,000,000 for the regular budget and US\$188,000,000 in peacekeeping dues. US President Bill Clinton had given an undertak-

ing in his address to the UN General Assembly in September [see p. 39667] that a payment towards the settlement of the USA's UN account would be effected "within the next few weeks".

Earlier UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had warned the General Assembly of the perilous state of UN finances. The total outstanding from all member states (after the US Oct. 6 payment) comprised US\$536,000,000 in regular dues and US\$1,300 million for expanded UN peacekeeping operations.

A report by the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing which was submitted to Boutros-Ghali on Oct. 11, recommended significantly higher peacekeeping contributions and interest on late payments.

#### Non-permanent members of Security Council

On Oct. 29 the General Assembly elected Argentina, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Oman and Rwanda as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a two-year term commencing Jan. 1, 1994. The other five non-permanent members for 1994 (elected in October 1992—see p. 39171) were Brazil, Djibouti, New Zealand, Pakistan and Spain. Current members whose two-year term expired at the end of 1993 were Cape Verde, Hungary, Japan, Morocco and Venezuela.

■ Last article p. 39667; reference article p. R156.

## WAR CRIMES

### Rejection of Touvier appeal

The French Court of Appeal on Oct. 21 turned down a petition by the alleged war criminal Paul Touvier appealing against an order made in June by a court in Paris ordering him to stand trial on charges of crimes against humanity [see p. 39539]. Touvier, who was placed under judicial supervision in July [see p. 39581], was expected to stand trial in 1994.

Civil groups representing victims of the Jewish Holocaust and French Resistance called on Oct. 14 for Touvier to be tried in the French city of Lyon rather than in Versailles, Touvier's current place of residence. Spokesmen representing the groups said that they sought a trial in Lyon both for symbolic reasons (Lyon having been the venue of the first conviction of Klaus Barbie in 1987 on charges of crimes against humanity—see p. 35417) and due to practical considerations (relating to Lyon as the scene of Touvier's alleged crimes).

■ Last article p. 39667; reference article pp. R158-59.

## VATICAN

### Papal encyclical

A papal encyclical, *Veritatis splendor* ("The Splendour of Truth"), published on Oct. 5 after six years in preparation, called on Catholic bishops to assist Pope John Paul II in combating a "genuine crisis in church and

society" and "an overall and systematic calling into question of traditional moral doctrine". Although much of the dissent centred on the Church's teaching on sexuality—including its opposition to birth control, abortion, pre-marital sex, divorce and homosexuality—the encyclical only specifically mentioned such issues once, in describing contraception by artificial means and other infringements of Catholic teaching as "intrinsically evil".

■ Last article p. 39219; 1991 encyclical p. 38219; reference article p. R158.

## ENVIRONMENT

### Russian dumping of radioactive waste

A Russian naval vessel, monitored by the environmental activist group Greenpeace, on Oct. 17 dumped 900 tonnes of low-level coolant and cleaning water from Russian nuclear submarines into the sea 500 km west of Hokkaido, Hokkaido. It was the first such act by the Russian navy since November 1992 and provoked criticism from Japan, the USA and South Korea. The Japanese government issued a formal protest to the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, on Oct. 19, and demanded an immediate halt to the practice. After initially suggesting that further such releases of radioactive waste would take place, the Russian government on Oct. 21 announced that it had suspended plans for future dumping. However, it warned that dumping would have to be resumed within the next 18 months unless international assistance was forthcoming to expand the current Russian reprocessing facilities.

■ Last article p. 39443; 39539; reference article p. R151.

## IN BRIEF

**AVIATION:** Virgin Atlantic Airways announced in London on Oct. 21 that it had filed an anti-trust suit in New York amounting to US\$325,000,000 against British Airways (BA) for engaging in "a variety of unfair and illegal activities"; any award would automatically be trebled by a US court. In January BA had been ordered by the UK High Court to pay a total of some £1,000,000 in damages and costs in settlement of a libel case brought by Virgin Atlantic and its chairman Richard Branson after a lengthy confrontation over BA's "dirty tricks" campaign against Virgin Atlantic.

**IMO:** The accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on Oct. 13 brought the total membership of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 147.



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